FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

OCTOBER
1937

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
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The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.*

The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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FOREIGN POLITICAL MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

By Frank C. Hanighen

CHARGES are frequently heard that political organizations controlled and subsidized by foreign states, or by the dominant parties in those states, have gained a strong foothold in this country and have been engaged in stirring up class, racial and religious antipathies and prejudices in order to undermine the American democratic system and eventually overthrow the constituted government of the United States. The targets of these assertions are the Communist Party, the German Nazis and the Italian Fascists. Are the allegations true? Are the groups concerned likely to have an important influence in this country?

I

Judged by its membership figures, the Communist Party is small indeed. According to Earl Browder, its leader and General Secretary, there are now "about 50,000" enrolled members. But admittedly the turnover in the Party has always been large. The number of "comrades" who enter and leave the Party (voluntarily or by expulsion for such faults as "Trotskyism," "petty bourgeois Negro nationalism," etc.) runs very high in most estimates. Members are originally chosen, kept on the rolls, or expelled, depending on their individual zeal and obedience to the Party leadership and the Party "line." There is some truth, then, in the assertion of critics of the Communist Party that each active member is a strictly disciplined officer who in a future revolution may command many privates, and that hence the Party's official membership is not necessarily an index of its potential strength.

On the other hand, those on the periphery of the Party — in

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part former members, in part those variously called "sympathizers" or "fellow travellers" — constitute a variable political factor also. The editors of *Fortune* [1] have estimated that during the period 1930–34 (when, due to the depression, the Party's influence and following were undeniably on the increase) the number of "sympathizers" totalled from 300,000 to 500,000. This could not in any case be considered a numerically important portion of the 130,000,000 American people. Moreover, within the past year the Party has definitely suffered a setback. Its loss in strength is at least partially indicated by its presidential vote: in 1932, at the depth of the depression, the Party candidate, William Z. Foster, polled 102,991 votes; in 1936, Earl Browder polled only 80,181. There are several valid explanations for this decrease, running all the way from the return of prosperity to the disintegrating effect of the Moscow trials.

But the Communist Party's importance transcends numerical limits. It is a center of extra-party activities known as the tactic of "boring from within." Ostensibly unconnected with the Party but beyond doubt controlled by it, are the International Labor Defense, the International Workers' Order (a fraternal and benefit association), the Trade Union Unity League, the John Reed Clubs (for writers), etc. Communist leaders appear on the Board of the American League Against War and Fascism. Non-Communist members of the League deny that it is Communist-controlled; but Communists are reported to have brought a number of local branches under their sway. This often occurs in non-Communist organizations for the reason that the disciplined Party members attend meetings more regularly and earnestly than the others. Communists have penetrated the A. F. of L. and C. I. O. to only a negligible extent; the only Communist union worthy of the name is that among the fur workers in New York City. Communists have also led some of the Unemployed Councils, but there is no evidence that they have influenced the political opinions of the unemployed members beyond strengthening their demands for more relief.

Does Moscow subsidize these activities? Party funds have always remained a mystery. Many Communists admit privately that over a decade ago the Party received aid from Moscow to the extent of hundreds of thousands of dollars; however, almost all of them emphatically insist that at present it receives no such

[1] September 1934, p. 154.

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money whatsoever. Anti-Communists point to the existence of the *Daily Worker*, the *New Masses* and many lesser Communist organs as evidence that outside money must be available; for certainly these publications do not appear to be self-supporting.[2] But the *Daily Worker* (circulation probably about 25,000 though the Party claims over twice that amount) pays very low salaries and possibly receives voluntary contributions from American sources. As for the *New Masses*, which caters to an intellectual audience, estimated at from 8,000 to 12,000 purchasers and subscribers, it runs on a very restricted budget, rarely pays for articles, and in the past year tried to raise money by floating a note-issue. The opinion of this writer is that the Party gets little or nothing from Moscow and that funds which support the Party, its subsidiary organizations and its publications come from membership fees, subscriptions, collections from drives and mass meetings, and from wealthy sympathizers.

But if Moscow does not supply the funds, it at least controls the Party "line" and leadership. In 1929 Jay Lovestone was elected Secretary over William Z. Foster by a vote of 106 to 1. A cablegram seems thereupon to have been sent from Moscow to the New York convention charging that Lovestone entertained heretical beliefs and demanding the election of Foster. The Party at once proceeded to unseat and expel Lovestone and to elect Foster. Browder, the present Secretary, is regarded as Stalin's choice.

The connection between the Communist Party of the United States and Moscow appears officially in the fact that the former is a "section" of the Third International.[3] Though the Third International is supposed to be controlled by a majority vote of the members from sections all over the world, the Communist Party of Russia admittedly predominates. Thus the Soviet Government, which is not distinguishable from the sole Party in the Party-state, actually, if not technically, controls the "section" of the International in the United States, *i.e.* the Communist Party. Perhaps because of this, the Soviet Government's diplo-

[2] A press memorandum of the Communist Party dated August 20, 1937, announced plans for two new daily papers, one to be published in San Francisco, the other in Chicago, also a drive for a Party "educational fund" of half a million dollars, apparently to finance the publication of these papers, plus a special fund of $250,000 for use in New York State.

[3] See Report of the so-called "Dickstein Committee": 74th Congress, 1st Session, H. R. No. 153, "Investigation of Nazi and other propaganda," p. 14 ff. Henceforth this document will be referred to merely as the "Report."

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matic and consular representatives in this country have taken pains to avoid any public contact with members of the American Communist Party. When Ambassador Troyanovsky gave his opening party in the old Tsarist Embassy in Washington he invited none of America's leading Communists. Unlike German, Italian and Spanish diplomats, the Soviet Ambassador and consuls have conspicuously avoided speaking at mass meetings in such places as Madison Square Garden.

In contradistinction to its previous policy, the American Communist Party does not now call for the overthrow of the United States Government. Testifying before the "Dickstein Committee," Earl Browder, Executive Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the United States, admitted that the Central Committee, meeting in New York in January 1934, approved and adopted the resolutions (passed a month before) of the Thirteenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.[4] These resolutions stated:

> There is no way out of the general crisis of capitalism other than the one shown by the October Revolution, via the overthrow of the exploiting classes by the proletariat, the confiscation of the banks, of the factories, the mines, transport, houses, the stocks of goods of the capitalists, the lands of the landlords, the church and the crown.[5]

But in the summer of 1935 the Congress of the Third International in Moscow adopted the "new line" of united front collaboration with other radical and "bourgeois" parties against Fascism.[6] Soviet leaders clearly had become impressed by the advent of Hitler in Germany and the successes of ruthless Japanese, Italian and German foreign policy. They seem to have realized that the former policy of aiding in the overthrow of democratic governments threatened to make the world safe, not for Communism but for Fascism. The sense of the resolutions of this 1935 meeting of the International, reflecting this shift in Soviet tactics, was clearly to employ the united front as (in Dimitroff's phrase) a "transitional form" of revolution — that is to say, to postpone the revolution pending the defeat of Fascism.[7]

[4] Report, p. 14–18.

[5] "Theses, Reports, Speeches of the Thirteenth Plenum." New York: Workers Library, 1934, p. 19. The "Dickstein Committee" Report interprets this resolution as advocating "the overthrow or the preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing about by force of a change in the social or political order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions" (p. 20).

[6] *New York Times*, July 26, 1935.

[7] *New York Times*, August 7, 1935.

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Earl Browder and William Z. Foster attended the 1935 Congress of the Third International, and the Communist Party of the United States has since then followed the new "line." Thus Earl Browder ran for President on a rather ambiguous platform which by indirection encouraged many members to vote for Roosevelt (much as Communists in Britain have voted Labor in opposition to the Tories), on the theory that a party run by J. D. M. Hamilton and supported by "reactionary" elements which had succeeded in identifying its interests with theirs actually represented Fascist tendencies. This course undoubtedly contributed to the drop in the Party's presidential vote between 1932 and 1936. As one dissident Communist wittily remarked, "Browder, from hair-splitter to President."

At present, due partly to this unpositive policy and perhaps more to the disillusioning effects on radical opinion of the Moscow trials and the attacks of the Trotskyite opposition against Stalin's "abandonment of Communism," the Party's membership has become restive and many sympathizers have been alienated. Party militancy has certainly diminished. It has no "workers' militias" or armed organizations (these are taboo as "Trotskyite measures"), and one may concur with the Congressional Committee when it says in its Report [8] that it "does not believe that the Communist movement in this country is sufficiently strong numerically nor in influence to constitute a danger to American institutions at the present time."

II

The Nazis arrived in this country much later than the Communists, although their advent antedated the Third Reich. In 1924, Kurt Georg Wilhelm Lüdecke, who claimed to be a member of the German National Socialist Party, came to the United States and utilized his position as a travelling salesman to cover his activities in spreading Nazi propaganda. He enlisted members in, and obtained financial support for, the National Socialist Party in Germany. In the ensuing years the Nazi movement in the United States was split among a number of groups; but after Hitler's advent to power they came together in an organization called the "Friends of New Germany." Heinz Spanknöbel, a German citizen and member of the Nazi Party, who had entered the United States under the guise of a clergyman, became leader

[8] p. 20.

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of the Friends. He also gained temporary control of the United German Societies of New York. However, in the fall of 1933 he was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in New York City for failing to register as an agent of a foreign nation, and has since then been a fugitive from justice. His successors in the leadership of the Friends were, in chronological order, Fritz Gissibl, Reinhold Walter and Hubert Schnuch.

In 1934 rumors of the Nazi activities of the Friends and other German organizations resulted in the creation of the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, headed by Representative McCormack of Massachusetts, but often called the "Dickstein Committee" because one of its members, Representative Samuel Dickstein of New York, introduced the resolution for the investigation. The hearings of the Committee produced many contradictory and unsupported allegations. But they also revealed much specific evidence regarding the Nazi movement in this country. The high points in its findings are contained in the following paragraphs from its Report:

> One of his [Heinz Spanknöbel's] first activities was to take over, by intimidation and without compensation, a small newspaper in New York published by the German Legion, which paper he largely financed by subsidies under the guise of advertisements granted him by the German steamship lines as well as the German railways. . . .
>
> This committee found indisputable evidence to show that certain German consuls in this country, with all the appurtenances of diplomatic immunity, violated the pledge and proprieties of diplomatic status and engaged in vicious and un-American propaganda activities, paying for it in cash, in the hope that it could not be traced.
>
> Several American firms and American citizens as individuals sold their services for express propaganda purposes, making their contracts with and accepting compensation from foreign business firms. The firms in question were Carl Byoir & Associates and Ivy Lee-T. J. Ross. The owner of the Ivy Lee-T. J. Ross firm admitted to the committee that the reports he furnished to the I. G. Farben Industrie, his ostensible employer, dealt with public and political questions rather than trade promotion, and that they were intended to be relayed to the German Government. For this service he received $25,000, all payments of which were in cash, and an effort was made to secrete the connections. Mr. Lee also admitted that he had never made such a contract before. Carl Dickey, junior partner of Carl Byoir & Associates, testified that his firm handled the contract with the German Tourist Bureau with the fee for services set at $6,000 per month. He testified that the contract was secured with the help of George Sylvester Viereck who received $1,750 per month with free office space and secretary as his share of the $6,000. The committee finds that the services rendered by Carl Byoir & Associates were largely of a propaganda

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nature. . . . Viereck admitted that he discussed the Byoir contract with a German Cabinet officer before it was entered into.

The National Socialist German Labor Party, through its various agencies, furnished tons of propaganda literature, which in most cases was smuggled into this country. Some of it, however, came through our Customs, because there is no law against it.[9]

The Friends of New Germany were not openly associated with all of these transactions; but in general they seem to have been the most active center of Nazi activities in the United States. The Congressional Committee found "that it was for all practical purposes, if not in fact, the American section of the Nazi movement of Germany, designed to influence, if necessary and possible, our governmental policies."[10] It held mass meetings at which anti-Semitic speeches were made, the Nazi salute given, the swastika flag displayed, homage to Hitler proclaimed and Nazi propaganda distributed. Orders from Germany were received by the Friends and were obeyed. The conditions of membership in the Friends were the same as for the National Socialist Party in Germany. By means of "boring from within" they had obtained control of the important United German Societies of New York. And, to quote the Congressional report, "the evidence conclusively shows that this movement in the United States is inconsistent with our principles of government."

At their highest point the Friends of New Germany had perhaps not more than 15,000 members. The publicity attendant on the hearings of the Congressional Committee, along with internal quarrels and splits, led to a sharp decline.[11] In view of mounting American resentment, the authorities in Germany had gradually come to adopt an attitude of reserve towards the Friends; they apparently preferred to remain on good terms with conservative German organizations like the United German Societies, which had repudiated the Friends' control. Finally, on April 1, 1936, the Foreign Division of the German National Socialist Party gave orders for the dissolution of the Friends.[12]

On the same day, however, an organization called the "Ger-

[9] Report, p. 4–6.

[10] Report, p. 7.

[11] Other factors as well were involved in this decline. Anton Haegele led a revolt in New York in 1934 and founded the American National Socialist League, taking with him some members of the Friends. German-Americans gradually received the impression that forming Nazi parties had become a sort of racket. The anti-Nazi boycott, and the counter boycott called the DAWA (Deutsch Amerikanische Wirtschafts Ausschuss), also produced disturbance and dissatisfaction.

[12] *New York Times*, April 1, 1936.

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man-American Bund" (*Amerikadeutscher Volksbund*) appeared and took the place vacated by the Friends as the principal Nazi organization in this country. The Bund claims that it admits only American citizens as members. Representative Dickstein charges that this is not so.[13] The *Bundesführer* is Fritz Kuhn, a native of Bavaria who came to the United States after service with the German Army during the war and was employed as a chemist by the Ford Motor Company. He was naturalized in 1933.[14]

While the Bund announces its adherence to the American system of government and displays the American flag, there can be no doubt that it is a lineal successor to the Friends. It has all the customary Nazi trimmings. Thus at one of its first meetings in the Schwabenhalle in Brooklyn on April 1, 1936, the hall was decorated with both swastikas and an American flag, and was patrolled by uniformed men of the *Ordnungsdienst* ("Service of Order"), a body not unlike the Storm Troopers. After speeches were made, the meeting closed with a verse of the Horst Wessel song.[15] At a meeting in the Hippodrome in New York on February 12, 1937, the *Ordnungsdienst* marched into the hall and upon the command "Present Arms!" stood at attention while the American national anthem was played and the crowd gave the Nazi salute.[16] The Bund also operates some twenty summer camps in various places — particularly in the Middle West, in New Jersey and on Long Island. For some reason, the Bund seems to find that New Jersey offers a peculiarly congenial climate for its activities. These camps have in recent months attracted considerable newspaper attention and public criticism. In fact, Attorney-General Cummings was led to announce on August 18, 1937, that he had instructed the Federal Bureau of Investigation to determine whether or not the Bund's camps are violating Federal laws by shipping unregistered fire arms across state lines. *Bundesführer* Kuhn stated that the Bund welcomed such an investigation. He said: "We are strictly an American organization, with no connections with Germany. . . . We are the only movement which fights Communism successfully, and for that reason alone we are being attacked by Mr. Dickstein and his henchmen. . . . The aim of the German-American Bund is to unite all Germans and Americans in our country to a united

[13] *New York Times*, August 5, 1937.
[14] *New York World-Telegram*, March 31, 1937.
[15] *New York Times*, April 2, 1936.
[16] *New York Times*, February 13, 1937.

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front against Communism. We do show the Nazi emblem alongside of the American flag, with the biggest respect for Hitler and his movement in Germany, fighting the world's madness, Communism."[17]

Mr. Kuhn asserts that his Bund has a membership of 200,000. Anti-Nazis call this a gross exaggeration. The best estimate is that at the present time there are about 20,000 members. Nor is it probable that the party organ of the Bund, the *Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter*, has the circulation claimed for it — 250,000.[18] A generous estimate would probably be 25,000. The *Weckruf* at one time carried a number of advertisements from German firms, the only indication of subsidies from Germany.

The circulation of the *Weckruf*, however, does not give the measure of Nazi influence through the press. The majority of the German-language newspapers in this country approve of the National Socialist régime for Germany, though many point out that it would not be suitable for the United States. There are, however, at least ten newspapers which do not draw this distinction even though they stop short of openly advocating National Socialism here. These ten papers are enthusiastic supporters of Nazism in general, very anti-Semitic, vociferously anti-Communist, and give much space to speeches by Hitler and to Nazi propaganda releases. That German language papers in the United States are not free from intimidation by Nazi agents may be seen from the testimony of Victor Ridder, the well-known publisher of the New York *Staats-Zeitung* and other papers, who said that Heinz Spanknöbel, leader of the Friends of New Germany, paid a visit to his office in 1933 and notified him that "the pro-Jewish articles which we had been running would not be permitted any longer."[19]

In general, it may fairly be said that the Nazi organizations in this country give the impression of forming a definitely alien influence which owes allegiance to a foreign Power and supports a system of government at variance with American democracy.

While it is true that they do not directly attack the American

[17] *New York Times*, August 19, 1937.

[18] This paper describes itself as "The Central Organ of National Germandom [völkisches Deutschtum] in America," and as in favor of "a united Germandom [Deutschtum] in America and in our own homeland."

[19] 73rd Congress, Second Session. Investigation of Nazi Propaganda Activities and Investigation of Certain Other Propaganda Activities. Hearings No. 73–Ny–7, p. 112.

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system of government, the constant praise of Hitler's totalitarian system of government is at least an indirect attack on the contrary American system. Like the Communists, they take orders from abroad. Their International may be said to be the "Organization for Germans Abroad" (*Auslandsorganisation*), the head of which, Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, has said: "We look on Germans abroad not as Germans by accident but as Germans through the will of God. Like our comrades in the Reich, they are chosen and obliged to coöperate in the work that Adolf Hitler began with his movement."[20] According to a dispatch from Berlin in the *New York Times*, August 22, 1937, Herr Bohle (who meanwhile has been appointed head of a section in the German Foreign Office) announced that he had issued instructions to German diplomatic representatives abroad not to accept invitations to official affairs unless the chief of the local section of the National Socialist Party is also invited — saying that "through the absorption of the National Socialist Party's foreign section into the Foreign Office the unity of party and state is made clear abroad" and declaring that foreign governments would have no choice but to accept party officials on the same basis as German diplomatic representatives. Later dispatches[21] said that the determination to demand diplomatic status for Nazi Party officials abroad had been modified; instead, "Cultural Attachés" would be sent to German embassies, legations and consulates.

According to another hardly less remarkable report from Germany, "National Socialist leaders seem to have hopes of making pan-Germanism a political weapon to be employed in internal American politics."[22] The dispatch in question quotes as follows from an editorial in the *Kurier* of Stuttgart — the city which is the headquarters of the Institute for Germanism Abroad:

> We desire to bring back Germans in the United States to the racial unity and common fate of all Germans. To this end the intellectual and spiritual reform of Americans of German extraction is necessary in accord with the model furnished by the old homeland.
>
> When we have attained this goal we will then organize German-Americans for spiritual regeneration, economic support and political schooling.
>
> German-American influence thus economically strengthened and politically reactivated shall then be thrown in the balance under our leadership for the coming struggle with communism and Jews and for the Americans' regeneration.

[20] *Westdeutscher Beobachter*, September 12, 1936.
[21] *New York Times*, August 27, 1937.
[22] *New York Times*, August 17, 1937.

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Unlike the Communists, the Nazis in the United States engage frequently in semi-military activities. However, even if armed, such a force would prove of small importance, for the most generous estimates give the American Nazis 4,700 Storm Troopers.[23] Clearly the Nazis constitute no direct threat to the stability of the American Government.

Nevertheless, the movement may exert considerable influence on American habits of thought through certain features of its propaganda. Two of the principal objects of Nazi invective are the Communists and the Jews. The Communists, as we have seen, are numerically weak. But the Jews are numerically strong, especially in the urban centers where the Nazis usually operate. The chief result of the campaign, then, is to stimulate anti-Semitism. Nor must it escape notice that Nazi agitation has strengthened German nationalistic feeling among German-born American citizens and possibly among those of German extraction — a fact which might have political consequences in the event that Germany become engaged in a war of major importance.

III

The Italian Fascists entered the American field energetically at about the same time that Karl Lüdecke was sowing his first seeds of Nazism. In the early years following the March on Rome there were some sporadic activities here by a few Italian Fascists, but it was not until the Fascist League of America was organized in 1925 that the movement really got under way.

At the head of the Fascist League of America Mussolini set his friend, Count Ignazio Thaon di Revel, nephew of Admiral Paul di Revel, formerly a member of the Fascist Cabinet. The secretaries of this organization were under the direct orders of the "Bureau of Fascism Abroad" (*Direzione Generale degli Italiani all'Estero*) the headquarters of which is in Rome.[24] Mussolini's command — "My order is that an Italian citizen must remain an Italian citizen, no matter in what land he lives, even to the seventh generation" — was one of the Bureau's fundamental tenets. Article I of the Bureau's Statute described its affiliated organizations as "unions of Italians residing abroad who have adopted for their

[23] *Cf.* "The Fascist Threat to America," by Guy Emery Shipler, Jr., in *The Churchman*, February 1, 1937, p. 16.

[24] *Cf.* "Mussolini's American Empire," by Marcus Duffield, *Harpers Magazine*, November 1929, p. 662.

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private and civic life obedience to Il Duce and to the laws of Fascism and who intend to collect around the Lictoral Emblem colonies of Italians who are living in strange countries."

The Fascists soon obtained a strong foothold in the "Sons of Italy," an old Italian-American organization whose membership at one time numbered 300,000. Mass meetings were held at which Blackshirts paraded in military fashion, the Fascist salute was given, homage was rendered to Mussolini and pilgrimages were organized to Rome. Members were apparently threatened with expulsion if they took out American naturalization papers. And it was impressed upon Italian-Americans with business connections in the mother country that such expulsion might lead to grave difficulties for them. The ostensible objects of all this activity were: (1) to keep Italians, and Americans of Italian birth or extraction, loyal to Italy, and thus ready to answer the call to military service in case of war; and (2) to influence American opinion in favor of granting loans to Italy.[25]

By 1927–28, however, the Fascist League had acquired more fame than it had bargained for. Articles in magazines and newspapers exposed its character and aims. Senator Borah attacked it. Prominent liberals like Professor Taussig of Harvard, Rabbi Wise and Oswald Garrison Villard sponsored an anti-Fascist "Friends of Italian Freedom." A Congressional investigation was proposed. This reaction apparently frightened the representatives of Fascism in this country and the League was voluntarily dissolved on December 22, 1929. At the time of its dissolution, it claimed a membership of 12,000.[26]

There seems little doubt that the League has carried on its work in other guise, though exact data are difficult to obtain. This is partly because the anti-Fascist Italians in the United States are badly organized and financed; Italian business men, desirous of remaining on good terms with the home country, are afraid to support anti-Fascist organizations and are chary of giving information about Fascist activities in the way that Jewish business men have sought to publicize Nazi activities. Nor can we turn for data to the Dickstein Committee. For various reasons the Committee did not extend its investigation to the Italian Fascists. Jewish organizations, the mainspring of the anti-Nazi agitation, had been inclined to tolerate Italian Fascism because its program

[25] *Ibid.*, 661 ff.
[26] *New York Times*, December 23, 1929.

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did not at the start include anti-Semitism.[27] Furthermore, this writer has grounds for believing, the Committee did not attempt to investigate Italian Fascist activities because of solicitude for the Italian vote, which in some centers exerts considerable power over certain Representatives in Congress. Out of a mass of allegations and charges, however, the main fact emerges that Fascist activity undoubtedly continued in the United States after the dissolution of the Fascist League in 1929.

On January 24, 1935, Girolamo Valenti, editor of the anti-Fascist New York daily, *La Stampa Libera*, presented documents to the State and Labor Departments at Washington purporting to show that paid agents of Mussolini were at work in this country spreading subversive propaganda among Americans of Italian extraction. Valenti claimed, for example, that an agent of the Fascist Government, Ettore Frasina, had been trying to stir up trouble among Italian unions in the dress-goods industry in New York.[28] The 1934 budget of the Italian Government listed an appropriation of 154,000,000 lire for Fascist propaganda abroad. Valenti suggested to the Labor Department that it might ascertain what proportion of this money was being spent in the United States. At the State Department he left documents accusing the Italian vice-consuls in Pittsburgh and Detroit of intimidating non-Fascist Italian immigrants and naturalized Americans. Among these documents were affidavits, one of them signed by a Catholic priest, charging attempts at terrorization by these two Italian officials. Valenti also submitted documents and photographs which he said proved that Piero Parini, head of the Bureau of Fascism Abroad, had laid the groundwork for a propaganda organization during a visit to this country ostensibly for "cultural purposes." One of Parini's accomplishments, according to Valenti, was a pilgrimage by American children in 1934 to Rome, where they were steeped in Fascism and sent back to America in black shirt uniforms to further the Fascist propaganda campaign. No action, so far as can be learned, was taken on these charges, although it may be significant that one of the vice-consuls was moved from his post.[29]

[27] Possibly this attitude may have changed as a result of signs that Mussolini is preparing to adopt a more definitely anti-Jewish policy. The anti-Semitic pronouncements of General Franco may also tend to convince Jews that they cannot pick and choose friends and enemies in the Fascist bloc.

[28] Luigi Antonini, prominent anti-Fascist leader of these unions, later told the writer that this was true and that the object was to oust him because he was an anti-Fascist.

[29] *New York Post*, January 24, 1935.

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The ramifications of Fascist activities in this country have become more diverse and complicated than in the days of the Fascist League. The Italian Historical Society (the chairman of which is Giuseppe Previtali, formerly associated with the defunct Fascist League) [30] exists for "educational activities;" these included the dissemination of pro-Italian propaganda during the Italo-Abyssinian war.[31] The aim of the Lictor Association is to keep Italians loyal to Italy; it recently held its eighth annual convention just eight years after the dissolution of the Fascist League. More important seem to be the numerous Circoli, or clubs, usually bearing the name of some famous Italian (*e. g.* the "Circolo Mazzini") which engage in military drills and spread Fascist propaganda. It is impossible to ascertain whether Italy sends funds to these organizations, although an Italian Fascist told the writer that this was the case. The truth is probably that they depend largely on contributions from Italian-Americans.

The principal Italian Fascist organ is *Il Grido della Stirpe* ("The Cry of the Race"), edited by Domenico Trombetta with the subtitle "Organ of Fascist Propaganda." It is reputed to have a circulation of 10,000. Fascist influences, however, find a wider scope through the daily and weekly Italo-American press. It cannot be said that these papers attack American democratic institutions directly; nevertheless, the anti-democratic Fascist system and the Fascist Government of Italy are always described in a laudatory manner.[32]

The radio is often alleged to have been made a medium of Fascist propaganda. New York stations WBNX, WOV, WHOM and WFAB have Italian broadcasts, some of which are marked by the playing of the Fascist hymn "Giovinezza" and the army song "Faccetta Nera" and by talks praising Mussolini's policies. Programs like these are usually sponsored by firms doing business in Italy. It is natural to assume that such firms will allow nothing in the way of an attack on Fascism to be broadcast on their programs. Italian films of a definitely propaganda nature are frequently shown at Italian moving-picture theaters.

The Fascist boycott — which anti-Fascists allege is one of the strongest weapons used by the Fascists to intimidate firms, news-

[30] Duffield, *op. cit.*

[31] *New York Times*, August 30, 1935.

[32] Notable exceptions are the anti-Fascist daily *La Stampa Libera* and Carlo Tresca's anarchist weekly *Il Martello.*

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papers and individuals — was not long ago invoked against three New York newspapers, the *Daily News*, the *Post* and the *World-Telegram*. In April 1937 an organization called the Young Italian-American Federation of Greater New York City asked Italian groups to boycott these papers on account of their "anti-Italianism," "anti-Americanism" and "Communism." The letterhead of the organization carried as members of its Advisory Board the names of 17 local Democratic politicians, Italian-Americans, some of them Assemblymen and Aldermen. These gentlemen later repudiated the listing of their names in this connection.[33]

The Fascists seem to have pushed their way here and there into the American educational system. In 1934 and 1935 *The Nation* devoted much space to a controversy concerning the Fascist nature of the *Casa Italiana* at Columbia University.[34] The *Casa* is the largest of all Italian organizations in American universities. It possesses ample quarters, where it acts as host to visiting Italians and holds lectures and meetings. Among *The Nation's* charges made against the *Casa* were the following:

> That the *Casa Italiana* has refused to permit in its publications any opinion at variance with fascist doctrine.
>
> That Professor Prezzolini, director of the *Casa* and former liberal journalist, in 1933 announced outspoken support of Mussolini and fascism.
>
> That an intimate association and regular correspondence exist between the Italian Embassy at Washington, the Italian Consul-General's office in New York, the office of the *Fasci all 'Estero* of Rome, and the *Casa Italiana*.
>
> That student gatherings for the purpose of discussing fascist rule are forbidden at the *Casa*.
>
> That the real purpose of the *Casa* educational bureau is to carry on fascist propaganda among the Italian American population of New York.
>
> That the Consul-General's office last year gave $3,000 to the *Casa*, and that the Italian government originally donated most of the furnishings.

To *The Nation's* charges President Butler of Columbia entered a blanket denial: "The *Casa Italiana*, which is the generous gift of men and women of Italian origin living in New York, is wholly without political purpose or significance."

Regardless of the accuracy or inaccuracy of the specific charges to which this controversy gave rise, the fact remains that, according to *The Nation*, the director of the *Casa*, Professor Giuseppe

[33] *New York World-Telegram*, April 23, 1937.
[34] *The Nation*, November 7, 14, 21, 1934; January 30, April 3, November 27, 1935.

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Prezzolini, is still an Italian subject, and therefore presumably comes within the provisions of an official circular issued by the Ministry of Education, as follows:

> When, moreover, professors intend to go abroad to lecture or to take part in events or conventions of a cultural character, the Ministry must be informed, if possible, at least two months before the date fixed for departure, so that measures may be taken, in concert with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for the guidance of our authorized diplomatic representatives concerning the proper propaganda to be carried on in the interest of our culture.[35]

The *Popolo d'Italia* on January 17, 1935, stated: "The Duce has received Giuseppe Prezzolini who reported to him on the activities of the *Casa Italiana* of Columbia University."

In educational circles one frequently hears that Italian teachers in the public schools and universities, particularly in New York City, are largely influenced by the Italian authorities and that many of them are active propagandists for Fascism. A writer in *La Stampa Libera* of February 21, 1937, described a development in California. He stated that "under the supervision of two educational agents sent here by the Fascist Government and with the coöperation of the Italian Fascist consulate, over thirty so-called Italian schools have been recently established, five or six of them in San Francisco and almost thirty in other parts of the state [California]." This same writer asserted that the Bureau of Italians Abroad has supervisory jurisdiction over the agents who have established these schools, that the textbooks used in the schools are edited by that Bureau, and that these books contain an "appalling" proportion of matter devoted to Fascist propaganda. Anyone examining these books can hardly fail to concur with this last assertion.

To sum up, the Italian Fascist organization would not seem at the present time to represent any immediate threat to the stability of the American system of government. However, it is the impression of this writer, based on a wide and prolonged investigation, that the Italian Fascists exercise a much stronger influence over their racial groups in the United States than do the German Nazis. The solidarity of the Italian groups in large American cities and their resistance to the melting-pot process undoubtedly provide a favorable field for Fascist propaganda.

[35] *The Nation*, January 30, 1935, p. 118.

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IV

If the close coöperation between Germany and Italy now evident in Europe — the "Rome-Berlin axis" — should be extended to the United States, the Nazi and Fascist groups here might have to be taken more seriously. On February 12, 1937, a meeting held at the New York Hippodrome under the auspices of the German-American Bund attracted an audience of 4,000. Speeches denouncing Communism, the Loyalist Government of Spain and the anti-Nazi boycott were delivered in German, Russian, Italian and English. The flags of Nazi Germany, Italy, the former Spanish Monarchy and Imperial Russia were displayed together with the Stars and Stripes. Among the speakers were Fritz Kuhn, Luigi Ciancaglini and Nicolai Melnikoff. The latter claimed to represent the Russian National Union in the United States. (White Russians, it might be mentioned, have in this country an organization of which A. A. Vonsiatsky is a leader. Although diminutive, it is armed and engages in military manœuvres.[36]) Another of the speakers was Russell J. Dunn.[37]

The presence of Mr. Dunn, a native-born American associated with anti-Semitic activities, indicates that these Fascist organizations are sympathetic with bodies of similar aims in the United States. During his investigation of Fascist tendencies two years ago, the Reverend L. M. Birkhead, Unitarian minister in Kansas City, had occasion to interview an official at Julius Streicher's anti-Semitic headquarters in Nuremberg. This official told him that he was in constant touch with William Pelley, head of the Silver Shirts, the only important Fascist organization in the United States.[38] Observers have long noted that the literature of American anti-Semitic organizations is often obviously copied from similar German publications.

It is significant that at a meeting on July 18, 1937, at Nordland, the German-American Bund's camp near Andover, New Jersey, about 500 uniformed members of that organization marched with a delegation of Italian War Veterans, who were clad in black shirts and who gave the Fascist salute. Their leader, Dr. Salvatore Caridi, opened his speech by addressing the assembly as "My Nazi Friends." In the speech he referred to critics of the Nazis and Fascists by saying "if they insult Mussolini or Hitler

[36] *New York World-Telegram*, May 19, 1937.
[37] *New York Times*, February 13, 1937.
[38] *Cf. The Churchman*, February 1, 1937, *op. cit.*

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we can punch them in the nose." [39] *The News of the World* (published by the Hollywood Anti-Nazi League) in its number of June 12, 1937, reported the establishment of "The National Protective Order of Gentiles." At the first meeting of this organization held in June at the *Deutsches Haus* in Los Angeles, it was announced that in addition to native American groups, German, White Russian, Italian and South American groups would be represented. The *News* described this as a consolidation of anti-Semitic and Fascist groups on the Pacific Coast.

The most serious manifestation of collaboration between alien and American Fascists appeared recently during the Michigan labor disturbances. On June 29, 1937 the *New York Times* printed a dispatch from its correspondent, F. Raymond Daniell, in which he reported that among the Ford employees the Germans possessed the largest separate group after the veterans' organizations, and that they had been holding joint meetings with the Veterans of Foreign Wars as well as distributing literature for the Silver Shirts.[40] He adds:

> It is a strange liaison, this reputed combination of patriots and followers of an alien philosophy with whom are allied a horde of heterogeneous organizations.
>
> There are the Young Nationalists of Toledo, who hold mass meetings wherever they can and broadcast periodically over a radio station which covers two or three states. There is Gerald Smith, organizer of the Committee of 1,000,000, founded to combat communism, who has been invited to address vigilante sympathizers in several of the industrial centers of Michigan this summer.

It might be pointed out that the Reverend Mr. Smith, a Protestant minister, is reputed to have had connections with Pelley and is often described as Huey Long's successor in the leadership of indigenous American Fascism.[41]

These reports, even when treated with due circumspection, reveal that the activities of foreign political organizations might become a matter of real concern in this country. Mussolini and Hitler came to power in circumstances of industrial unrest or unemployment. What the branches of their political organiza-

[39] *New York Times*, July 19, 1937.

[40] See the July 26, 1937, issue of *Life* for photographs of some of these neo-Fascist activities.

[41] At a meeting in the Pennsylvania Hotel (New York) in April 1937, attended by the writer of this article, the Reverend Mr. Smith made a speech in which he attacked the Communist Party and made flattering references to the Catholic Church. It was evident that Mr. Smith was attempting to appeal for Catholic support in his campaign against Communism. When he alluded to certain prominent Jews, notably Mr. Bernard Baruch, individuals in the audience responded with cries of "Down with the Jews."

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tions might do to assist an indigenous American movement to overthrow the democratic system of government cannot be dismissed as negligible. Although too small to lend great numerical aid to American Fascists, they can nevertheless contribute much in experience, technique and leadership. They have done as much — and more — in other countries. Thus it is not disputed that the Nazi Party of Germany has actively supported foreign Fascist bodies both in Europe and in Latin America. Berlin participated openly in the organization of the Nazi *putsch* of 1934 in Austria, resulting in the murder of Chancellor Dollfuss. There have been repeated instances of Nazi and Fascist help for such organizations as the Rumanian "Iron Guards," the Sudeten German movement in Czechoslovakia, the local Nazi organizations of Hungary, Switzerland, the Scandinavian and Baltic countries, etc.[42] "Nazi penetration" has stirred repeated protests in various parts of Latin America, most recently in Chile and Costa Rica.[43] In Mexico City, *La Prensa* charged on August 23, 1937, that the German Legation there had financed and directed the anti-Semitic campaign of the outlawed revolutionary association known as the "Golden Shirts."[44] In the case of Spain, there exists ample documentary evidence to prove that German Nazis assisted Fascist and other organizations hostile to the Government to prepare for the revolt now being led by General Franco.

But American conditions obviously are quite dissimilar to those in most foreign countries. An instinctive American repugnance to Fascist ideology has been embedded in the American character by over a hundred and fifty years of history. Nor will sober persons incline to dispute the Congressional Committee's finding that the Communist movement is not today a menace to American institutions as such.

We open a field of more plausible speculation when we discuss the possible influence of Communist, Nazi and Fascist organizations on American neutrality. A war involving Russia, Germany and Italy, one or all, would tend, as we saw during the World War, to arouse feelings and produce agitation among the corresponding racial groups and sympathizers in this country. Communists and Communist sympathizers, whether Russian or not, would undoubtedly rally to the Soviet side; the German and

[42] See F. E. Jones, "Hitler's Drive to the East" (New York: Dutton, 1937); also J. Joesten, "The Nazis in Scandinavia," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1937.

[43] *New York Times*, August 12 and 26, 1937.

[44] *New York Herald Tribune*, August 24, 1937.

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Italian Fascist organizations would support the "mother countries." We had a foretaste of what would happen during the course of the Italo-Abyssinian war. There were disturbances between Negroes and Italians in New York City,[45] and, more important, the Department of State was in receipt of many thousands of identically worded protests against the enforcement of neutrality measures considered detrimental to the Italian Government. Many of America's most prominent Italian-Americans sponsored a committee which lobbied in Congress against any measures which, by ensuring that the United States would refrain from attempts to break through a system of League sanctions, might operate to the disadvantage of Italy.

For many years it has been assumed that because the groups of foreign-born American citizens and those of recent foreign extraction were diminishing in numbers, as a result of the enforcement of drastic United States immigration quotas, they would not again present so serious a problem as was the case just before our entrance into the World War. A certain weakening of ties of language and sympathies has undoubtedly taken place — the decline of the immigrant press is an instance. But the rise of foreign political organizations in the United States may offset this tendency. Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy have militant and fairly efficient organizations in this country. The Communists, while much smaller in numbers, are better organized than the Socialists were at the time of the World War and in particular have considerable influence among the intelligentsia. In cases where American neutrality is at issue will not these organizations make themselves felt politically?

In conclusion, the writer ventures the opinion that if the foreign political organizations here described hold any danger for the established American way of life it derives, (1) from whatever assistance the German Nazis and Italian Fascists can give to the nascent Fascist movement in this country; and (2) from whatever strength all three — Communists, Nazis and Fascists — might lend to assaults on American neutrality during a war in Europe.

[45] *New York Times*, October 4, 1935.

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THE PRICE OF JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

By Nathaniel Peffer

GIVEN Japan's continuing and portentous activities in China proper, we may do well to attempt casting up Japan's account in Manchukuo. Paradoxically the situation in Manchukuo itself has little to do with the question of profit or loss for Japan. The answer is not to be found there. Manchukuo might be pacified and its Chinese inhabitants reconciled to their lot; its government finances might be in good order, its trade flourishing and its resources on the way to being developed. All this might be true (which it is not) and still prove nothing with respect to the success or failure of Japan in Manchukuo. The test of that is to be found not in Manchukuo but in Japan. It is to be found in the facts of Japan's financial situation, facts like the following:

National expenditure, 1930–31	Yen	1,588,000,000
National expenditure, 1937–38		2,870,000,000
Military appropriations, 1930–31	Yen	470,000,000
Military appropriations, 1937–38		1,400,000,000
National tax revenue, 1930–31	Yen	835,000,000
National tax revenue, 1937–38		1,300,000,000
National debt, 1930	Yen	6,000,000,000
National debt, 1937		10,500,000,000

There are other revealing comparisons. While the volume of Japan's industrial production increased by 92 percent from 1931 to 1936, and the quantity of exports by 46 percent from 1933 (when Japan started her commercial bound forward), the national debt increased by 75 percent and taxes by one-third. The test of Japan's failure or success in Manchukuo lies in facts like that, and in the fact that the excess of Japanese imports over exports for the first half of 1937 was Yen 600,000,000, nearly double that of 1936, with the result that Yen 250,000,000 has had to be shipped to America in three months of the current year, governmental restrictions have already been imposed on exchange and imports, and more stringent control is projected as indispensable for the protection of the currency.

The answer to our question lies, further, in such statements as the following made by Eiichi Baba when he was Minister of Finance in 1936: "People speak of our present conditions as those

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of semi-wartime economic preparation, and I think that is on the whole an apt expression of the situation." For whether Manchukuo is profit or loss for Japan is determined, not by what Japan has done in Manchukuo but by what Manchukuo has done to Japan. And this is to be found less clearly in detailed statistics than in an understanding of the broad lines that frame Japan's national position today as compared with these that show what her national position was before Mukden was occupied on the night of September 18, 1931.

Early in 1931 Japan was a country relatively at ease. Economically she was caught in the toils of the depression like every other country, but nevertheless she was less constricted than most, since her economic and financial organization was less complex and she was not wholly dependent on factory production. There may already have been fundamental dislocations in her social system, but they had not yet become malignant. As for security, only the United States was in a more enviable position. Japan's neighbors were weak and not particularly hostile. There were conflicts, but only such as could be postponed, if not definitely allayed. With China, Japan's relations were not good; but neither were they severely strained. In the preceding years when China had been swept by nationalism the Western Powers had borne the brunt of Chinese antagonism and Japan has remained comparatively immune. In 1930 there was friction over South Manchuria, but friction of the kind that could have been at least temporarily smoothed over by routine negotiations. With Soviet Russia there were no relations at all. Manchuria served as a buffer, and in any case Russia was a negligible military quantity in the Far East. Its absorption in five-year plans, further, gave every prospect that in a military sense it would remain negligible on its eastern front for some years to come. Japan had nothing specific to fear from without. From the tempests apparently brewing in Europe she was in a position to hold aloof, a disinterested spectator, less liable to involuntary entanglement even than the United States.

Today Japan is a harried country. Economically she is at the danger-point. Her currency reserve is depleted; and the heaviest drain has just begun. The strain of carrying the overhead of state expenditure threatens to buckle the pillars of the financial structure and already has begun to bear down on trade and industry. While an expanding industry cries for capital, banks are

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pressed to invest in government bonds to cover treasury deficits. Higher taxes to defray state expenditures work out as higher costs of production, and foreign trade is by so much penalized. Rising prices mean a higher cost of living: either wages must be raised, thus penalizing foreign trade still more, or the standard of living, already shockingly low, must be depressed further, with social consequences that may be postponed or repressed but cannot be escaped. The profits of Japan's phenomenal advance in world trade have been consumed, and she will be drawing on her capital soon if she is not doing so already. A country only recently developed in the modern sense and therefore with not a very large capital reserve, she cannot continue long to draw on capital without the obvious results. These results are already foreshadowed and many farsighted Japanese are conscious of the fact. It is this consciousness that is making for passive resistance on one side and pressure for a form of totalitarianism on the other. But Japan's economic problem is one for which totalitarianism can provide at best only an evasion; it cannot offer a solution.

Politically Japan is in even worse straits. She is caught in a net of enmities from which she cannot extricate herself and through which she dare not try to slash a way. Her neighbors now are implacably hostile and no longer are so weak. China, embittered by Japanese aggressions, thirsts for revenge and has been deterred from seeking it only by her unreadiness. But month by month she has become palpably stronger, building up her strength singlemindedly with the intention of eventually evicting Japan from its soil. Soviet Russia, so far from being negligible, has massed a huge army on her eastern frontier opposite Japanese territory, an army equipped with its own sources of supply and offensive weapons capable of carrying hostilities into Japanese territory. Threats of southward expansion in the direction of British, Dutch and American colonial spheres have aroused a general suspicion which has materialized in intensive fortification programs at Hong Kong and Singapore, conscription in the Philippines, and defensive measures in the Netherlands East Indies. By refusing to enter a naval agreement on the pre-1936 ratios Japan bound herself to participation in a naval race against the richest Powers. The treaty with Germany, instead of breaking through isolation, has tightened the net around Japan. Thereby all practical possibility of reconciliation with Soviet Russia has

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been closed and by general inference at least Japan has grouped herself in the Fascist bloc. Indirectly Japan has given a hostage in Europe and can be entangled in a war arising out of no direct interests or actions of her own.

Whatever Japan's position may have been in the beginning, it is now defensive as much as offensive. Japan has sown dragon's teeth in Eastern Asia, and the hostile forces have sprung up. Now she cannot disengage herself if she would. However much she may be disposed to reconsider her policy of expansion, she stands committed. And the commitment is one that can be supported only by a force strong enough to operate in continental warfare against any combination of enemies, in particular against a combination of China and Soviet Russia. The initiative is no longer wholly with Japan, nor does the option lie with her alone. She might be drawn into action against her will or judgment, involved not by interest or desire but by the accident of position. As this is being written, the incident on the Amur River has flared up, with Russian troops in occupation of disputed islands, the Japanese peremptorily ordering evacuation and Russian gunboats brought up to prevent forcible expulsion. This incident has apparently — as I write — been settled; another one like it may not be. Intrinsically the two disputed islands mean little to Japan. Under normal conditions they would be names on a map. But with two armies facing each other, they or some other names on a map might be the stake on which Japan has to cast her national existence.

The words of Mr. Baba quoted above are an understatement. Japan's conditions are not those of "semi-wartime economic preparation." They are full wartime conditions, the conditions of a possible war which Japan is only doubtfully able to wage successfully and the preparations for which are exhausting her national wealth.

The contrast between Japan's situation in 1931 and 1937 can be explained in one word — Manchukuo. If this is oversimplification, then it is so only in so far as it is theoretically true that if Japan had taken Manchuria alone she might have escaped the consequences by which she is now jeopardized. In large degree the world has been arrayed against Japan because of what followed *after* the taking of Manchuria. China might have reconciled herself to the loss of Manchuria. She has been driven to her present almost reckless determination by the subsequent attack on Shanghai,

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the invasion of China proper and the manifest Japanese intention to incorporate North China into Manchukuo as a Japanese dependency. Soviet Russia might have confined herself to simple vigilance if the Japanese army had not made unmistakable moves in the direction of Siberia and Mongolia. That the Western world would do nothing concrete to restore Manchuria to China was conclusively evidenced at Geneva. Abstractly it may be true that if Japan had stayed north of the Great Wall of China and within the confines of the three eastern provinces of Manchuria she would not have called out the opposition that now compels her to spend herself. But in practical politics Japan could not have restrained herself. Her easy initial successes were an invitation to go further, to realize the Japanese army's dreams at one swoop. And expansion begets further expansion for strategic reasons. Newly acquired territory is always insecure until the adjoining territory is occupied, and then that territory is insecure, and so on. When one foot is advanced, the other must be brought up sooner or later. The taking of Manchuria was not a single act but one link in a chain of acts. And there is little or nothing in Japan's contemporary situation that is not directly or indirectly attributable to the effects of that chain of acts.

The simple, insuperable and (for Japan) disastrous truth is that she was not and is not rich enough to make a success of Manchukuo. Thus Japan's current experience documents a general truth of national expansion: the success or failure of any colonial acquisition depends less on the intrinsic worth of the colony than on the wealth and power of the colonizing country. A country rich enough and powerful enough to pour capital into a colony to develop its resources, simultaneously fortifying itself against other countries that resent its acquisition, may be able to make a colony profitable. No other country can, no matter what the colony. Japan might have had capital enough to develop Manchukuo's resources to the point where they would yield a profit; even that is doubtful. Or she might have had the wealth to build up a military establishment to safeguard her continental possessions against Russia and China and to defy their resentment; that is more doubtful. But that she did not have and does not have the capital to do both is certain. And the attempt to do both is already drawing the social and economic condition of Japan fine and may in time break it.

In actual investments Japan has poured some Yen 1,150,000,-

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000 into Manchuria from 1931 to the close of 1936. Now, an average of two hundred million a year would not be very serious if it came out of a surplus, if the investments were yielding a return or could be counted on to do so in a reasonable period, and if there were more capital available to complete the development of resources without which investments already made cannot become fully productive. Which is to say that there is little use sinking money into railways and other means of transportation if there is not additional money for the opening of mines and mills to provide products to be transported. And all three conditions are contrary to the existing fact.

With respect to the first. In 1931 Japan already had a national debt of six billion yen, a heavy charge on a country with an annual state revenue of one-fifth that sum. She was a country still industrialized only in patches and therefore having the limited annual income of a predominantly agrarian country. And she was just entering on a period of industrial expansion, the export boom that both startled and alarmed the rest of the world, with its urgent demand for capital for plant, machinery and other capital goods. Under the circumstances two hundred million yen a year has been a heavy drain, diverting money from domestic needs and opportunities that could be turned to surer account.

With respect to the second. Not even the most ardent Japanese army apologist maintains that most of the investments already made in Manchukuo have been profitable. For one thing, they have been made with an eye to military strategy rather than economic utility. The railway construction, for example, has been impressive, but many of the new lines, if not most of them, are designed to carry troops toward Siberia rather than freight in and out of Manchukuo. And many of the industrial enterprises are designed to produce materials to make the Japanese army self-sufficient for war purposes rather than commodities for sale at a profit. It is this fact that is responsible for the silent strike of Tokyo bankers against the Kwantung army's demands for funds for Manchukuo in the last year. Money can still be found in Tokyo for enterprises that will yield a return on money invested, but the Japanese bankers and investing classes have made it clear that if money is to be advanced for other purposes, however necessary from the political or military point of view, it must come from the state treasury. And most of the ill-feeling between the headstrong elements in the army and the financial

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and industrial classes, evidenced in the tug-of-war between the army and the political parties, arises from this conflict. The army is not interested in considerations of economic soundness; the industrial and financial classes are, for they know the force of economic truths.

With respect to the third. It is self-evident that there is no reservoir of capital in Japan from which to draw the sums still necessary if Manchukuo is to be made to pay. There would not be enough even if there were no other claims on such capital as Japan possesses. But with nearly a billion yen a year that has to be earmarked for the purchase of bonds to cover budget deficits; with large amounts required for expansion of plants for munitions industries, and the consequent tightening of the money market; with an increasingly unfavorable balance of trade which calls for a considerable export of capital to maintain the yen abroad; with higher taxes which shave the margin of profits that normally make up a reservoir of investment capital; with an increasing share of production going into armament — with all these concurrent demands on national wealth, official talk of great sums for the exploitation of Manchukuo is chimerical. Space is lacking here to analyze Manchukuo's economic potentialities and their worth in terms of risk, money and effort relative to possible returns from the same expenditure at home. Undoubtedly the potentialities exist in tempting measure, though quite likely they have been exaggerated in the high-flown discourse of Japanese army philosophers. Nor is there space to analyze the ultimate effects of Manchukuo's completed development in the way of competition with Japanese industry and agriculture; too conspicuous a success in Manchukuo might be self-defeating. But whatever Manchukuo's potentialities or whatever the effects of their exploitation, they cannot be exploited by Japan with her own financial resources.

I have collected in the last year I do not know how many "plans" for Manchukuo's development, varying in scope and in cost from half a billion yen to five billion yen. The latest (put forward in June of this year) is a plan for the economic coördination of Japan, Korea and Manchukuo, calling for a total of ten billion yen, of which nearly two and a half billion is allocated to Manchukuo. The details have not yet been formulated, and it does not matter. Whether the sum is one billion or ten billion or a hundred billion is immaterial. It will not be forthcoming any-

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way, for it does not exist. There is not that much excess capital in Japan. There would not be even if there were no budget deficits to meet every year, no higher taxes to pay, no pressure on currency and no squeezing of capital resources to pay for mechanization of the army and enlargement of the navy. In actuality there is no prospect of the budget being reduced in the next few years, no prospect of reducing the deficit even if taxes are raised much more, as they will be, and no prospect that the army and navy will moderate their determination to get even bigger appropriations for armament than they have in the last few years. Unless Wall Street, New York, and the City, London, are suddenly smitten with a Tolstoyan frenzy, all the opulent plans for the development of Manchukuo can be forgotten.

The likelihood of an unavoidable cessation of the flow of investments into Manchukuo in the near future might have serious internal repercussions in Japan. For there will be an end to the brisk export of capital goods to Manchukuo, which has had a good deal to do with Japan's boom in the last few years, and much of which has been financed by Japanese credit. When additional credit is not forthcoming the exports will cease or materially decline and there will be danger of deflation. And if the credit already extended is not to be frozen, Manchukuo will have to increase its exports to Japan. If in order to reduce imports from Japan Manchukuo begins to develop its own light industries, such as textiles, what happens to the Japanese market in Manchukuo and the Japanese manufacturers and workers engaged in producing for that market? And if Manchukuo is itself to carry forward its own development, if it is to build railroads and harbors and establish steel mills and power plants, where will it get the surplus to exchange for the Japanese capital goods required? It might do so by concentrating on primary products instead of light industries, thus at the same time avoiding competition with Japanese manufacturers; but this it cannot do without an enormous initial outlay for means of transportation, plant and overhead to carry enterprises until they have reached the point of yielding profits. So we come back to the question: Where will the money for that outlay come from? And to the answer: Not from Japan, for Japan does not have it.

So much for Japan's investment for the development of Manchukuo. This is the least of her expenditure. In addition, there

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has been appropriated out of the national revenue from 1931 to the current fiscal year the sum of Yen 1,400,000,000 — what is called in the budget "Manchurian Incident Expenditure." By this is meant the maintenance of the expeditionary force, the cost of pacification measures (which are still required to put down "bandits"), the cost of erecting fortifications, and routine administration. The appropriation for the current year, six years after the occupation of Manchuria, was Yen 270,000,000, more than a tenth of Japan's estimated national revenue for the year. It is significant that to pacify and administer Manchukuo has taken more money than has been available for investments. It is significant also that this cost does not decline, and that there is very little prospect of its declining in the immediate future. In any accounting for the whole of the Japanese economy, investments in Manchukuo would have to show bonanza profits on an unprecedented scale to balance the cost to the Japanese economy of Manchukuo's upkeep. And by any standard of accounting an outright payment of more than one yen for every yen invested is of dubious soundness.

Taken together, investments in economic enterprises and appropriations for pacifying and administering Manchukuo have cost Japan some two and a half billion dollars in less than six years. But this is only the direct and visible cost. More important is the indirect cost, the cost of armament.

All else Japan might bear, though with difficulty. But this cost of armament renders the country's situation critical, as may be seen from a few comparative figures. The budget calls for Yen 2,800,000,000, of which half will go to the army and navy. Japan's total government revenue for the current fiscal year (including an increase in taxation of about Yen 300,000,000) is roughly estimated at two billion yen. Something like Yen 800,000,000 will have to be raised by loans. The appropriations for the army and navy are Yen 1,400,000,000 — nearly three-quarters of the total revenue and half of the budgetary expenditure. In 1930 Japan's appropriations for defense were less than one-third of the total state expenditure; now they are half. In 1930–31 the appropriations for defense were Yen 470,000,000; this year they are three times as much. In the six years before the taking of Manchuria, Japan spent Yen 2,860,000,000 on her army and navy, a yearly average of Yen 477,000,000; in the six years since the taking of Manchuria she has spent Yen 5,860,000,000, a yearly

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average of Yen 977,000,000. This is an increase of more than 100 percent. In other words, Japan has spent three billion yen more on her military services since she acquired Manchuria than before, and if we add to that sum the total appropriation of Yen 1,400,000,000 for the "Manchurian Incident" account already referred to, we have almost exactly the amount by which Japan's national debt has increased since the acquisition of Manchuria. And if we add to the Yen 1,400,000,000 appropriated for the army and navy this year the debt service charge of Yen 400,000,000 for the year, we have 90 percent of the government's normal revenue for the year. On the other 10 percent she must administer the nation — on 10 percent and the Yen 800,000,000 which she must borrow. The latter will add still more to the debt service charge next year, which will in turn entail more borrowing, which will add still more to the debt service charge the following year — the pyramiding process familiar in business before a crash.

Now, not all of this is chargeable to the Manchurian adventure alone. The rising scale of armaments the world over could not leave the Far East unaffected. Japan is a Great Power, and to some extent she would have had to increase and modernize her defenses. But she would not have had to do so to anything like the same extent. To whatever length the European arms race was carried, Japan could have assured herself of security at moderate cost. Geography is, or normally could be, her impregnable defense. No matter how strong Soviet Russia was, Japan could have been at ease so long as Russian strength was massed to face Europe, as it would have been. American naval building is potentially a threat to Japan; but Japan's aggressiveness since 1931 has been the main incentive to American naval building. As for China, without the fear of extinction to goad her on, her army would have remained numerous and ineffective. In passing it may be said that if ever China should become a unified nation capable of self-defense, she will have Japan to thank. Indeed, this may ultimately prove to be the net effect of Japanese encroachment on China. I am not trying here to level any moral preachments at Japan; she is not alone in weakening herself to attain military power. But whereas at least some, if not most, of the other countries engaged in the arms race were the prisoners of their geographical and historical position, Japan was not in that plight. She was in effect a free agent. She is so no longer. But she has forged her own fetters. Her headlong plunge in a desperate effort at self-

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aggrandizement has frightened the whole world, and the nations most directly affected, Soviet Russia and China, in particular, have been impelled to throw up counter-defenses. Having put herself into a position that is being challenged, Japan must defend the position. But she put herself there of her own motion. That is the principal result of Manchukuo: compulsion to maintain a position that can be maintained only by means that sap the nation's vitality.

This is Japan's national crisis. Its gravity impels Japanese ministers of war always to adjure the political parties to remember it when members of the Diet balk at voting appropriations which they know threaten to bankrupt the nation. All the other controversies, internal and external, all the issues pendent on Japan's policy of expansion, all the other results flowing from that policy, are unimportant by comparison with this central fact: the cost of Japan's armament program and the effect of that cost on Japan's political stability, on her economic equilibrium, on her viability as a society.

I have said very little in this article about internal changes in Manchukuo since 1931, very little about the concrete results there of Japanese rule.[1] There are some solid achievements. The Japanese have much to their credit. The currency of Manchukuo is stable for the first time in a generation. Taxation is regularized. There is order; bandits move about with less impunity than at any time since 1911 — not a small matter to peasants whose villages were periodically despoiled. More iron, more steel, more coal, more shale oil, more electric power are being produced. The wealth of the region has been enhanced. There are more social services. In many respects the country is better governed than it ever has been. This is not to say, however, that Japan is successful as a colonizer. She is not. What capacity she possesses for construction is counterbalanced by a lack in the intangibles of ruling. Her notorious psychological deficiencies have never been more conspicuous. As a result not only are the inhabitants of Manchukuo unreconciled; they are hostile, unreconstructedly hostile. Japan can hold them only by buying them or cowing them. If the Japanese expeditionary force were withdrawn, the Manchukuo state and the Japanese supervisory régime there would not last a week. Japan has not the capacity to win loyalty by sharing benefits and rewards. Chinese business men who go in

[1] I say Japanese rule, because everybody knows that Manchukuo's independence is a fiction.

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with Japanese soon find themselves thrust out. For others there is place only as hewers of wood and drawers of water. The Japanese can command but they cannot coöperate. All these considerations I have not discussed, because they are local to Manchukuo and irrelevant to the larger question. They are irrelevant even to the specific question of the ultimate future of Japanese rule in Manchukuo.

As I said in the beginning, what matters with respect to Japan's six years in Manchukuo is not what Japan has done in Manchukuo but what Manchukuo has done to Japan.

Japan is in a state preliminary to war and must sacrifice every consideration of national welfare to the possible eventuality of that war. National credit is impaired. Currency is jeopardized. Trade is handicapped. The social services are starved. Education is on short commons. Medical examinations of army recruits and factory workers show the deleterious effects of overwork and under-nourishment. Alleviation of the agrarian problem, acute these many years, is out of the question. The factory worker is being ground harder, and must be ground still harder, for wages must be kept down in order that the price of manufactured products for export can be kept low enough to undercut competitors — this being made more and more difficult by the higher level of taxation. And foreign trade not only cannot be allowed to decline; it must be increased, in order that Japan may be able to pay with goods for the raw materials which she must import not only for her ordinary factories but, still more, for her munitions plants. So the industrial worker must be kept down. Real wages have dropped by 18 percent since 1931; the cost of living has gone up by 25 percent.

And there is no way out. The new cabinet that took office at the end of June has appointed a national planning board to coordinate economic activities on the basis of a three-point policy: expansion of productive power, balancing of international accounts, adjustment of demand and supply of commodities. This is baying at the moon. Productive power of a sort can be expanded and is being expanded, dangerously so. For much of the expansion is for the production of armament. A good deal of Japan's recent appearance of prosperity is unhealthy precisely because it is based on the production of arms and munitions. Once that lets up, there will be a dangerous deflation; and sooner or later it must let up, because it cannot be paid for. The balanc-

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ing of international accounts is a physical impossibility so long as the country runs deeper into debt and must strip herself in order to pay for imported raw materials needed for munitions and for manufactures to be exported to pay for raw materials. For the same reason the demand and supply of commodities cannot be adjusted, because there is an uneconomic factor in the equation. No programs or policies, no techniques or devices of organization, are of avail so long as Japan is defying a simple law of mathematics. Whatever permutations of the figures there may be, the resultant will always come nearer the minus sign.

If Japan possessed the assets and resources of Great Britain and the United States, she might have made a success of Manchukuo. She did not, so she has not. A hundred years ago, when conquest was technically simpler, she might have been successful. Had she waited until a hundred years from now, when her resources were more intensively developed, she might have been successful. Now she has not been successful and she cannot be successful. All the conditions of her physical and social being were against success. She has overreached herself. She will fail.

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MILITARY LESSONS OF THE SPANISH WAR

By Major-General A. C. Temperley

ALTHOUGH there was an immense development of new weapons and new military methods during the Great War, there has been little opportunity of testing their postwar evolution during the uneasy peace that has followed. Abyssinia taught us something of the value of airplanes, both as a destructive weapon and for the transport of supplies in difficult mountainous country; the tank in that unsuitable terrain was found not to be a success. Mechanical transport and good engineering, on the other hand, won the war for the Italians; without them they could not have reached Addis Ababa before the rains. Deductions from the Ethiopian campaign, however, are apt to be misleading, as the Abyssinians had no air force, no artillery and few modern weapons. Their tactics also seemed peculiarly designed to ensure their early defeat.

It might be expected that the civil war in Spain would have taught some valuable military lessons. Certainly the Powers that sent their material to the support of one side or the other have had an unusual opportunity for a practical test of its efficiency. But accurate information as to the performance of the various weapons is exceedingly hard to obtain; the secrets are jealously guarded. The correspondents with the two forces in the field are not allowed very much freedom of movement and the messages they send are subject to censorship. Even when they are able to write freely, their information is seldom sufficiently exact to allow generalizations on the success of this or that weapon or method of warfare. The peculiar conditions under which civil war is necessarily fought is another reason for avoiding hasty judgments in this case. The failure of tanks in a particular action may have been due to the fact that they were in inexperienced hands rather than to any inherent defect in the weapon itself. On the Government side particularly the militia was hastily recruited from civilian ranks. Few officers possessed of any military knowledge remained loyal and Staff work at the start was conspicuous by its absence. General Franco had the advantage in possessing the majority of the regular officers and a well trained force in the Foreign Legion and his Moors. But until the

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arrival of the so-called "volunteers" the fighting was conducted on extremely amateurish lines, rather like the early stages of the American Civil War. My attempt, therefore, to extract some military lessons from the campaign must be subject to these limitations.

The first and most unmistakable lesson is the ever increasing power of the defense. The multiplication of machine guns makes a frontal attack nothing but mass murder unless surprise can be achieved. Even the Government's half-trained militia, whose morale at times sank extremely low, was generally able to hold up General Franco's attacks in front of Madrid and inflict heavy losses on his troops. The development of the tank in the Great War restored to the infantry the ability to break through; and it dominated the battlefield until the end of the war. But a new phenomenon has now appeared in the shape of the anti-tank gun. A frontal attack by tanks can now be brought to a standstill, if the anti-tank guns are sufficiently numerous and unless they are blinded by smoke or fog or put out of action by artillery. The battlefields of Spain are the first on which the tank has been confronted by a gun specially devised to deal with it. We thus see the heavy preponderance in favor of the defense, which had been disturbed by the advent of the tank, to some extent restored by the invention of an efficient anti-tank gun.

It is the old story of guns versus armor again. Some new invention gives the one a temporary superiority, which is in a few years nullified by further improvements in the other. So the see-saw continues. A new gas, a new gun, a ray of some extraordinary power or an artificial fog on a large scale may swing the balance once more in favor of the attack. But such an invention is apparently not yet in sight. Meanwhile we may fairly say that the war in Spain has confirmed the view that recent developments in warfare have tended to strengthen the defense.

Another striking feature of the Civil War has been the importance of towns and villages as centers of resistance. No general front has existed; there have been at least four fronts in various parts of Spain, all separate. The Government forces faced westward in Madrid, south at Cordoba and east at Santander. Columns operate in the open country and prolonged struggles take place for the possession of villages. The reason for the prominence of towns and villages as fortresses in the defense is perhaps due to the lack of large masses of heavy artillery on

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both sides, which in the Great War tended to reduce a village to a mass of dust and rubble in a comparatively short space of time. But the super-heavy artillery was only possible under conditions of siege warfare. It cannot be used to any extent so long as armies manœuvre. Probably European General Staffs will reflect upon this development, concluding that towns and villages can be reconstructed into fortresses, and as a result these will figure largely in schemes of defense like the Maginot line, saving the expenditure of vast sums of money.

Before attempting to draw specific lessons from the employment of tanks in Spain, I should like to make some general observations upon the changes in their use on the battlefield which have resulted from the appearance of the anti-tank gun. In the Great War the tank was the reply to trench warfare, the machine gun, barbed wire and concrete. Even masses of heavy artillery were unable to assure that infantry would get forward without very heavy losses. The tank, particularly when able to effect surprise as at Cambrai and in front of Amiens on August 8, 1918, burst through barbed wire defenses, put the machine guns out of action and enabled the infantry to advance almost unscathed. This tank was a heavy, well-armored and slow-moving vehicle which could be knocked out only by a direct hit from a field gun or heavier piece, and these were not particularly suitable weapons to employ against tanks. The British Army's postwar development of the light tank which has a speed of from 25 to 30 miles an hour completely changed tank tactics. One could then have visions of masses of light and medium tanks moving round the flanks of an opposing army and playing havoc in its rear and with its communications. They were to be employed much as J. E. B. Stuart, the Confederate General, used his cavalry.

The French General Staff were particularly attracted by this idea in case of a war with Germany, and for a time gave up their intention of using tanks only in coöperation with infantry in the attack. Their latest Field Service regulations, however, indicate that they are returning to the earlier view. They believe that the plan of long distance mechanized raids is no longer possible owing to the existence of the anti-tank gun. We must not, however, jump to the conclusion that the day of the tank is over. It will still be an arm of opportunity capable of great things, if its speed enables it to avoid the anti-tank gun or if it can be accompanied into action by a weapon capable of dealing with the latter.

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There must now be a tank mounting an anti-anti-tank gun, which can accompany the tanks in attack and overwhelm the anti-tank guns with rapid fire. When I attended the German manœuvres last summer I found that they were thinking on these lines; nor has the idea escaped the notice of British tank experts.

In Spain, tanks have hardly proved as successful as was hoped by either combatant. The reasons are various. In the first place they have been in incompetent hands: this was only to be expected. Breakdowns were frequent and maintenance was non-existent until the trained drivers came from Russia, Italy and Germany. Secondly, the Staff had no idea of tank tactics. They were usually employed in small numbers and without infantry or artillery support. This method of use in the face of a certain number of anti-tank guns as well as other devices ensured the destruction of a large proportion of the tanks engaged. So serious did the resulting discontent become that the tank crews on the Nationalist side were for a time seriously demoralized and wilfully caused mechanical breakdowns. They employed any device rather than face being burnt alive in their tanks, as had been the fate of many of their comrades. Thirdly, although the intervening Powers had obviously sent some of their new material to Spain in order to gain practical experience regarding its efficiency in war, they also dumped upon the two armies a large amount of material of faulty design, things which either had proved defective or had become out of date. This, combined with the rough handling of inexperienced crews, naturally produced further inefficiency.

The number of tanks which each side has acquired up to the time this article is written is very difficult to estimate. Probably the Spanish Government has received about 200 tanks from Russia. The Nationalists have received something like 400 or 500 tanks from Italy and Germany. There is some diversity of opinion amongst observers as to which tanks have proved the best. All are agreed that the 2-ton Italian "Fiat" tank is the least efficient. In many of these the machine guns can only fire straight ahead and the armor is too thin to keep out anything bigger than rifle bullets. This only confirms reports of their failure in Abyssinia. On the whole the Russian light and medium tanks appear to have been superior to the German ones. The German light tank is the same that I saw at their manœuvres last year. It weighs from 4 to 5 tons, is armed with two machine guns, and

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has a speed of about 30 miles an hour. Its great defect is the thinness of its armor.

The medium-size tanks have rarely been used on either side in Spain except for trench attacks, as it has been thought unwise to commit them without artillery and infantry protection. The Russian one reputedly weighs something like 28 tons and is armed with a quick-firing gun. It is probably heavily armored but little is known of its performance. The general criticism about all the tanks employed is that their armor is too thin and their track-base is too short. Of course there is a close connection between armor and speed. The thicker the armor, the safer the crew; but then speed is necessarily slowed down. Scientists continually experiment to obtain harder steel without an increase of weight, but obviously there are limits to what can be done in this direction. The famous Lord Fisher, former First Sea Lord, said apropos of battle cruisers that "speed is armor." The remark is not entirely true as applied to tanks. The problem is to find the proper compromise between the size and weight of the engine, the thickness of the armor and the fighting power of the vehicle.

Major General J. F. C. Fuller, the great tank expert, wrote an interesting letter in the London *Times* on April 6 after a visit to the Spanish Front. The following is an extract:

> The three types of light tank I have seen, Italian, German and Russian, are mere runabouts, the offspring of cheapness and not of a tactical idea. As regards tank tactics I could discover none. Tanks are used singly or scattered over wide fronts. Up to three weeks ago the largest number used in an attack by either side, I was told, was 15: therefore, there have been no mechanized battles.
>
> So far, from the point of view of mechanization, this war has, I think, proved that the light tank is not really a combat machine at all. It is an indifferent armored scout, but could be made a highly efficient one if its track base were lengthened.

To sum up the experiences of tanks in Spain, it cannot be said that any final tactical lessons have been learnt and we are no nearer a conclusion as to whether a big break through by mechanized forces is possible. But we have gained valuable experience regarding the performance of anti-tank guns and it seems certain that a tank attack will break down against them if they are present in sufficient quantity and if the element of surprise is lacking.

Various means of defense against tanks have been improvised

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in Spain in addition to anti-tank guns. The Moors and Carlists have been adepts at setting tanks on fire; gasoline is thrown on them, and this is ignited by a hand grenade. The inside of the tank becomes an inferno and the crew has the choice of remaining inside to meet a horrible death or of coming out and being shot down. A similar method is used against the tracks. The synthetic rubber in the track bearings is set alight; this brings the tank to a standstill and it is destroyed by gunfire. Yet another method is to dig a deep wide trench which the tank cannot straddle and from which, once it has entered, it cannot climb out on the farther side. The object of lengthening the track base would be to forestall this method of defense.

I have referred to the anti-tank gun several times. On the Nationalist side the German 22-millimeter gun mounted on a small wheeled vehicle has proved very successful. It is the gun that I saw in use in the German Army. Other German models are also reported to be in Spain, a 37 mm. and a 47 mm. From all the information that can be gathered the German anti-tank gun is a very efficient weapon.

If we study the uses to which aviation has been put in the Spanish civil war we reach conclusions not very different from those reached when we investigate the use of tanks. In the early stages particularly was a similar amateurishness, a similar lack of airplanes (notably on the Government side), and a similar lack of skilled pilots. Later on ample material and well-trained pilots were provided for both sides and air warfare became more intense. But the actual tactical lessons are somewhat obscured by the fact that the anti-aircraft fire was at first negligible and has never been very severe. I think it is true to say that, until Franco's attack upon Bilbao, the moral effect of air bombardment was surprisingly small. Whether it is the fatalistic Spanish temperament or because the bombing was ineffective, the fact remains that the people of Madrid ceased to be perturbed by air bombardment. It must of course be remembered that General Franco did not want to lay the capital in ruins, for he was hoping to enter it at any time. Bombs have usually been directed upon military objectives and upon the western outskirts of Madrid where the Government forces were actually entrenched. Naturally many buildings have suffered and there have been many casualties; but it would be a false deduction from the operations in question to assume that, if ever air bombardment were to take

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place in a future war in western Europe, it would be of this comparatively mild character. General Franco has certainly never set out to destroy the morale of the people of Madrid by terrorism, as we understand would be the objective of the air force of any Great Power in a European war.

That very capable observer, the correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* with the Nationalist Forces, wrote in January 1937:

> In an article from Saragossa in the first weeks of the war I expressed the view that the military importance and effect of aviation has been much exaggerated. Subsequent observation during close on six months of war has not changed my view.
>
> Of course it is a terrible experience for civilians to have their homes destroyed by aircraft, but what is the military effect? Again and again planes have attempted to bomb bridges or destroy roads. Invariably they fail.
>
> Not once have I seen an air raid combined with an infantry attack. The planes pass, drop their loads on the enemy's trenches and vanish. An air raid can only last a few minutes, an artillery bombardment can go on for days.

Yet we must remark upon his changed point of view after the bombing of Guernica and the taking of Bilbao. On July 18, the anniversary of the beginning of the Civil War, he wrote:

> The chief military lesson of the war has been the terrible moral and material effect on civilians and soldiers of large-scale air bombardments. More and more are aircraft deciding campaigns, but the intense use of aircraft is only quite recent.

In the offensive against Bilbao the Nationalist Commander had made up his mind to use his air force as we expect it to be used in war. With ruthless efficiency his German airmen bombed and machine-gunned the Basques, who were unable to make a reply of any kind whatsoever. They only had one anti-aircraft gun of indifferent quality; and the Valencia Government, for reasons that are difficult to understand, failed to send them a single airplane which could either attack the Italian bombers or retaliate by bombing the Nationalist troops. It was the changed manner in which the Nationalist command used its air force that no doubt caused the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent to change his views and to realize for the first time what air warfare might really be, particularly in attacks upon great cities. His opinions are confirmed by other observers. The only lesson we can safely draw is this: everything points to the fact that, where air superiority exists, the results will be not less decisive and not less horrible than our imagination has led us to believe. And nothing that happened at Bilbao or Guernica — bad as it was — can give any

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idea of the shambles and destruction that may be produced by large and efficient air forces armed with high explosive, gas and incendiary bombs operating over great cities like London, Paris, Rome or Berlin.

In the early days of the war the Spanish Government employed some commercial machines as makeshifts. The Nationalist equipment was very different. The forced landings of a number of Italian "Savoia" machines on French territory, before the war actually started, made it clear that from the very beginning Franco was being supplied by Italy; and later he was supplied by Germany as well.

The greater part of the airplanes provided for both sides have reached them in spite of the non-intervention agreement and with the connivance of foreign Governments. The arrival of the International Brigade and of Russian airplanes and artillery saved Madrid in the nick of time in November last. The disheartened militia were slowly falling back on the capital without any serious resistance when suddenly they were electrified by the sound of guns giving them support and by seeing fast and well-handled machines for the first time attacking the Nationalist planes in the air. Since then there has been a steady flow of machines to both sides.

The Russians sent both fighters and bomber machines of very high quality to Spain. Their pilots were also extremely good and were on the whole superior to the Germans and Italians on the other side. The "Katiouska" bomber, with a speed of 198 miles per hour, is a particularly good machine. On the Nationalist side there are "Junker 52," "Heinkel," "Savoia," "Caproni" and "Fiat." On the whole the Italian machines are superior to the German ones. On both sides the pilots have been almost entirely foreigners. It is very difficult to ascertain the number of machines now available, but it is probable that Franco has numerical superiority, which is partly counteracted by the efficiency of the Russian pilots and machines. On July 19 it was announced that 170 aircraft were in the air, taking part in the fighting southwest of Madrid.

The comparative failure of the German machines is due to the conditions under which the German air force was created. Prior to Herr Hitler's denunciation of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles on March 16, 1935, the German air force was being constructed in great secrecy. No tests of new machines

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could be made openly and the handicap of producing a ready-made air force in secret, as the German army leaders were determined to do, entailed too much reliance upon theory and was likely to cause serious defects in design. The Germans are excellent engineers and fine and fearless pilots; but no air force in the world could have produced satisfactory machines under such conditions. The war in Spain has been a valuable "trial over the course" for them, and I do not doubt that the defects disclosed are being rapidly put right.

The anti-aircraft weapons supplied and manned by Germans have been very efficient. I saw them in Germany and it is not surprising that their General Staff are obviously very satisfied with them. There is firstly the gun with a calibre of 88 mm., an extreme vertical range of 36,000 feet and a rate of fire of about 15 rounds per minute. Secondly there is the 37 mm. gun which is also used for anti-tank defense. Of all the material that Germany has sent to Spain her anti-aircraft guns have acquitted themselves best. They have been successful against fighter machines below 6,000 feet, less so against bombers that are accustomed to fly at a higher altitude. Their range and height finding instruments must be very efficient and their personnel well trained. On the Government side, air defense has been distinctly inferior both in weapons and in personnel. We are entitled to deduce that the latest patterns of anti-aircraft guns and instruments will act as a real deterrent to air attack and, under favorable conditions, may inflict severe casualties. At the same time it must be remembered that airplanes are getting faster and are able to fly higher. A good deal more experience of the plane-versus-gun problem will be necessary before we can make up our minds that the gun, even in large numbers, can give satisfactorily efficient protection against air raids.

Propaganda is comparatively new as a weapon in warfare but it has been extensively used, chiefly on the Government side. Much of this work has been carried on by Russians, who have long been experts on the subject. The Nationalists, on the other hand, have the priceless advantage of unity of command. General Franco is a leading soldier who won a great name for himself in Morocco. He has a well trained staff of regular officers and there can be no doubt that it has given efficient higher direction. The Government side, on the other hand, has been prey to a long succession of quarrelling, political intrigue and continuous

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change. No one has known from day to day exactly who was in control. There are also commissars with the military units, who perform political functions and constantly interfere with discipline and with the command of the troops. No commander is safe, and when they get a good soldier like General Kléber, the Commander of the International Brigade, they seem unable to keep him. It is remarkable that the morale of the militia has remained so high in view of the lack of confidence that they must feel about the Higher Command.

The title of this article is "Military Lessons of the Spanish War." I am conscious of the fact that with regard both to weapons and methods I often have had to record that, owing to the conditions under which the campaign is being fought and the difficulty of obtaining technical information, it is premature to form very definite views. Most observers have said that there are no tactical lessons to be learnt. It would be safer, I think, to say that even so there are certain tendencies to be observed. As regards material, it is already clear that the anti-tank gun is destined to cause many changes in the employment of tanks and that the most modern anti-aircraft gun is relatively a greater threat to air power than ground defense has ever been before.

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THE RUSSIAN MYSTERY

Behind the Tukhachevsky Plot

By Balticus

THE recent evolution of the Soviet Union has been overwhelming in its surprises. These surprises have recently become so disconcerting that many Russians, Communists and non-Communists alike, as well as many foreign observers accustomed to speak with assurance on all things Russian, are abandoning attempts to find a rational explanation for them, to discover in them an inner logic, a sense of direction. Yet certain definite theories exist about the cataclysmic events which have so perturbed the Communist movement in recent months and so perplexed the most self-satisfied foreign observers. The present article will not attempt to choose between these theories. All it purports to do is furnish the reader with some light on them as a means of distinguishing, even if only vaguely, the various political currents which seem to be operating in Russia as the Soviet régime approaches its twentieth birthday.

The observers who throw up their hands in bewilderment are exemplified in an extreme form by those who say that Stalin is insane. Rumors to this effect have circulated in Moscow since May 1931. But insanity is too simple and neat a way of explaining the acts of a man who controls the life of an immense realm containing a population of 170 millions. History does not allow absolute rulers — whether sovereigns, dictators, or "leaders" — to do anything so banal as to lose their reason. This privilege is reserved for private citizens. Loss of reason or weakness of will in a man who commands thousands of subordinate leaders, and through them millions and millions of men, can have reality as a political factor only if it is the supreme expression of some fatal malady in the body politic. Such was the case in Russia of the Tsars. On the eve of the Revolution, the fate of the régime and of Russia itself was in the hands of an hysterical woman, an ignorant sorcerer, and a minister stricken with complete paralysis.

But at the time the Zinoviev-Kamenev affair burst on the public in July 1936 the Soviet régime seemed never to have been stronger. The economic situation had recently been improving. Certain branches of industry had been making distinct progress.

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Relations between the Government and the people had noticeably diminished in tenseness, and in any case were very different from what they had been in 1928–33 when wheat was requisitioned and agriculture collectivized. In certain fields, *e.g.* national defense and public instruction, responsible Soviet leaders seemed to be agreed on matters of policy. They seemed willing to abandon many of the exaggerations and fantasies of the purely revolutionary period. The recreation of a Russian national patriotism, the first signs of a more tolerant attitude towards religion (even if this was primarily prompted by a desire to conciliate foreign opinion), the reëstablishment of grades in the Army, the adoption of exceptions (slight to be sure) to collectivism in the rural areas — all these things reflected an interesting evolution in the Communist mind. We can take it for granted that they corresponded to the mentality and aspirations of the new generation of Russians now taking their place in all branches of the country's governmental and economic life. True, the reversal of policy which these developments represented was prompted in part by the threat of external danger; also, it did not affect all phases of life equally and often it took bizarre forms. Still the fact remains that the evolution was a sign of improving health rather than decay, of a return to reason rather than an excursion in madness.

The tendency towards normalcy received political expression in the new Constitution adopted December 5, 1936.[1] The régime continued exclusively in the hands of only one political party, to which the Constitution gave plenary powers and complete control over all public institutions and associations. Democracy was very far from having arrived. Nevertheless, if we remember how for eighteen years Communist leaders had been haunted by the fear of a secret vote and of universal, direct and equal suffrage, then we can get some idea of how great a change the institution of even the *appearance* of those things betokened. Just as the Devil blessed the water, so the Government began to feel itself sufficiently strong to risk making a pretense of replacing the Soviet régime by a more normal régime of popular representation. To state that one of the Government's motives was probably to give the Soviet régime a better reputation in democratic circles abroad does not invalidate the belief that the Government leaders had two other objectives as well: (1) to give some satisfaction to the masses, who aspire to participate more directly in the affairs of

[1] Since given effect in the electoral law of July 9, 1937.

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the state; (2) and to give a sop to the peasantry, against whom the former electoral system particularly discriminated.

Thus the Government appeared to be resting on fairly solid foundations. The régime was moving to acquire increased domestic stability and the people were taking hope of a better future. The atmosphere that prevailed in Moscow in the spring and summer of 1936 is described by a Soviet functionary — an old militant Communist who had belonged to the Party under the *ancien régime*, who had known both prison and Siberia, and who now belongs to the category called by Stalin "the officers of the Party" [2] — in an extremely interesting letter which first appeared last winter in the *Socialist Messenger*, the émigré organ in Paris of the Russian Social-Democratic (Menshevik) Party.[3] "Looking back today," wrote this veteran Communist at the end of 1936, "one recognizes certain symptoms which might have given ground for concern. But that is being wise after the event. In reality, everyone was convinced that the worst had passed, and that a period of economic and political improvement had begun, which, though slow, would, nevertheless, be certain."

Suddenly came the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial and a series of bloody executions and reprisals. To the author of the letter just quoted and to other "officers" and "non-commissioned officers" of the Communist Party the whole affair was a thunderbolt from a cloudless sky. The Russian public was also surprised, but not in the same way. It did not become unduly excited and its astonishment was mixed with no little satisfaction. It had known nothing of the struggle which had been going on in the top ranks of the Communist Party for over a year. Numerous observers agree that the man in the street — the functionaries, the technicians, the workers, the non-Party masses — saw with considerable pleasure the execution or imprisonment of the men whom they regarded as personifying the most terrifying periods of militant Bolshevism. The names of Trotsky, Zinoviev, Yagoda evoked many unpleasant memories.

But the execution of Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven other

[2] According to statistics presented by Stalin to the plenary session of the Central Committee on March 3, 1937, the Russian Communist Party includes: 3,000 to 4,000 "superior leaders" (the "generals" of the Party); 30,000 to 40,000 "middle leaders" (the "officers"); 100,000 to 150,000 "minor leaders" (the "non-commissioned officers").

[3] Paris, December 22, 1936, and January 17, 1937. The letter attracted wide attention. It was published in English by the Secretariat of the Labor and Socialist International ("Documents and Discussions," Vol. XIV, No. 2, Brussels, February 20, 1937); and by the Rand School Press, New York, under the title "Letter of an Old Bolshevik" (62 p. 25 cents).

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generals in June 1937 was a different matter.[4] Their political past had been forgotten or ignored. For years the Government had done everything to increase their popularity. But even so their deaths produced no excitement. The army itself remained calm. The Government was, in the traditional phrase, master of the situation. It was able to continue removing, imprisoning and executing a series of other high functionaries and members of the Party, often without any pretense of public trial, often for failures less of the individual than of the system, often, doubtless, to satisfy personal grudges — and all without encountering resistance. The machine of repression functioned perfectly. The people, as in the last act of Pushkin's *Boris Godunov*, "remained silent."

Some observers interpret this silence as the worst possible sign. This apathy, they assert, proves that Russia is sick, that it is overcome with debility, that it is able to be no more than a passive witness of the death agony of the Revolutionary régime and the continuing internecine strife within the Communist dictatorship. The outcome, say these observers, must be a Fascist or Bonapartist régime.

This thesis is upheld by the Russian Mensheviks who regard themselves as the only true revolutionary Marxists. In their periodical, the *Socialist Messenger*, observers like Theodore Dan and Raphael Abramovitch describe the Soviet régime as entering its last crisis. For them, the dénouement is close at hand. Stalin, they say, plans to continue his personal rule in the transformed régime with the aid of the new "privileged class," *i.e.* those who have profited from the Revolution, those who hold permanent posts in the civil and military bureaucracies and in the administrative and technical personnel of industry. This social class is free from all revolutionary tradition. It has no ideology, except that of the totalitarian state; no ideal except, to borrow Stalin's words, an "easy and pleasant life." To smooth the way for this avid, rapacious, impudent horde Stalin is, according to the Menshevik theory, getting rid of the old revolutionaries. True, most of the latter have now settled down as peaceful bureaucrats.

[4] The officers and the posts they had recently held were as follows: Marshal Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky, Vice-Commissar for Defense; General A. I. Kork, Director of the Red Army War College; General I. E. Yakir, former Commander-in-Chief of the Ukraine forces at Kiev, later Commander of the Leningrad military district; General I. P. Uborevich, Assistant People's Commissar for War and Vice-President of the Revolutionary Military Council; General Robert P. Eideman, Chief of the Home Defense organization for training military reserves; General B. M. Feldman, Chief of Personnel of the General Staff; General K. V. Putna, former Military Attaché in London, arrested in August 1936; General V. M. Primakov, Deputy Commander of the Leningrad military district.

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But Stalin remembers their past and does not trust them in the new scheme of things.[5]

But, the Mensheviks continue, Stalin was not alone in aspiring to a Thermidorian dictatorship or a Cæsarian one. Other men were dreaming the same dream. To forestall these, the Georgian first thought of going before the people and, with the aid of the new Constitution, submitting his policies to a plebiscite. Then, determining to take a short cut to get his rivals out of the way, he decapitated the OGPU of its leaders — Yagoda, Prokofiev, etc. — relying meanwhile on the army. He then, against the wishes of the army, appointed his own man, Yezhov, chief of the political police. Thus prepared, he turned on the high military command, particularly on the man whom he suspected of longing to be the new Bonaparte. Today it is Tukhachevsky who is executed; tomorrow it may be Voroshilov. The only end to this bloody race is a plebiscite or a *coup d'état* — unless the industrial proletariat awakens and finds ways of imposing a political democracy.

The *Socialist Messenger* in its issue of July 5, 1937, places no credence in the accusations of espionage and treason to Russia made against Tukhachevsky and his colleagues. "It is one of those detestable calumnies by means of which Stalin tries to strangle his victims morally." The *Messenger* thinks the execution of the generals could be interpreted as an act of madness had there not really been in the army a movement directed against Stalin. It admits the existence of a pro-German tendency in the top civil and military groups. This may have been tolerated by Stalin himself until recently as a "reserve credit" in case of an eventual change in Russian foreign policy. But in the eyes of the Mensheviks the pro-German tendency does not by itself explain the execution of the eight generals.

The Menshevik thesis is ingenious. Its weakness is its desire to make events fit a theory. Since 1918 the Mensheviks — the "real" Marxists — have been looking for parallels in the course of the French Revolution. During the years of the New Economic Policy (1921–1929) they predicted the imminence of a reaction — of a Thermidor — and at least the partial restoration of the capitalist system. Actually, Stalin abandoned the NEP, destroyed the new bourgeoisie, expropriated nearly a million farmers, and created a formidable state-owned industry. It must be in the

[5] Leon Trotsky shares this opinion, affirming that Stalin has already replaced the "real" Communists with deserters from other parties.

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interests of the leaders of this industry that Stalin and those who agree with him now prepare the way for a counter-revolutionary "régime of order." Then why should the generals plot against Stalin if they were pursuing the same ends as he?

Professor Miliukov, the leader of the Democratic Republicans of the Russian emigration, launches quite a different theory. According to a report from "a foreign source" published in his newspaper, *Les Dernières Nouvelles*, the executed generals were *opposed* to a pro-German foreign policy and plotted against Stalin with the idea of establishing a democratic régime.

Kerensky, who seems to share this opinion, has published another report from a "Russian source," the authenticity of which he guarantees. He says that his information confirms the existence of the plot and he gives further details. The plot was discovered "because of delay on the part of the conspirators and the fact that among them there was not a man possessing the unchallenged authority of leader." But Kerensky's informer is strangely silent on the foreign policy of the conspirators. He limits himself to saying that Stalin "had not renounced internationalism," that he was "incapable of reëstablishing the military power of Russia" and that "his government was at heart defeatist." As for the internal policy of the Tukhachevsky group, he defines it thus: "The conspirators firmly opposed a social régime based on undirected private capitalism. Consequently they did not have the intention of setting up in Russia all the accepted institutions of democracy. They believed that the state must remain owner of the great industries." This would lead one to infer that the executed generals were friends of the small proprietor. Yet, according to Kerensky's informer, they renounced "international proletarian socialism" and espoused national coöperation within the national borders, in other words, "state socialism."

Thus for Kerensky and his informer Stalin remained what he had always been, the old international revolutionary, the destroyer of Russia. But if Stalin was still an internationalist, why did he shoot the internationalist Trotskyites?

The thesis put forward in only slightly different terms by Kerensky and Miliukov stands in opposition to that of a number of British, French, Baltic and Czech observers, both foreign service officials and publicists who in the past have shown themselves well-informed. According to them, the plot of Tukhachevsky and his group was not merely directed against Stalin but was

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undertaken in conjunction with the leaders of the *Reichswehr* with the idea of creating a military dictatorship and concluding a Russo-German understanding.

The English publicist Wickham Steed goes even further. He believes that the plot was part and parcel of a long-range plan of the German high command directed against the Western Powers. The plot if successful would have neutralized the Russian Army in case of a war in Western Europe. "Hitler," Mr. Steed wrote, "was broadly informed and may or may not have suspected that, once the Russo-German alliance was concluded and Russian friends of the *Reichswehr* in control at Moscow, the German *Reichswehr* no longer would be content to obey Hitler in Germany. At all events, news of the Russian executions caused consternation in the German higher command. The neutrality of the Russian Army having become uncertain and the economic situation in Germany being extremely critical, the *Reichswehr* was obliged to go slow while Hitler grew more independent of its political control."[6]

In the usually well-informed European circles to which I have just alluded the belief is held that the purging of the Russian Army and the extermination of the old Communist leaders was intended to end once and for all the pro-German tendencies in Soviet Russia and to guarantee the continuity of Litvinov's foreign policy of collaboration with the Western democracies to save peace in Europe. The series of executions was the counterpart in Russia of Moscow's policy at Geneva. According to this thesis, the whole affair, action and reaction, was quite in the Russian manner. The Trotskyites and Zinovievites were implacable adversaries of the League of Nations and "British-French imperialism." They were convinced that world revolution was the indispensable condition for the success of the Russian socialist experiment and that this revolution would only come as the result of a new world war. Hence, as true adventurers, they worked to provoke incidents which might bring about the conflagration. They were the men who in 1923, during the occupation of the Ruhr by French troops, collaborated with the German Nationalists and the German magnates of heavy industry, in the hope of creating a national Bolshevik revolution in Germany and possibly war on the Rhine. In March 1923 Zinoviev had put Radek and Pyatakov in charge of plans for the German revolution. Trotsky, set

[6] *New York Times*, July 4, 1937.

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aside for personal reasons, reproached them for lacking decisiveness.

After these agitators had fallen into disgrace they consorted with certain army officers who were ambitious, who were discontented with Litvinov's policy of pacifism, who were convinced of the superiority of the German Army and who were unfriendly to the Western democracies. The proponents of this theory put Tukhachevsky's name at the top of the list of those mainly ambitious; the officers most impressed with German military strength were supposed to be General Putna, who before going as Russian Military Attaché at London had held the same post in Berlin, and General Kork, who had received his military education in Germany (and who, incidentally, had been Putna's predecessor as Military Attaché in Berlin). These officers were ready to conclude any kind of an alliance which promised to allow Russia to keep her frontiers or even perhaps to enlarge them at the expense of the border states. They regarded themselves as good nationalists and good Communists after their fashion, and were not defeatists like the pure Trotskyites. They would never have dreamed of ceding the Ukraine to the Reich or Siberia to Japan. But they did wish to avoid the risk of a war on two fronts. They considered Japan for the time being as the principal enemy. Hence they argued that Russia should reach an understanding with Germany at the expense of Poland, *i.e.*, return to much the same foreign policy as prevailed from 1922 to 1933.

Interesting sidelights are thrown on the part of this thesis which touches German participation in the plot in the "Letter of an Old Bolshevik" already quoted above. I regard this letter as a document of primary importance and ask attention to the following passages:

> In the first few months after Hitler's seizure of power, it seemed to us[7] in Russia that the Third Reich would be merely a *passing phase in Germany's history*, that Hitler would be able to remain in the saddle only a few months, to be followed quickly by severe crash and revolution. That the "imperialists" of England and France would permit Germany, their "hereditary foe," to carry out her rearmament plans was generally regarded as impossible; neither were Hitler's mouthings about a campaign against Russia taken seriously. Gradually, however, we began to realize that the situation was far more serious than we had thought, that no preventive measures against Hitler by the Western Powers could be expected, and that preparations for a campaign against Russia were in full swing. A big stir was produced by the investigations

[7] The "old Bolshevik" is writing, remember, as one of the "officers" of the Communist Party.

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into and the disclosures regarding German propaganda in the Ukraine, and particularly with regard to the so-called "homosexual conspiracy." The particulars of that conspiracy, which was discovered at the end of 1933, were as follows: An assistant of the German military attaché, a friend and follower of the notorious Captain Roehm, managed to enter the homosexual circles in Moscow, and, under cover of a homosexual "organization" (homosexuality was still legal in Russia at that time) started a whole network of National-Socialist propaganda. Its threads extended into the provinces, to Leningrad, Kharkov, Kiev, etc. A number of persons in literary and artistic circles were involved: the private secretary of a very prominent actor, known for his homosexual inclinations, an important scientific collaborator of the Lenin Institute, etc. These connections were utilized by the Germans not only to procure military information, but also to sow disintegration in government and Party circles. The aims of those directing this conspiracy were so far-reaching that the leaders of Soviet policy were compelled to intervene. Thus, there gradually ensued the change in foreign policy which soon led to Russia's entry into the League of Nations, and to the creation of the "Popular Front" in France. Naturally, this change did not take place without a great deal of discussion. It was not easy to overcome the old, deeply-rooted orientation for an alliance with Germany, even with a reactionary Germany, for the purpose of bringing about an explosion in the victorious countries. This was all the more difficult because it was clear that a new orientation in the direction of the democratic parties of Western Europe would inevitably lead to considerable changes in the *internal policy* of the Soviet Union.

The reversal of Government foreign policy mentioned by the "old Bolshevik" was carried out during the course of 1934. At the beginning of that year the Comintern still was adhering to its tortuous and complicated plan of action. It was anticipating a war of the imperialist Powers and hoping that the beneficiaries might be Russia and the world revolution. In France the local Communists were protesting against increased rearmament, were extolling revolutionary defeatism, and at the time of the riots of February 6 demanded the arrest of Daladier. The change from this policy was radical. On September 18, 1934, Soviet Russia became a member of the League of Nations. In May 1935 she concluded the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with France. Stalin promised Laval that henceforth the French Communists would not sabotage plans for French national defense. Parallel to this evolution came a slackening of the economic and military ties which had existed between Moscow and Berlin since the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922. There had been some 70,000 German officers, engineers, technicians and workmen in Soviet Russia. Numbers of these now left. Soviet business concerns in Germany were closed. There may have been one exception to the operation of

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the new policy. According to details given from apparently well-informed Russian sources in the *Basler Nachrichten* for June 27, 1937, certain officers of the Red Army, including Tukhachevsky, had agreed to continue to remain in contact with their German colleagues. Stalin approved — it was useful to have this card up his sleeve. We naturally cannot verify this hypothesis, which, however, coincides with the views put forward by the *Socialist Messenger*. Other reports published in the *Basler Nachrichten* virtually coincide with those of Wickham Steed.[8]

And now let me add to this mélange of views one given me recently by a Soviet leader who must obviously remain anonymous. His statement confirms in many respects the general thesis which I have said is held in many European foreign offices and by various leading publicists, as also much that is written by the "old Bolshevik." The Soviet functionary spoke as follows:

Obviously, the charges of espionage and treason against the generals should not be taken literally.[9] The charges were framed so as to impress the masses and deprive friends of the conspirators of any opportunity to stir up public opinion against the Government. Nevertheless, there really was a Fascist and pro-German plot. The eight men shot had received training in Germany. During ten years of collaboration with the *Reichswehr*, in the period when Germany and Soviet Russia were following the Rapallo policy, they had formed numerous contacts with German officers. You may not know, but now I can tell you, that at certain times between 1923 and 1933, half of the German army was on Russian soil. Not for nothing did Krupp obtain tremendous concessions of lands in Russia. After the end of the Rapallo policy in 1933, Tukhachevsky, Uborevich and others remained firm in their conviction of the superiority of the German military technique and ideas. Naturally: military matters were their business. Then, too, Lenin taught us that we must assimilate the methods of our class enemies. Hence we sent dozens of young officers to study in military academies in Germany and Japan, just as today we send them to Belgium and France. If it had not been for the Spanish war, we still should be believing in the superiority of Germany strategy and armaments. But the first Soviet aviators who saw action in Spain in 1936 found out that all they had been told about German military superiority was nonsense.

Even as early as the conversations which prepared the way for the Treaty of

[8] Thus in March 1937 the *Basler Nachrichten* reported that opinion was divided in Moscow, and continued that Tukhachevsky, pointing to the Spanish war, argued that the Western Powers were seeking to exploit for their own benefit the hostility between Germany and Russia. He declared for an alliance with Germany which would give Russia a free hand in the Baltic countries, Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria.

[9] This admission, made quite simply, is in the best Communist tradition. One sample will suffice. *Pravda* published last January a letter which Lenin had addressed to the Commissar of Justice in 1922, containing the following: "I think that it is necessary to widen the application of capital punishment to include all forms of activity by Mensheviks, Social Revolutionists, etc. It is necessary to find a formula connecting these activities with the international bourgeoisie and its fight against us."

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Mutual Assistance between France and Russia, our attention had been drawn to Kork, the Director of the War College in Moscow, who was accused of having suspicious relations with Germany. We did not believe the charge. A year later we learned that Paris did not consider Tukhachevsky to be entirely trustworthy. We put the accusation down to malice, for we always had the highest opinion of his abilities. But France, and Czechoslovakia too, continued to be uneasy.[10] Both countries naturally had to be certain that Soviet Russia would not turn out to be an untrustworthy ally because of any sympathy between high Soviet generals and the Reichswehr. Our eyes were opened unexpectedly by the discovery of irrefutable proofs. You recall that just before he was removed and executed the Marshal had been appointed the official delegate of the U. S. S. R. to the Coronation of George VI. General Yakir was arrested only a few days after his appointment as head of the Leningrad military district. You will agree that a government doesn't take steps in that sequence unless it has good reasons!

Do we have proofs that the plot against Stalin and the Government went so far as to include treason to Russia and connivance with Germany? I can only tell you this. After the arrest of Yagoda, former chief of the OGPU, his successor, Yezhov, discovered some interesting clews in the secret *dossiers*. His subsequent investigations, plus evidence obtained from counter-espionage, confirmed many of the accusations earlier levelled against Tukhachevsky and Kork. We learned that General Putna, the Russian Military Attaché at London, possessed the confidence of the German Military Attaché and was the intermediary between Moscow and Berlin. We pieced together how General Uborevich spent his time when he vacationed in Germany last summer. Besides these proofs on the Russian side, I suspect that the French "Second Bureau" has some interesting facts. At any rate, our General Staff gave the French officers who were in Moscow in June and July of this year all the evidence accumulated against Tukhachevsky.[11]

You ask whether the execution of Marshal Tukhachevsky will weaken the prestige of the Soviet Army in the countries linked with the U. S. S. R. by pacts of mutual assistance, in particular whether France will agree to make the military alliance which Moscow has long and insistently demanded. We need not bother too much about the reaction of the French press. What matters is that the men at the top, whose opinion is decisive in great affairs of this sort, should know the facts. And they do. As for the Red Army, it contains plenty of excellent officers. Those who have succeeded the traitors are men of first-rate ability, among them, to name only a few, Egorov, Fedko and Belov.

Regarding the domestic program of the conspirators my informer limited himself to saying that they were for "the restora-

[10] Reports to this effect have since been given currency in many places. *The Week*, London, stated, June 30, 1937, that the French Military Attaché in Moscow had commented on Tukhachevsky's "hostile attitude." This article is reprinted in *Soviet Russia Today*, New York, August 1937. See also an article by Pierre Dominique in *L'Europe Nouvelle*, Paris, June 19, 1937.

[11] The French journalist, "Pertinax," who has the confidence of members of the French General Staff, accepts the theory that Tukhachevsky *et al* were in contact with *Reichswehr* officers, were attempting to free the Red Army of Party control, and wished to act with rather than against Hitler.

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tion of capitalism." This must be accepted with reserve. Orthodox Communists regard the slightest deviation from the official policy of the Party as preparing the way for capitalism. The formula put forward by Kerensky, that the idea was to set up a limited "state socialism," seems to me more likely to suit the mentality of the people who the conspirators hoped would follow their leadership. Nor, of course, does that formula exclude a possible foreign orientation towards Germany. Quite the contrary.

We have very little basis for judging the accuracy of all the various statements, many of them irresponsible, now being made about Tukhachevsky. A French officer, Pierre Fervacque, who had been his companion when both were prisoners of war in Germany in 1916, describes the former ensign of the Guards as a courageous man, patriotic, sincerely nationalist, and extremely ambitious. He had adhered to Bolshevism because of the prospect of new revolutionary wars and a resolve to obtain revenge for the shame of Brest-Litovsk. In an article published in *Le Temps* for July 24, 1937, M. Fervacque refrained from alluding to the late Marshal's ideas on foreign policy, although he had recently had a private talk with him. He merely brought forward the hypothesis that the "mystic" army chief's "Pan-Slavist" and expansionist projects conflicted with the "cold resolution" of the more prudent Soviet dictator.

As a matter of fact, there is no doubt that after 1917 Tukhachevsky was indeed a resolute partisan of "revolutionary imperialism" and dreamed of carrying the Revolution to neighboring countries at the point of the bayonet. Trotsky, who held the Marshal in great esteem (General Putna also), wrote recently that Tukhachevsky had long ago insisted on the creation of a "world general staff" which was to exist side by side with the Communist International.[12] For a short time, when his troops approached Warsaw in August 1920, he believed that his ambitious plans would be realized. But then occurred his first clash with Stalin. The latter, then political commissar with the Army of the South, deflected his forces from Warsaw contrary to the orders of Tukhachevsky and directed them against Lwów in the hope of conquering Galicia. Budenny and Egorov were with Stalin at that time. Tukhachevsky attributed his defeat before Warsaw to this deflection. Trotsky has expressed the same idea in his autobiography. In a recent article published in a Soviet

[12] "The Revolution Betrayed," New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1937, p. 211.

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military review, Tukhachevsky criticized in retrospect, without mentioning names, the military ideas of "the group infested with Tsarism" which during the civil war had been in violent conflict with Trotsky, the head of the Red Army. The group he referred to was the group dominated by Voroshilov and Stalin!

Then was Tukhachevsky a Trotskyite? But how reconcile this idea with the pro-German plot, with the nationalistic direction of his socialism and with his condemnation of internationalism? With determination and the use of Marxian dialectic it is not entirely impossible. We should not forget that in 1923 Trotskyites like Radek and Pyatakov were on good terms with German magnates like Stinnes, Krupp and Schlageter. Tukhachevsky was above all an ambitious general. To him the means to his end mattered little.

Trotsky's recent writings show how a man can find arguments to justify any kind of an adventure. He energetically condemns Stalin's thesis that Nazi Germany is the principal threat to the peace of Europe. In this respect he makes no difference between Germany and the Western democracies. In the *Bulletin de l'Opposition* (December 1935, No. 46) he wrote of the "superficial not to say trite idea of international relations" which merely substitutes "Fascism" for the "Prussian militarism" of the period 1914–1918 and which arraigns "Democracy" again in opposition. In another article published in April 1936, dealing with an interview given to Roy Howard by Stalin, Trotsky said: "Russia's true means of defense consists in weakening the position of imperialism and reinforcing that of the proletariat and colonials the world over. Although we are determined to preserve the fundamentals of the Revolution, an unfavorable situation may force us to cede various 'bits' of land, as we did in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. On the other hand a favorable situation obliges the Workers' State to aid revolutionary movements in other countries. The assistance should be not only moral but material. Wars of liberation are preludes to wars of revolution." Again, Trotsky attributes Hitler's rise to power to Stalin's weak policy. Thus he wrote in February 1934: "If the Government of the U. S. S. R. had stated at the opportune moment that it considered the rise of Hitler as a threat, if taking advantage of the situation in Europe it had at once resorted to military measures along Russia's western frontier, it would have reassured the German workers and Germany could have become a Republic of Soviets."

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So much to indicate the ideas which can find place in a mind dominated by dialectic. We are led back to a statement made earlier in this article which clearly seems true. Trotsky and Zinoviev became unpopular in Russia because of their political adventurousness. The Revolutionary romanticism of 1918–1919 is out of fashion. Russians want peace so as to be able to build their state, their economy and their private lives without the interruptions of foreign war. Here probably is one of the secrets why Stalin's violent purges could be accomplished without resistance.

If the conclusions drawn by the Mensheviks and by Trotsky are alike too hasty, those of the Fascists are evidently the product of wishful thinking. Thus the *Critica Fascista*, edited by Signor Bottai, believes that Stalin is developing towards "an organized authoritative national democracy, with forms of state ownership and management of industry existing side by side with forms of private property." Another article in the *Critica* entitled "Stalin's Fascism" concludes that Stalin's evolution since 1935 proves the natural power of expansion possessed by Mussolini's ideas of revolution. Yet obviously on the vital issue, the nature of the economic régime, Stalinism differs radically from Fascism.

In trying to understand what is taking place in Russia, one evidently must renounce in advance all the ready-made formulæ and criteria which might serve in discussing a state with a normal life — a state possessing an adequate defense, a loyal army, established laws and a seasoned civilization. In Russia everything is still new. We are watching the elaboration of a new state and a new society. The counterpart has never existed in history. To predict what will eventually emerge we should be obliged to penetrate into Carlyle's "dim regions" and "imponderables of history." The future Russian state will be, I believe, the resultant of blind historical forces. Those are the forces which have caused the great zigzags of Soviet evolution, each of them drenched in blood, each of them exacting its toll of human victims.

The immediate future, meanwhile, depends on two factors: the Communist Party, or rather Joseph Stalin; and the character and temperament of the new Soviet generation mentioned above.

As for Stalin, I personally incline to believe that he still cherishes the ideal of a classless society, that he has remained faithful to Lenin, remembering better than others, perhaps, what the Master taught about the world revolution: *power first of all!* All means are good to come to power. Once established, all means are

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good to retain power, even, if necessary, the renunciation provisionally of some parts of the program. What is forbidden Social Democrats is allowed to Communists. The former are still agents of the bourgeois influence even when they indulge in revolutionary acts; the latter are the sole representatives of the revolution of the proletariat even when they make working alliances with the bourgeoisie. On this much Stalin was in agreement with the other heirs of Lenin. But at each crisis of the Revolution serious divergencies regarding practice arose between the heirs. Each conceived himself to be the only true interpreter of the Revolutionary will of the proletariat; each tried to eliminate his adversaries by accusing them of falling prey to bourgeois influence. This is the key to the steady internecine strife within the Communist Party. And the result? Stalin manœuvred better than Zinoviev, Trotsky and Bukharin — that is all. He frequently borrowed largely from the program of his opponents, but always when it was least dangerous for the Party and himself. Although a temporizer by nature, whenever he resolved to act he stopped at nothing and hesitated not at all to use the most violent and cruel means. In this respect he resembles Peter the Great, for whom he has vast admiration. Thanks to his theory of "socialism within one country," he has known how to avoid the foreign adventures into which Trotsky and Zinoviev would have plunged headlong. He has made the Comintern a docile instrument of his policy; and with the aid of Voroshilov, Tukhachevsky and Germany (let us not forget Germany: where would Russian armaments be without German financial, commercial and technical help?) he has forged a powerful army, created a war industry, developed a first-rate flying corps and a submarine flotilla, and is now building a navy.

How will he use his formidable new military machine? Will he be tempted, now that the opposition is exterminated, to borrow their foreign policy of world revolution? With the blood of the pro-German generals still fresh on his hands, will he choose their policy, try to reconcile Russia and Germany? The answer to these questions will depend on the development of the general international situation and on the domestic situation in Russia. With regard to the latter, Stalin must certainly take into account the attitude of the new Soviet generation, the second of the two factors which I ventured to call decisive for the next few years.

A foreigner finds tremendous difficulties in understanding the

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new élite which now is taking its place in all the organs of Soviet life. Western ideas of liberty, of tolerance, of goodness are quite foreign to a generation hardened in the frightful Revolutionary years and nurtured daily on an implacable propaganda to hate. Marxism, the Russian Asiatic atavism, the instinctive generosity of the Slavic nature, the thirst for knowledge, an unconscious national pride, the elementary desire to live and to create — these mighty and conflicting conditions and aims have set the minds of the young men of Russia in a most extraordinary whirl. But neither the faults of the Soviet schools nor the stifling environment of dictatorship have been able to change essentially the Russian people. They are extremely gifted and, whatever may be said, they possess a profound political instinct. Did they not build an immense empire? The new generation does not lack able men. They have already distinguished themselves in various domains of technology and science. It does not lack men sincerely devoted to their country, who wish it to be great, rich and happy. What the younger generation does lack is contact with the civilized world, participation in the heritage of abstract knowledge and the free circulation of ideas. Even so, in the course of climbing towards the top of the new Russian social hierarchy these young men from country regions and workers' suburbs have unavoidably heard murmurs about the eternal problems of the mind and soul for which Communism leaves no place — about religion, about canons of beauty, about the family. They have come to know something, somehow, about French styles; they even know about democracy and private property. They will end by knowing about Europe and America.

I have had the opportunity to talk at length with several representatives of this new Russian élite, and I need no excuse, I think, for reproducing the views of one of them as a document bearing on our inquiry. This man, thirty or thirty-five years old, is the son of an artisan and obtained his engineering diploma in Germany. He is an orthodox Stalinite. I put to him the question about the orientation of Russian foreign policy, and added a word designed to bring out his interpretation of the recent executions. Here is his reply:

We Russians begin from the premise that war is inevitable. If we could be sure of having peace for at least twenty-five years, our policy, particularly at home, would be different. We shall do nothing to provoke war; we shall delay it as long as possible. But we must prepare seriously for it. Our foreign office

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works, or is ready to work, with all states that are democratic and pacifist. We also should like to collaborate with Italy. There was a time when Russia and Mussolini worked together very well; but that changed when Mussolini saw a chance to gain other allies closer home. So he joined in the chorus about the Communist danger.

Of course, the *ultimate* goal of our external policy still is to liquidate the capitalist system. But we have abandoned the methods of Zinoviev and Trotsky. We are through with adventures. There have been enough in the past — in China, in Germany, in Estonia. They cost us dear. Zinoviev and Radek fed us fairy stories about the strength of the German Communists. They were supposed to number five million. What became of them in the moment of crisis? Hitler seized power without having to strike a blow. Not one Communist stirred. Now we have better information about the real strength of Communists abroad.

Our desires can be put in a few words: to be left alone so that we can build our socialist society, develop the country, raise the standard of living, and transform the ignorant and barbarian Russian peasants of former times into agricultural workers associated in the *kolhoz*. A tremendous amount remains to be done in every field. We must push on as fast as possible.

We are afraid the capitalist states will not tolerate the firm establishment of a socialist state covering one-sixth of the globe. They know what an inspiration that would be for their own proletariat. Bourgeois statesmen already envisage a preventive war to destroy the source of Communist contagion. Even the democratic countries will turn against us when their liberals and radicals find the sacrosanct institutions of private property threatened.

Here I interposed an objection. I said:

Even the conservative bourgeoisie will not attack Russia, for the mere reason that the Russian economic régime is too different from that of other countries. Apart from Germany and Japan, Russia has no national enemies. Russia will acquire other enemies only if she does certain things: (1) If she competes too strongly with them for world markets. This quarrel would be the same as that between the capitalist countries themselves. (2) If she intervenes in their domestic affairs and endeavors to introduce Communist methods into their social development. In that case Russia risks acquiring the hostility not only of the upper bourgeoisie but also of the petty bourgeoisie and the workers.

The young Russian rejoined:

You know we have changed our tactics. We must rally the lower classes. The orders of the Comintern now are not to touch small individual holdings of property. Now don't tell me that this is being untrue to ourselves. Of course we cannot renounce giving help to the working class when it comes in open conflict with Fascism. We are aiding the workers in Spain and we shall always aid those in a similar situation. That does not mean that we are in favor of Sovietizing Spain. I repeat, we are opposed to adventures. But the imponderables are working on our side. Armed conflict everywhere between the proletariat and bourgeoisie is inevitable.

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To my question how he explained Stalin's purges, he answered:

There are two parallel sets of purges. The first is that of the Trotskyites, adventurers, and spies. The second is that of corrupt bureaucrats and the profiteers of the Revolution who at the present time are directors of industry or ministers of state and believe they can do anything.

You cannot imagine all the harm which the Trotskyites have caused. When the Master [Stalin] surveyed the field of public education what did he find? The Trotskyites held all the teaching posts and had suppressed the teaching of history. Our children were no longer going to know the great past of Russia. How were the Trotsky-inspired histories interpreting the past? Peter the Great was a drunkard, Catherine the Great a tart. True, Catherine had her paramours, but she continued Peter's work of making Russia great. The Trotskyites told the youth nothing of the Russian poet, Pushkin. If they had had their way, they would have suppressed the theater and the ballet of which Russians ought to be proud. In place of the thought of the best Russian thinkers, they substituted doctrines imported by Austrian or German émigrés. They made out the very greatest Russian painters, Repine and Sourikov, and the national sculptor, Antokolski, as ridiculous, as reactionaries. They forbade the music of Glinka and Borodin. In a word, everything Russian was suspect. But Russia is still alive.

I tried to find out how it had come about, in the theory of Stalin's young adherents, that the men who after all had helped make the Revolution could become spies in the service of Germany or Japan. This was the answer:

We discovered some extraordinary things in studying the old *dossiers*. Many of these who later became Trotskyites and Zinovievites were in contact with German spies during the World War. I should not be surprised if some day documents were published revealing that in 1917 some of the immediate entourage of Lenin were German spies. You recall the story of the sealed train? Where there is smoke there is fire. Then, too, we naïvely received with open arms all the Communists that Germany, Austria and Hungary expelled. There was a good percentage of spies among them. As to the Communist leaders suspected at various times of espionage — Kamenev, Pyatakov *et al* — they were pardoned twenty times, given important positions, and each time resumed their intrigues. We could not condone them forever. It was necessary to have a final cleanout.

There also had to be a purge of another sort of dangerous characters, and this has been only partly accomplished. Many local tyrants and venal administrators still remain to be unmasked. We will do this when we can hold elections. We shall be pitiless in expelling all who have earned the hostility of the population. It was unavoidable that many should fall victim to the possession of unlimited power. One automobile was no longer sufficient, they must have one for their wife, another for traveling. They must have a villa and trips abroad. Then there are others who try to live just on memories of the struggle against Tsarism and the civil war. They did their bit once and now suppose it is enough for them to make speeches and draft resolutions. We are through with them,

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too. We need men who know their business. We no longer need theoretical revolutionaries. Finally, there are those who dream of new battles. Before dying they wish to command a division of the Revolutionary Army in England or in Italy. We are through with these adventurers too.

I said that this was all very well, but didn't he think that instead of combating corruption by arbitrary action it would be much simpler to establish freedom of the press and give the people the possibility of controlling their government? The young Stalinite replied:

You mean freedom to establish political parties, to found newspapers? What good are these institutions? We do not want the confusion we see in many parts of Europe, with dozens of parties battling among themselves. We are surrounded by enemies. We cannot afford to talk about principles. We have a nation of 170 millions to keep in order.

The "old Bolshevik" whose letter I cited earlier in this article gave objective recognition to the validity of the complaints formulated against some members of his generation by my "young Bolshevik" friend. But neither of them mentions another cause which contributed to the purges. The progress of Soviet industry in 1935 and 1936 was accompanied by innumerable accidents, caused by badly handled or worn-out machinery, insufficient technical preparation, lack of organization, and feverish haste. The product naturally suffered both in quality and in volume. During the first six months of 1937 industrial production fell behind schedule. As usual, scapegoats had to be found. The villains were sought out. They were accused of sabotage and, if they were so unfortunate as once to have admired Trotsky, they were shot or jailed.

I can best indicate what I tend to believe is Stalin's internal policy by saying that he is trying to keep pace with the ideas forming in the minds of the young Soviet generation. These, as we have seen, are ill-defined, often contradictory, but turn principally about the desire for a more regular life. Only slowly and through experience does the new ruling class discover truths; but, once known, these appear elementary. Each time a group which belonged to the Bolshevik Party in the old days attacks the new empirical truths, Stalin labels their criticisms as "Trotskyite." Incidentally, he seizes the occasion to excuse some of the failures of the Communist system or of his régime by putting the blame for such failures on "saboteurs," "spies," "foreign agents" and "enemies" of all sorts.

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Up to the moment of Hitler's advent in Germany there was room in Soviet Russia for some differences of opinion as to the most advantageous foreign policy to follow. But after the Nazis took power it became plain that democratic and Fascist governments were not equally dangerous to Soviet Russia. Those who had urged that the German Communists be instructed to make trouble for the German Republic by helping the Nazis, on the theory that in the ensuing chaos the Communists could seize power in Germany, had been proved wrong. To urge that kind of adventurous foreign policy no longer represented a tolerable divergence of opinion. Peace had to be saved for Soviet Russia; Fascism had to be checked before it became a preponderant force in the world; Communism had to be developed at home, not fought for abroad. Yet the group which can roughly be labeled as Trotskyite continued to hold to some of their former ideas. They favored making terms with Germany, perhaps with Japan, as the most promising means of keeping Russia at peace. Germany and Japan would then be free to turn their attention to their other neighbors; and if wars were perchance to ensue, so much the better — Soviet Russia would remain aloof, and international Communism might profit in the ensuing social chaos. Against this view Stalin and Litvinov set themselves strongly. They favored maintaining peace for Russia by joining the collective system, by working with the democratic countries in the League of Nations. The sort of difference of opinion which in 1929 had led simply to the expulsion of Trotsky rather than to his execution, led in 1936 to the execution of those who still pursued some of his policies. Stalin brushed aside Lenin's warning not to fall into the Jacobin error of "mutual extermination." His dictatorship had come to the logical conclusion of all dictatorships: any difference of opinion is treason.

Outside these two ideological groups, or rather as an adjunct to one of them, was the military clique headed by Tukhachevsky. These officers were intent on creating a Red Army free from Party control; they were partisans of the policy of making terms with Germany; it seems that they went further and plotted with the Reichswehr; at all events — and it was enough — they were rivals of Stalin and would-be inheritors of his power. Tukhachevsky thought that he could make himself the Bonaparte of the revolution. He met a dictatorial will more ruthless than his own.

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THE MOSCOW TRIALS

A Legal View

By Max Radin

TWO trials that took place in Soviet Russia, one in August 1936, and the other in January 1937, engaged the attention of the world. The first resulted in the immediate execution of the sixteen defendants; the second, in the execution of thirteen out of seventeen defendants and the condemnation of the other four to long terms of imprisonment.

The defendants were members of a group called by many the "Old Bolsheviks," but designated by the government of the U.S.S.R. as members of a "Trotskyite-Zinovievite Center" or of a "Trotskyite Center." That is to say, they constituted a group of political opponents who professed that they and not the existing government were the true exponents of the doctrines of Marx and of Lenin, doctrines that both sides maintain to be the proper governing principles of the Union of Soviet Republics. With the truth or the falsity of this claim, we need not concern ourselves. The point is that the defendants were accused of crimes committed as part of a political scheme and were, therefore, to a certain extent charged with political crimes, although the specific acts cited would be criminal enough in all conscience whatever the motives.

The foreign comment on the trials has been in the main highly unfavorable to the prosecution. Two factors made it so. First, there is prejudice against the existing Russian government almost everywhere. Second, even among persons not prejudiced the spectacle of wholesale executions is profoundly shocking. Subsequent executions on similar charges, particularly in Siberia, have intensified this feeling in the United States.

A real basis for judgment regarding the merits of the case and the nature of the trials has now been furnished us by the official publication in an English translation of a verbatim report of the second of the two trials, that which took place January 23–30, 1937, in Moscow before the "Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R."[1] The defendants were seventeen persons

[1] "Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center." Moscow: People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R., 1937, 580 p. (New York: Bookniga Corporation, $1.00.)

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of whom the best known outside of Russia were Pyatakov and Radek, although many of the others were notable persons in Russia and familiar names to those acquainted with recent Russian history. All seventeen were accused of "treason against the country, espionage, acts of diversion, wrecking activities and the preparation of terrorist acts, *i.e.* of crimes covered by Articles 58^{1a}, 58^{8}, 58^{9}, and 58^{11} of the criminal code of the R.S.F.S.R."

In the further specification of these charges, given in pp. 5–19 of the report, they are accused specifically:

1. of having entered into communication with two foreign countries, Germany and Japan, and having promised the surrender of the Ukraine to Germany and of the Maritime Provinces and the Amur region to Japan; and of having further promised both countries valuable economic concessions and especially a high degree of economic control over Russia;

2. of having furnished to these same foreign governments important information regarding particular munition resources of the country (p. 15);

3. of having organized the wreck of several trains in 1935 and 1936, in one of which twenty-nine soldiers were killed and twenty-nine injured and in all of which great property damage was caused; this under direct instructions from members of the Japanese and German intelligence service (pp. 12–15);

4. of having attempted to murder the Commissar V. M. Molotov and of having planned the murder of other leaders of the Government.

These four charges obviously are all extremely serious. They are not merely what lawyers call *mala prohibita*, morally indifferent acts declared to be unlawful by statute, but *mala in se*, acts of so obviously immoral a quality that any reasonable person would know them to be so even without knowing the statute. Nor is there any suggestion of *ex post facto* punishment or of any violation of the principle of *nulla poena sine lege* with which the humanitarians of the eighteenth century successfully combated "reasons of state" as the basis of punishment. These acts are not merely among those generally recognized as crimes in most modern civilized communities, but were definitely described in available sections of the Russian Penal Code, duly specified in the indictments.

From examination of the nature of the charges we must now turn to the procedure. Was the procedure such that any rights of

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defendants in such cases in western civilized countries were violated?

Formally, no such violation took place. The defendants had been arrested and examined in a preliminary hearing, the character of which I shall discuss later. They knew in advance the charges against them. The charges were repeated to them on arraignment. They were allowed counsel, a permission of which only three availed themselves. The opportunity to be represented by counsel was renewed for the others at the opening of the trial (p. 3).

They were then asked to plead, after an elaborate and somewhat denunciatory recital of the charges (pp. 4–19). Each one was addressed personally and each one of the seventeen pleaded guilty (p. 20) when his name was called.

In England and in most parts of the United States this would have ended the trial, in its proper sense. At the Common Law the only thing that can follow a plea of guilty is the sentence of the court announcing the punishment. Until recent statutes, the court had little discretion in the matter. Usually the penalty, within limits, was determined in advance by law. The power to suspend sentence is a recent one bestowed by statute. It is no part of the judge's office as such. In New York, however, and in a few other states of the Union, a plea of "not guilty" is automatically entered in a capital charge.

We must understand the term "trial" in the case under examination as a public demonstration that these persons who had pleaded guilty were in fact really guilty of the acts which they have admitted. The demonstration is addressed not to the court, but to the public, Russian and foreign, and evinces a desire for general approval of their course and a sensitiveness to criticism that revolutionary governments in the past have not always shown.

There are instances even at Common Law when, the accused having pleaded guilty, something like a trial may be necessary to determine the character and degree of the punishment or even whether punishment is to be inflicted. We have had a notable example not long ago in the Loeb-Leopold case in Chicago, in which after a plea of guilty an elaborate trial took place, quite as complete as if a plea of "not guilty" had been entered. The only purpose this trial could have had was to determine whether the death penalty or imprisonment should be inflicted, although

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actually much of the evidence submitted was irrelevant for this question.

While the four parts of the indictment consist of completely separate acts, they are none the less obviously connected. The gravamen of the charge against these seventeen defendants is that all of the crimes committed were part of a general plan of counter-revolutionary activities formed by a "parallel" or "underground" Trotskyite center at Moscow, and that these activities were directed by a single head animated by a single purpose. The defendants are charged with conspiracy. Only in the case of some of them is it assumed that they actually in their own persons did or attempted to do the acts recited.

It is, however, important to remember that in the case of conspiracy the individual participation of all the defendants in all the acts need not be proved. We may quote from an American case (U. S. v. Lancaster, 44 Fed. 896) the following general formulation of our law on the subject:

> It is not necessary that the conspirators should meet together in order to constitute the unlawful combination. If they have a mutual understanding, and act through one or more individuals, as a consequence of such mutual understanding, the conspiracy may be complete. . . . It is, indeed, not necessary that all the conspirators should be acquainted even with each other. If they conspire to accomplish the illegal purpose through one common acquaintance or go-between, the conspiracy may be complete. — U. S. v. Lancaster (C. C. Ga. 1891) 44 F. 896.

Who the head of this conspiracy was is not left in doubt. At the end of the court's sentence in the August trial of Kamenev, Zinoviev and their associates, and at the end of the official sentence in the trial of Pyatakov and Radek and the rest, there is a special reference to Trotsky and his son Sedov. In both cases it is stated that they have been "convicted by the evidence and by the materials" and that "in the event of their being discovered on the territory of the U.S.S.R., they are subject to immediate arrest and trial by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R."

In our terminology, "conviction" cannot very well be *followed* by "trial." We must assume that the word *predanie sudu*, which is here translated by "trial," means rather what it literally says, *i.e.* "to be delivered up for judgment" or else that in this case the term *izoblichennie*, which literally means "revealed," is the equivalent, not of "convicted" in our sense, but "accused" or

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"indicted," although the indictment is more like the *gravis praesumptio* of English medieval law. Trotsky and Sedov are officially described in the January trial as "enemies of the people," *vragi naroda* (p. 580). If this is a declaration of outlawry, equivalent to the *mise hors la loi* decreed by the French Convention against Robespierre and his associates in Thermidor, 1794, the only legal proceeding left would be the identification of the outlaws, and in that case the sentence is practically one of death.

The figure of Trotsky, indeed, is the dominating one — in the official title of the case, throughout the testimony, in the summing up of the prosecutor, in the speeches of the accused, and in the formal sentence of the court. If there were no such person as Trotsky or if he did not do the things there ascribed to him, make the plans, issue the directions, send the communications referred to in these reports, the case against nearly all of the defendants — not quite all — would be considerably weakened, since the confession of each one is in many instances merely an admission of participating in a plot organized by Trotsky. It is quite true that they may have conspired for their own purposes and used the name of Trotsky either to gain adherents or, upon arrest, to mitigate their own guilt by pretending to have been his dupes. That, however, is a pure conjecture.

Trotsky was, of course, not present at the Moscow trial. Before the so-called Dewey Commission, however, which sat at Coyoacan April 11–17, 1937, he had a full opportunity of testifying in regard to all the statements made by the defendants. Before this commission Trotsky stated specifically that since his expulsion from Soviet Russia, he had been in no communication, direct or indirect — except to a limited extent which is not material in this instance — with any of the defendants in either the August 1936 or the January 1937 trials. He denied inciting them to do the acts they confessed doing. His statements, therefore, amount to a denial that he was associated with them in the conspiracy to commit the crimes charged and, to speak technically, he enters an emphatic plea of not guilty to the charge of conspiracy.

A real issue is accordingly raised on the charge of conspiracy. This issue does not quite go to the root of the matter so far as concerns those of the defendants who do not claim to have had any communication with Trotsky himself. But we must decide whether we will believe Pyatakov, who says he spoke to Trotsky at Oslo in 1935, and Radek, who said he received letters from

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Trotsky between 1933–1935, or Trotsky, who declares he neither wrote to Radek nor spoke to Pyatakov.

That decision cannot really be made on the basis of a printed record. Personal acquaintance with the men who thus contradict each other would be helpful. It would be still better if they could be confronted with each other in public. Since that cannot be done, we are reduced to estimates which must at best be unsatisfactory and which cannot help being colored by prepossessions.

The testimony of Pyatakov and Radek and of the others who claim to have received instructions from Trotsky and Sedov is partially what is known as self-serving. Most of these men were executed, but they may well have hoped for clemency and some of them in their final speeches make an unqualified plea to be spared. They may have supposed that their chances of receiving a lighter sentence were greater if they represented themselves as the dupes of the arch-conspirator, Trotsky. Trotsky's denials are also obviously self-serving.

On the specific question of Pyatakov's airplane visit to Trotsky at Oslo in December 1935 the balance of probability is in favor of Trotsky's denial. It is certainly true that there is no regular airplane service in winter between Berlin and Oslo. There is further an official report that no foreign airplane landed in Oslo between September 1935 and May 1936. If Pyatakov went by air from Berlin to Oslo, as he states, it must have been with the connivance of both the German and Norwegian officials. That is not excluded as a possibility in view of the accusations made of Nazi interest in these intrigues, but no statement is made to this effect by Pyatakov.

In the case of Radek and those others who professed to have been in communication with Trotsky and Sedov, it is a sheer case of assertion by one person and denial by another.

Sedov, Trotsky's son, is in Paris and, we may suppose, will appear before a French commission similar to the Dewey Commission which met at Coyoacan. No specific denials — except in regard to minor matters — are quoted from him, but we may assume that like his father he denies having transmitted the instructions which are declared in the January trial to form the basis of the conspiracy. It is, however, admitted that he did meet Smirnov and Holtzmann, defendants in the August trial, at the time he is declared by the defendants in both cases to have met them.

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Can we disregard all the statements concerning Trotsky and Sedov? Whether they acted for themselves or as Trotsky's agents, the seventeen defendants accused in January confessed in detail and in open court that they conspired and took steps to commit treason, murder and sabotage. Is it conceivable that men would so fully confess such serious crimes unless they were guilty of them? Were they tortured, mentally or physically, during their imprisonment or their preliminary examination? Were they tricked into confession by promises of remission of sentence? Were they induced to confess by threats of suffering to be inflicted on their families? All these things are theoretically possible. There is no specific evidence that any one of them occurred here in the case of any one of these defendants.

We should be in a better position to determine the value of the confession if we knew at what stage of the proceedings the confessions were first obtained. As would be the procedure in other Continental countries, the public trial in this case was preceded by a preliminary examination, like the *instruction* of the French procedure. This may be protracted and secret. It resembles in some respects the Grand Jury hearing or the preliminary hearing before the magistrate in England and America. It differs, however, in many respects from both of these. There is no rule against self-incrimination and the accused at this stage is usually not entitled to counsel as a matter of right. Torture, however, is prohibited and, if it occurs, is as illicit as the "third degree" methods too often used in the United States.

The results of the preliminary examination were before the Russian court in a great many volumes — at least thirty-six volumes — although we do not quite know what a "volume" is in this case. But these results are not available to public inspection. For that there may be reasons which would be accepted in similar investigations in other countries. The volumes may contain matters involving personalities of foreign diplomats or of the police whose identity it was not advisable to disclose. But explained or not, we do not know what took place at these investigations nor when or under what circumstances each of the thirty men involved in both trials confessed. We can only guess, and our guesses will not further our search.

The confessions elicited in the preliminary examination were repeated during the trial. In fact the so-called examination of the defendants is little more than a detailed confession. The confes-

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sions are repeated sometimes with rhetorical amplifications in the final pleas of all the defendants.

It must first be noted that in no comparable cases in the history of western Europe did the defendants confess. In English state trials confession is rare and when it occurs it is defiant, not submissive. In the trials before the French Revolutionary tribunal in 1793–1794, confessions were extremely rare and the opposition leaders, Hébert, Danton, Robespierre, who successively were condemned along with all their associates, denounced their accusers violently and publicly. The defendants in the Moscow trials acted quite differently.

There have, of course, been false confessions. In fact, a vigorous controversy has raged for nearly two centuries in Common Law jurisdictions as to the value of confessions. Dean Wigmore in his classic treatise on Evidence has given the history of the controversy and has shown how confused the discussion has been in part and how easily one can substantiate from our greatest legal authorities — Lord Stowell, to take one example — the doctrine first, that confession is the least reliable, and next, that it is the most reliable kind of evidence.

The point, of course, is to inquire who is confessing and where. In general it is undoubtedly true, as Mr. Justice Stephen said, "Most persons accused of crime were poor, stupid and helpless," and — to quote Blackstone — the confessions of such persons are undoubtedly "the weakest and most suspicious of all testimony." The confessions in medieval witchcraft trials are particular examples. They were made chiefly by wretchedly poor and half-demented women who, we may add, were usually firmly convinced of their own guilt.

But the defendants in this case were not poor or stupid. Nor were they, properly speaking, helpless. They knew from the nature of the proceedings how much the government desired the approval of the world. If a single one of these doomed men had turned on his accusers, he would have discredited the Stalin régime more completely than by a year of intrigue. That not a single one did so, makes the situation unique in the history of criminal trials, unless the confessions are substantially true.

It is the fact of confession that must be explained. Besides the suggestion of some form of torture, of false promises of pardon, of sufferings to be inflicted on their families, there is the possibility of what is called "mass suicide." Suicide is a motive sug-

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gested by Trotsky. To many Americans, such a suggestion seems fantastic. And it may well be fantastic. Still, it is not to be brushed aside. We have more than once found Russian psychology, as it is portrayed in literature, difficult to understand. And we have often assumed that a morbid desire to confess is one of the elements of this psychology. It is not inconceivable that a group of men actively supporting a political doctrine may feel that they do not wish to survive the wrecking of their political aspirations. In that case, the value of the confession is impaired, even if we can understand why the confession is made. The ancient brocard, *volenti mori non creditur*, is something more than a phrase. Desperate men in the East and West have frequently gone defiantly to death. Perhaps the Russian temperament makes a spectacular resignation to death as plausible as defiance.

But it must be admitted that this suggestion, even if it may be entertained, is highly improbable. The formal confession and the final speeches might be so explained. But the detailed examination and the special form it takes here, are more difficult to understand on this hypothesis. And once more it is a gratuitous theory. What few inferences can be drawn from the actual words of the confession tend to disprove it.

Is there anything else — always on the assumption that the confessions were essentially false and that the defendants were not guilty? Could they have hoped against hope that if they confessed they might receive a lighter sentence than death? That is, after all, the usual reason for confessing.

And, as we know, such a hope was not without foundation. Four of the defendants for whom the prosecutor demanded the death penalty were in fact sentenced to imprisonment. No one could know in advance whether this would happen and who would be spared, if anyone would be. Some of the defendants, *e.g.* Sokolnikov (p. 556), Serebryakov (p. 556), Boguslavsky (559), Drobnis (p. 560), Norkin (p. 561), Stroilov (p. 565), make direct pleas for clemency, sometimes with words of abject self-loathing. Radek, however, makes no such plea. Shestov asks to be shot (p. 563). On the other hand, the fact that there was a motive for confession does not mean that the confession was false. On the contrary, in most cases, public confessions made in open court, even if accompanied by a plea for mercy, are usually true and that fact must give them some degree of credibility here.

If the attempt had been made by confession to throw the chief

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guilt on other members of a common conspiracy, the details of the confession would be under serious suspicion. Something of this sort is attempted in the adroit speech of the defense counsel for Knyazev, as far as Turok is concerned.

Corroboration is offered on some points. Strictly speaking, the requirement that an accomplice's testimony must be corroborated does not apply here, but one of the defendants, Stroilov, testifies to meeting a German representative, Wüster, in Berlin in relation to the plans of sabotage and treason which form one of the bases of the charge against the conspirators (p. 250). Stroilov's notebook, which is offered in evidence, contains Wüster's address, which is corroborated by the German official directory also offered in evidence (p. 276). Again, the photographs of several of the German emissaries in Russia are shown to Stroilov who identifies them by name (p. 277) and these names correspond to those on the passport photograph. It may be stated that this type of corroboration is adequate as to the fact that Stroilov had been in communication with Wüster and other Germans and would be accepted in American courts as corroboration of the testimony of Stroilov in general.

There is frequent reference in the trials to "materials," and in an article written by the procurator Vyshinsky in *Socialist Justice*, July 1936, importance is attached to "objective" evidence instead of the "subjective" determination of guilt which at one time had been accepted as a *ratio decidendi* in Soviet courts and which recalls the *éclaircissement de conscience* of the French Revolutionary Tribunal. By "materials" we are inclined to understand documents. The prosecutor, however, in this case (pp. 512–513) sneers at the suggestion that the documentary evidence is incomplete. "You cannot demand . . . minutes, decisions, membership cards" or a "written program." Obviously not. But as Mr. Duranty — not a hostile observer — is reported to have said, we should have liked *some* document.

Much is said about letters in the course of the trial. They were an important part of the means of communication between the alleged conspirators. They would have furnished strongly corroborative evidence by the mere fact that they are said often to have been in code. Oral testimony as to their contents is not enough, if the letters themselves can be obtained. That is a matter of common sense and not merely the application of a technical rule of the "best evidence." One such letter is actually offered in evidence.

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It is a letter sent by an unnamed Japanese emissary to one of the defendants, Knyazev (p. 383). The letter is not presented in full; but we may assume that it did not unmistakably prove a treasonable compact, nor did it apparently mention anyone but the addressee. Its confirmatory value against Knyazev and its corroboration of the defendant Turok's evidence against Knyazev and himself is undoubted.

We may, therefore, say that the prosecution is aware of the importance of letters in substantiating their charge. What of the other letters? In our practice, if a letter is referred to and not produced, its contents are not admissible in evidence until some testimony is given as to its disposition. We may well suppose that if the defendants received such letters, they promptly destroyed them. But if they did, why is this not stated? And among so many letters, it is inherently likely that more than one would have escaped by the same sort of careless accident as that which concededly allowed the Knyazev letter to survive.

For there were so many conspirators. Not only the defendants here but the seventeen of the August trial and those of the Leningrad group sentenced in December 1934 for the murder of Kirov were involved. Besides, a large number of other persons who are not found in any lists of defendants are referred to throughout the proceedings as agents and assistants of the conspiracy. Did no other written communication between them escape? It seems somewhat improbable.

The most important letter would, of course, have been the particular letter which Radek declared he received from Trotsky in 1932 (pp. 86–87) with detailed statements of Trotsky's plans and designs. No statement is made in the testimony as to the disposition of the letter, but in his final speech (p. 543) Radek declares that he had "unfortunately burned" all the letters he had received from Trotsky. This is the nearest we get to a justification for the absence of all letters; and to many that absence will remain as a permanent cause of dissatisfaction.

A question arises, however, which does not present itself in most trials. The truth of these confessions is doubted, not on the basis of technical or quasi-technical rules of evidence, but on the inherent improbability of their substance. However much the prosecutor may deny the right of these defendants to be called a political group, there can be no question that they did constitute one. This appears from the prosecutor's own historical summing

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up. Most of them — except perhaps Arnold and Hrasche — were or believed themselves to be Marxists, Socialists, Bolsheviks and Russians.

The charges of terrorism and sabotage can scarcely be called inherently improbable, either in Russia or any other country. The difficulty lies in the other charges.

Is it credible that Russian Socialists would have deliberately conspired not merely to become the government of Russia, but to displace the Socialist government by an avowedly capitalist government? Or that they would have deliberately sought to secure the military victory of Germany and Japan over Russia, while Germany and Japan were dominated by violently anti-Socialist groups who were ruthlessly exterminating every vestige of Marxism that they found?

To give such charges any plausibility at all, we must assume that men can take as a deliberate policy the doctrine that things must get worse before they can get better. We can perhaps imagine a dogmatic fanaticism that would actively assist in the defeat of one's own country by the aid of a ferociously anti-Socialist nation, in the hope or in the assured conviction that the victory of Germany and of Japan would lead to the collapse of these countries and would prepare the way for a socialist world-commonwealth. It is true that statements as extreme as these have been made. But that they should seriously be put into execution is hard to believe. Yet, the experience of almost everyone has brought him into contact with a type of fanatic who might well be capable of it. In the last analysis, it is a question of personal psychology.

The defendants, even Radek, a journalist by profession, have published little that is known to persons who do not command Russian.[2] In the case of Trotsky, however, we have not merely his writings in books[3] and articles but we have the detailed examination before the Dewey Commission.[4] He asserts that he has always opposed terrorism as incompatible with Marxist methods, but that his opposition to it was based on its believed ineffectiveness not on the fact that it violates moral principles. He asserts that he has consistently advised a common front against Fascism.

[2] *Editor's Note.* See, however, two articles written by Karl Radek for FOREIGN AFFAIRS — "The War in the Far East: A Soviet View" (July 1932) and "The Bases of Soviet Foreign Policy" (January 1934).

[3] See especially "The Revolution Betrayed" (Garden City: Doubleday, 1937, 308 p.).

[4] The report of the Dewey Commission based on the hearings in Mexico is being published under the title "The Case of Leon Trotsky" (New York: Harper, 1937, 602 p.).

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All such more or less general statements of policy advocated are material but they are conclusive only if we can be sure that Trotsky is not the kind of man who would or could change his tactics under the stress of circumstances, or that he would be incapable of denouncing the Hitler régime in public while secretly joining it in order to overthrow Stalin.

One gets a vivid impression of Trotsky from the report of the Dewey Commission. He seems to be a man of extraordinary keenness of mind, of sweeping personality, of mordant wit and torrential eloquence. But he also shows an intensity of purpose that his opponents might well call fanaticism and a confidence in his own intellectual superiority that they might call arrogance. Such men in time past have not hesitated to change methods or to use extreme measures to achieve ends that seem to them of supreme importance. The testimony of Trotsky is directed to proving that he is not the kind of person who could have conspired to destroy the Stalin régime by terrorism and sabotage or that he could have made terms with the national enemy to destroy the Stalin régime. I am afraid many of those who read the report of the Dewey Commission of inquiry will remain unconvinced of that, even if they are equally unconvinced that he did in fact conspire in this instance.

Only a real and direct acquaintance with the personalities of all these defendants can give those who have been brought up in our intellectual and social climate an insight into their character, and only with such an insight can we judge what they could or could not have done.

It is likely enough on the basis of general probability that a good portion of the evidence used in the preliminary investigation was the testimony of spies. If that is the case, the failure to produce it in public is intelligible. Were the witnesses Romm and Bukhartseff spies in the employ of the G. P. U.? Were any of the many persons who are mentioned as actual participants, and who were not accused either in this trial or in the former ones, spies? The saturation of an opposition movement with governmental spies, like the saturation of the governmental service with secret revolutionaries, is traditional in Russia. If such evidence was presented in the preliminary investigation, we can attach a definite meaning to the recurring statement that the accused were forced to confess by the accumulation of the evidence against them. Confronted with men whom they had regarded as associates and

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whom they discover to be spies in the service of the government, they may well have broken down without the aid of torture or bribery. But the gap is none the less present for those to whom the fact of the confessions in itself offers insuperable difficulties.

There are incidental matters that are hard to understand, supposing that the prosecution had convincing evidence of the guilt of the defendants over and above their confessions.

In the first place, it is difficult to see an adequate basis for the discrimination in the sentences. Four men were sentenced to imprisonment and not to death. Of these four, two, Arnold and Stroilov, might well claim exemption from the extreme penalty. They were clearly the rougher instruments of the crimes. In mind and in character they were men who obeyed the direction of others. Popular feeling, on the whole, is inclined to be as severe toward the actual perpetrator of a crime as toward those who hired and directed him, but a case can be made out for preferential treatment.

It is more difficult to justify the relative leniency of the punishment of Sokolnikov and Radek. Their confessions were full, and in spite of the statement of the court on page 579 there is nothing to indicate that they had a smaller share in the acts charged than most of those who were executed. Nor is there any indication that their confession or testimony was essential to convict the others. As a matter of fact, there is no reason for refusing to take literally the moral responsibility that Radek accepts (p. 95). It is highly likely that the adhesion of a man of Radek's distinction to the group was the determining factor that made some of the others join it.

It is true, however, that grounds of discriminating punishment are ordinarily matters of policy which do not lend themselves to the judgment of outsiders. In any case, they are only slightly relevant to any judgment of the justice of the sentences imposed.

Finally, the attitude of the prosecution does not assist our judgment of the trial. Mr. Vyshinsky has followed the worst traditions of his office. His opening speech and his questions are violent in phraseology and hectoring in tone. Above all, his summing up is highly objectionable. It is full of torrential abuse. On the very first page the following epithets are accumulated: "repulsive," "despicable," "disgusting," "stupid obstinacy," "reptile cold-bloodedness," "professional criminals," "bandits," "nightmare," "horror and revulsion."

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Further, his historical account is disingenuous. He begins (p. 467) with the doctrinal opposition of Trotsky and Lenin in 1904 and runs through the entire history of Trotsky's career from that year to the present. But he does not mention in an address directed specifically to the historical enlightenment of "millions and millions of young workers and peasants" (p. 468) the fact that Trotsky enjoyed the complete confidence of Lenin from the beginning of the Revolution till Lenin's death. This omission wholly distorts the historical sketch he gives at such length and on which he dwells so insistently.

Of course, in speaking in this fashion, the procurator is following accepted models. But by this time it ought to have been long apparent that they are extremely bad models. One of the models is Edward Coke ranting and bellowing in the face of the unfortunate and already condemned Raleigh in order to show his zeal for the new king. Another model is Fouquier-Tinville pouring out cold venom on the men proscribed by the French Revolutionary Convention. Other models could be found in hundreds of politician-prosecutors, in countless American jurisdictions, inveighing against almost any wretched or casual criminal in cases which are likely to receive public attention.

The justification in some of these cases is that these speeches are addressed to a popularly selected and untrained jury and that speeches as violent and bitter are made by the counsel for the defense. That justification is wholly absent here. The court is in this case the "Military Collegium of the Supreme Court," consisting of three judges, two of whom sat on the previous trial in August. It would scarcely need fifty-four pages of passionate rhetoric to convince these judges of the guilt of men who have confessed their guilt, and of the need of imposing a severe punishment.

Extreme violence by the prosecution is often regarded in our courts as misconduct justifying a reversal by a higher court, and in any case it is an element to consider in determining guilt because it often has a direct bearing on the motives for a confession. This is especially true of Continental criminal procedure in which the prosecutor plays a much more influential part than the American district attorney.

From what has been said, it is clear that no judgment that will command assent can be reached on the basis of the available evidence. The report on the Radek-Pyatakov trial is only a frag-

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ment of the case. It depends in part on materials that may well exist in the voluminous reports of the preliminary examination; but these are not before us. As for the examination of Trotsky, it is declared by the Dewey Committee to constitute merely a provisional and partial step in a fuller investigation.

The weakness of the case for the prosecution is the absence of letters written either by the accused or to them, from which inferences could be drawn as to their participation in a revolutionary conspiracy. It is further likely that the accounts given in the trials of August 1936 and January 1937 about meetings and conversations with Trotsky and Sedov in Copenhagen and Oslo are inaccurate in detail if not wholly invented.

On the other hand, the public confessions of all the defendants are extremely difficult to explain on any plausible ground unless they were actually guilty. It is unprecedented that men of this type — some of them of high intelligence, some of them soldiers of proved courage — should have acted as they did without any reasonable ground to believe that they would escape the death penalty and without any specific evidence of torture. We should further have to assume that the prosecution forced them to enter into a conspiracy to incriminate Trotsky and his son without advantage to themselves and without thereby making the seizure and punishment of Trotsky easier for the government. This is possible, just as it is possible that there are adequate if undisclosed reasons for the absence of documentary evidence.

If we must make some estimate of the weight of probability, I think it is still in favor of the prosecution as far as the Moscow defendants were concerned. In the case of Trotsky and Sedov themselves nothing except a suspension of judgment is possible. The extent of the punishment is a matter of policy. As long as capital punishment is part of a criminal system, the justification for its application must depend on considerations that cannot be easily estimated at a distance and by foreigners. But English and American observers will not readily overcome their repugnance to capital punishment inflicted wholesale on groups of thirteen and sixteen persons.

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THE ORGANIZATION OF ITALY'S EAST AFRICAN EMPIRE

By Corrado Zoli

ADDIS ABABA was entered by the Italian Army on May 9, 1936, thus putting an effective end to the government of the Negus, who had fled abroad. Since that date Italian occupation has gradually been extended to the rest of Ethiopian territory. The time has therefore come when we can sketch at least the broad lines of the political, administrative and economic organization which Italy is giving her new East African Empire.

First of all, let us take the designation "empire." It was not chosen accidentally or arbitrarily. A country that for thirty centuries had been governed in one way or another as an independent state could not be considered as of the usual type of colonial territory inhabited by primitive tribes in a semi-savage state. Rather it had to be regarded, like the vast British domain in India, as a geographic, historical and political unity of which the sovereignty had been transferred by right of conquest, a right reenforced by the conqueror's superior civilization. Hence it was logical that the term "empire" should be applied and that the King of Italy should assume the title, "Emperor of Ethiopia."

The basic lines to be followed in the political organization of the new Empire were laid down by Mussolini in his speech of May 5, 1936: "With the population of Ethiopia peace is already an established fact. The defeated and fugitive chiefs and *rasses* no longer count and no force in the world can ever make them count again." This statement was a solemn promise to the peoples of Ethiopia whom the Italian victory had liberated not only from slavery but from all sorts of servitudes and barbarous tyrannies. In making it, Mussolini reaffirmed the ethical reasons for Italy's African enterprise. A year later, Signor Lessona, Minister for Italian Africa, restated the concept in a speech before the Senate: "No continuation and no resurrection, either open or covert, of what was Ethiopian feudalism."

From these declarations it was plain that the Empire would be organized under a form of "direct rule" similar to that already to be found in Italy's other colonial possessions, either in East Africa or along the Mediterranean. No other form of government was really practicable. Had Italy wished to rule the country

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through the feudal hierarchy of the old native chiefs, she would have had to reëstablish the authority and privileges of those chiefs. It might have been easier to set up that sort of government than a régime of direct rule. But it would automatically have led to the reappearance of the hordes of chieftains, great and small, who used to attach themselves like leeches to the bodies and the goods of the miserable native populations. The Italian conquest would then have meant nothing more than the replacement of the Negus by the Viceroy representing the new white emperor. Things would have gone on much as they had done for some three thousand years. But, by this mere substitution of one monarch for another, could Italy have fulfilled her civilizing mission in the decrepit African empire?

Any discussion of the relative merits of direct versus indirect rule as applied to Ethiopia raises the preliminary question concerning the extent to which feudal institutions still persisted in Ethiopia. It is well known that Haile Selassie, though he himself came from the ranks of the great feudatories, had after his ascent to the throne used every means to replace feudalism with a centralized, authoritarian régime. On the pretext of endowing his country with a politico-administrative system inspired by European civilization—which no one in Ethiopia understood and very few desired—he had tenaciously carried on a program of gradually eliminating all the great regional chiefs. In their places he put his own trusted men, in large part Shoans, whom he sent out from Addis Ababa to govern the provinces on his behalf.

This program, already initiated by Menelik, founder of the empire, had not yet been fully carried out at the time of the outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian war. The feudal régime still remained in Tigré, Shoa and in certain minor peripheral provinces. From the rest of the empire, however, it had disappeared and the population was governed by imperial officers. Geographically, the proportion was that feudalism persisted in only five percent of the area of the empire while the remaining ninety-five percent was administered directly by imperial authority.

In ninety-five percent of Ethiopia, then, the Shoan or Abyssinian officials have automatically, so to speak, been replaced by Italians. In the remaining five percent of the country the solution of the problem has depended on the attitudes manifested during and after the war by the feudal chiefs in those provinces. Some of them — *e.g.* the principal feudatory of eastern Tigré — not

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only spontaneously submitted to the Italians but faithfully fought throughout the campaign under the Italian flag at the head of their troops. Some — like the overlord of western Tigré — fought under the Negus and only submitted to the Italians after the occupation of Addis Ababa. Others — perhaps the most



important — followed the Negus into exile. Still others — undoubtedly the most numerous — continued to carry on hostilities against the Italian forces even after all organized Ethiopian resistance had ceased. Many in this latter group have died in combat, or have been executed as rebels and traitors for taking up arms again after having spontaneously submitted.

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It must be kept in mind, however, that the native population, in those regions where the large-scale military and police operations took place, have not always imitated the behavior of their feudal chiefs or of the emperor's officials. The great majority of the inhabitants in Western Tigré, for example, received the Italian troops with sympathy, often with manifestations of joy, heralding them as liberators from the dreaded yoke of Shoa. It is obvious that Italy could not with decency reimpose upon these people the chiefs whom they had voluntarily abandoned in the grave hour of decision. Much less could the Italian Government invite the fugitive and exiled feudal lords to return to Ethiopia and confide to them the administration of their old provinces.

There is consequently no doubt that Italy is faced with the moral obligation and the practical opportunity to establish a form of "direct rule" over her new subjects in all parts of Ethiopia. This form of government does not exclude the natives from all participation in the administration of their districts, nor does it necessarily imply that all local usages will be abolished *en bloc* in favor of Italian law. Given the differences in the mentality, the levels of civilization and the social development, religion and customs which exist between the Italians and the peoples of Ethiopia, and among those peoples themselves, an extension pure and simple of Italian jurisprudence to the whole of the new empire would be absurd and unjust. No one has ever thought of doing any such thing. Indeed, in his speech before the Senate, Signor Lessona clearly defined the fundamental principles of direct rule as understood by Italy and as already applied in her older colonies. These fundamental principles may be briefly stated as follows: (a) Political power is to be exercised in its totality by the Italian authorities, with no compromises or half-measures. (b) Native notables may be attached to the central government as advisers. (c) Native notables may be called upon to participate in the local administrations. (d) The governmental action of the Italian authorities can be exercised through these native functionaries and in a manner that involves the least possible departure from local law and custom, whenever the latter are not in conflict with public order and with the ethical principles of European civilization.

The fundamental regulations concerning the political and administrative government of the Empire so far published have been modelled on the ones already in force in Eritrea and Somalia,

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for the inhabitants of those regions possess customs, traditions, religions and languages common to those of the peoples in the former empire of the Negus. Given this close similarity, the older colonies were fused with the territory newly conquered to form the Italian Empire of East Africa.

In dividing the Empire into regional governments, which for convenience we shall call provinces, efforts were made to group together peoples with similar languages, traditions and economic interests. In so far as possible, account was also taken of ethnic and religious factors, as is necessary in any government of African peoples. The subdivision of the provinces into *commissariati*, *residenze* and *vice-residenze* was inspired by these same criteria, in the hope of finding a happy solution to the complex problem of governing diverse and often mutually hostile peoples. This best of all policies — respect for the usages and traditions of the subjects — constitutes the basis of the Empire's political organization.

Further evidence of the desire to preserve local customs is found in the regulation that official acts are to be drawn up in Amharic, Tigrigna or Arabic, depending on the province; that in the native schools instruction is to be imparted in Amharic, Tigrigna, Galla, Caffino, Harari and Somali; and that in all Moslem regions the teaching of Arabic is obligatory. The Viceroy may, if he sees fit, decree that in certain regions instruction is also to be given in a language other than these just mentioned. All this demonstrates that Italy intends to preserve the linguistic patrimony of her subjects and to protect their ethnic individuality within the framework of her civilizing mission.

Large tracts in the empire are very sparsely inhabited, despite a salubrious climate and a favorable soil. In most cases this depopulation of fertile regions took place during recent decades as a direct result of the barbarous Shoan domination. Take, for instance, the case of Caffa, where scarcely a half century ago the Capuchin missionary, Cardinal Massaia, found an industrious population of over a million souls engaged in raising coffee, bananas and other tropical products. Today that region contains only 50,000 inhabitants, while nine-tenths of its area has reverted to equatorial jungle where the coffee bushes continue to produce in a wild state with no one to harvest them! The abuses of the Shoan overlord — the continual wars, the punitive expeditions and the large scale slave raids — have reduced this people from prosperity to a primitive state of barbarism. The new political

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imperial organization will permit the rehabilitation of these vast and desolate areas through the settlement of Italian farmers and workers. This immigration, contrary to the fears expressed in some quarters, will in no way injure the rights of the natives.

Italy is obliged to keep in view the vital necessity of directing at least a part of her superabundant population towards the virgin lands of Africa. In setting up a politico-administrative organization in Ethiopia, then, she could not neglect to provide for the immigrants who presumably will arrive from the homeland in increasing numbers, due to the favorable conditions for white settlement on the Ethiopian plateau. The juridical foundations of the Empire have therefore been made sufficiently elastic to allow Italians and natives to live side by side in tranquillity and with respect for each other's spheres of activity.

The prohibition against marriages between Italian citizens and native subjects, recently promulgated, is to be rigidly enforced; for it aims to prevent dangerous cross-breeding and the consequent damage to morality and public order. The interdiction is due partly to a desire to protect the race. An even weightier consideration, however, was the necessity of preserving the personal dignity and prestige of the Italians who take up permanent residence in the Empire. It can thus be said that the politico-administrative organization of Italian Ethiopia contemplates the harmonious coexistence of two societies — Italian and native — coöperating to develop the economic resources and insure the well-being of the Empire. Experience with the new laws and the example of industry set by the Italian immigrants will stimulate the natives to improve their methods of work and thought, and will bring them more and more into conformity with the standards of European civilization. This evolutionary process will be expedited by the various branches of the colonial administration. That represents for Italy a debt of honor, both towards herself and towards the civilized world.

What I have written above is not merely a program for the future; parts of it are already in process of realization. Schools are being opened throughout the Empire, with a steadily increasing native attendance. In Addis Ababa, for instance, the local *fascio* has assembled over a thousand native children in its schools, where they are given free lunch and are clothed in the uniform of the "Gioventù Etiopica del Littorio." This institution already has important ramifications in most of the large centers of

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the Empire. Likewise in Addis Ababa the *fascio* has set up special evening courses for native adults. The lower officials of the former Ethiopian régime are particularly anxious to attend these courses; already several hundred of them, after learning Italian, have entered the civil service of the Empire.

The imperial territory is also being dotted with hospitals, infirmaries, ambulatories and hygienic institutes, which are now carrying on praiseworthy work on behalf of public health and the preservation of the country's livestock resources. All the public services, particularly water supply, transport and electricity — almost non-existent before the Italian conquest — have already been greatly expanded and are receiving constant attention from the governing authorities. A country which had only a few primitive mule tracks and caravan routes, and these impassable for many months in the year, today possesses several thousand miles of asphalt roads, constructed by over 250,000 Italian and native laborers.

To maintain internal order and guard the frontiers a Colonial Army of the Empire has been created. It consists of "African detachments" composed entirely of Italians, and "colonial detachments" in which the soldiers are natives and the officers Italians. The basic unit of the colonial detachments is the battalion. Each battalion contains three rifle and one machine gun companies, has fixed headquarters and recruits its men within a certain region. The fixed headquarters does not interfere with the battalion's mobility: it can be employed at great distances from its base for limited periods of time. As has been demonstrated in the case of the Eritrean, Somali and Libyan *ascaris*, native battalions, in addition to their military value, form effective instruments of political penetration and of civilization among the local populations. This is due to the system of regional recruitment and to the old and well-tried institution of the "family-camp," in which the soldiers live with their families while on service.

In a "colonial brigade" there are four battalions; an artillery group composed of one battery of 65/17 guns and two of 81 mortars (which in the Italian Army are assigned to the infantry but in the Colonial Army function as artillery); an engineer company; specialists from various services; and a small field hospital. In all there are seventeen colonial brigades, of which eleven are organized as just described. The remaining six, being stationed in regions better supplied with horses, consist of three

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infantry battalions and a platoon of cavalry. The Empire is covered by a chain of "centers of mobilization" which assure the annual quotas of enlistments; these take place "on an exclusively voluntary basis."

The African detachments, composed entirely of Italians, constitute the mobile reserves. One of them is at the immediate disposition of the Viceroy in Addis Ababa. This consists of a division, the "Savoy Grenadiers," which contains two regiments of grenadiers, one regiment of artillery, three companies of engineers, and the relevant supply services. Attached to it is a special motorized unit of the "Black Shirts of Africa," capable of transporting the entire division. The rest of the reserves are at the disposition of the regional governors and consist of nine motorized battalions of the Black Shirts of Africa. Though the Savoy Grenadier division functions as guard to the Viceroy in Addis Ababa, it still is primarily a fighting unit. To relieve it of garrison or purely defensive duties, four battalions of Black Shirts and eight batteries have been detailed to serve under the "*Comando della piazza di Addis Ababa.*" The army organization in Ethiopia is completed by a special unit, called the "Engineers of Africa," containing various specialists, including a railway company. In addition, there are all the necessary supply services complete with magazines and depots.

The aggregate strength of this army is as follows: 2,000 permanent officers; 500 officers *di complemento;* 1,800 non-commissioned officers; 20,000 Italian and 40,000 native troops. In all there are around 65,000 men and 12,000 horses and mules. At the top of this military hierarchy is a general staff (*Stato Maggiore del Governo Generale*), located in Addis Ababa and composed of the chief, the assistant chief, the inspector of artillery, the inspector of engineers, the inspector of the Black Shirts, and the head of the supply services. Attached to each regional government there is also a "command of the armed forces."

As can readily be seen, the fundamental idea of this military organization is to give the Empire military autonomy. Defense of the imperial frontiers and the preservation of public order must not entail drawing on the military resources of the home country except in most exceptional circumstances. This new system will gradually be extended to the army in Libya, and perhaps also to the naval and air forces there. Furthermore, it was recognized from the start that the presence of Italian troops was required not

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merely to uphold the prestige of the dominant nation, but because of their military value. Hence the necessity for creating, alongside of the greater mass of native troops, a powerful nucleus of Italian forces that would constitute in itself an effective and autonomous military instrument.

As can readily be seen, the Colonial Army established for the defense of the Empire is extremely modest — 65,000 men occupying a territory of more than 650,000 square miles inhabited by nearly 8 million natives. That cannot be thought excessive for maintaining internal order and guarding lengthy frontiers. Evidently the reality is very different from the spectre (invented by foreign propaganda) of an enormous army of 400 to 500 battalions of Ethiopians which could easily conquer Africa. In point of fact, it would not have been impossible to create that sort of army. But it would have required an enormous financial sacrifice and it would have conflicted with any rational plan for the Empire's rapid economic development. Above all, Italy intends to accustom the populations of the Empire to work: the participation of native labor will be indispensable in the development of Ethiopia, especially on the plantations of the lowlands and foothills. The Italian Government has no intention of taking the native workers away from useful labor in the fields in order to create a gigantic military apparatus disproportionate to the requirements of internal order and imperial defense.

Before leaving this question of military organization, I should allude to one more thing: the enrollment of Italian laborers employed in East Africa in the Voluntary Militia for National Security. At the end of last May there were 135,000 of these men, in large part employed in constructing roads and buildings, and dispersed all over the Empire in groups of varying sizes. The officers of these groups have two functions: they are the natural protectors of the workers' rights *vis-à-vis* the contractors; and they constitute the hierarchy through which discipline is maintained. The enrollment of the workers in the militia also assures them constant sanitary and religious assistance as well as organized facilities for recreation. And finally — this is the most important consideration of all — the organization of the Italian workers into military units each having its own uniform, arms and regulations, helps greatly to maintain their prestige and at the same time furnishes a powerful element of security.

Thus far in speaking of the political, administrative, juridical

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and military organization of the new Empire, I have been able to stay within the bounds of a clearly defined program already in process of being put into effect. Now we come to the question of the Empire's economic development, and here we must enter into the less precise realm of probability. Our scientific knowledge of most of the territory of Ethiopia is so inadequate that any statement in regard to it must be taken as merely a rough approximation. Nevertheless, it is possible to establish certain fundamentals of the economic program that is already under way.

Faced with the obligation of rationally exploiting a vast reservoir of raw materials, Italy naturally sought to create an economy which as far as possible would complement rather than compete with her own. To attain this end the great corporative organisms of Italy have been called upon by the Ministry for Italian Africa (formerly the Ministry of Colonies) to collaborate with it in the regulation of private enterprises operating in the imperial territory. In view of certain important factors — the distance of the Empire from the mother country, the burdensome tolls of the Suez Canal, the existence of established Ethiopian markets in Africa and Asiatic countries — it has been thought wise to permit the Empire to develop a large degree of economic autonomy. The results desired were that Ethiopia should provide most of the necessities required by her native and Italian population; that she should be in a position to send Italy those primary products and raw materials in which the latter is deficient; and that the export of her own products to other African and Asiatic countries should increase.

In order to accomplish these ends the demographic colonialization of Italian East Africa is, and will remain, one of the fundamental objectives of the Italian Government. However, the Government is determined that this colonization take place gradually, methodically and with proper regard to the country's capacities of absorption. The wage scale will be adapted to the returns from local production, and the cost of living will be controlled (as it has been for years in Italy, with undeniable success). Further, the Government intends to see that Italian workers in Ethiopia shall pass as quickly as possible out of the class of wage-earners into that of small proprietors, each with his own modest farm on which he can support himself and his family.

The Italian Government believes that the state has the right and duty to supervise the essential productive activities funda-

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mental in the life of the Empire and the mother country. But, "supervision" does not mean "monopoly." No obstacles will be put in the way of healthy private initiative; no exclusive monopolies will be granted, either to individuals, companies or state entities. The recent concession granting German mining companies certain rights in Ethiopia shows that Italy is disposed, under proper guarantees, to admit the participation of foreign capital and technical assistance in the private enterprises which will develop the Empire's resources. The principal items which the Italian colonists are engaged in producing at the present time are: precious metals, meat, milk, wool, skins, cotton, coffee, oil seeds and cereals.

Studies are being actively pursued in all parts of the Empire in order to determine the forms and the proportions which demographic colonialization can take. One of the first things that must be done is to carry out a special survey to establish the ownership of the land. Italian colonization has always managed to avoid conflicts with native populations over questions of this sort, and will do so in Ethiopia. At the present time there are 250,000 Italians in Ethiopia, engaged in public works, commerce, industry, communications, etc. When the situation permits, these Italians will be joined by their families. There will then be nearly a million Italians in Ethiopia, for whom there will be plenty of room and adequate means for earning a livelihood. Nor is it exaggerated to predict that in the next few years the figure will be tripled or quadrupled.

The solid nature of the Italian Government's projects for the new East African Empire is shown by its announcement of a six-year plan of public works to be financed out of the ordinary budget. It will include: construction of a road network; the improvement of the principal ports; the construction of hydraulic and hydroelectric works; hygienic improvements; exploration and exploitation of mineral resources; housing; drainage, reforestation and other activities to prepare the land for settlement; construction of telegraphic, telephonic and radio communications; and military works.

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EUROPEAN LEGISLATION FOR INDUSTRIAL PEACE

By Norman Thomas

IT WAS inevitable that the sharp labor conflicts characteristic of our day here in the United States should evoke a discussion of laws "to do something about it." What that something is, or should be, is not agreed upon among the advocates of state action. Their proposals vary from a Fascist demand for the prohibition of strikes to the adoption of an industrial code like that now under controversy in Michigan. Here and there one hears a revival of proposals for compulsory arbitration — this despite the failure of such a plan in Kansas. Demands for the incorporation of unions are frequent. Before we rush into any plan for rigorous state control of unions or of strikes we would do well to look at European experience.

An inquiry into what has been attempted in Europe must be prefaced by a word of warning. The background of industrial warfare is the same in all industrialized nations, but there are differences in national attitudes, in forms of government, and in conditions of organization both among workers and employers, which make it quite impossible to say that such-and-such a plan has worked well in Great Britain, France, or the Scandinavian countries, and therefore would work equally well in the United States. No successful American legislation can be purely imitative. Unfortunately we have problems of racketeering virtually unknown in the European democracies; we also have a problem of internal democracy within unions sharper than exists abroad. But even taking account of qualifications like these we unquestionably will find it advantageous to inquire what the European experience has been, and specifically what has been the result of state intervention to secure industrial peace.

We must exclude from this inquiry the Fascist countries and Soviet Russia. The Fascist countries have momentarily obtained comparative industrial peace at the price of outlawing the free association of workers in their own unions and forbidding strikes. The uneasy industrial peace which has resulted is not a lasting peace of happiness or of freedom. In the U.S.S.R. trade unions are encouraged, and their rôle is definitely fixed by the government. A strike such as that against General Motors in America would be

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unthinkable. If it began, it would be ruthlessly put down. Partisans of the Russian dictatorship may argue that Russia is under a workers' government and that this fact makes strikes unnecessary. I shall not examine that argument here, but only point out that whether the Russian type of control of workers' associations is good, bad, or partly good and partly bad, it can have little significance for the United States under our present political arrangements.

The significant countries for us are the surviving European democracies, or what we call democracies by way of contrast with the totalitarian states. I came away from a recent brief visit to the Scandinavian countries with much admiration for them. But they are not Utopias of peace and contentment. They are familiar with strikes and lockouts, though these cause no such violence as is customary in the United States. The reason, in part, is that the very strength of the labor organization makes large-scale strike-breaking impossible. In all three Scandinavian countries there is a high standard of union responsibility as well as useful machinery of conciliation and voluntary arbitration. From 1916 to 1923 the Norwegian Government had power to impose compulsory arbitration in cases of grave national importance. However, in 1923 both the representatives of the workers and of the Conservative Government then in office united to defeat the renewal of the law. But much as there is to praise in Denmark, Sweden and Norway, their small size, their peculiar history, and their homogeneity, make the situation in them very different from ours or even from England's. It is to Great Britain, mother of the industrial revolution, that our inquiry must principally be directed.

The present British policy in labor relations has a long history behind it. As we might expect from our knowledge of British temperament, it was not born of philosophical consideration but of practical experience. In general, the British have granted nothing to the unions by law which they were not afraid that the unions might have been strong enough to take anyhow. But the British Government, even when in Conservative hands, has had a way of foreseeing necessity a little in advance, and of yielding enough in time to avoid explosion.

The most recent strike of consequence in England tied up the London bus service all through the month of May. No attempt was made to run the busses with strike-breakers. The public was badly inconvenienced. But it, or considerable sections of it, pro-

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fessed to find satisfaction in the fact that the absence of busses from London streets simplified the Coronation arrangements! In the end the strike was settled less by the persuasive powers of any mediators, governmental or otherwise, than by the insistence of that powerful trade union leader (bureaucrat, if you don't like him), Mr. Ernest Bevin, president of the Transport Workers Union, to which the busmen belong. In effect, what Mr. Bevin did was to make the men accept the recommendations of the Tribunal of Inquiry, to which, under British law, the Government had referred the dispute for investigation. Those terms gave the men nothing more than the promise of an investigation, and possible readjustment of working schedules. It was, however, an official recognition of the importance of those schedules to the health of the workers.

I had happened to meet some leaders of the busmen two weeks before the strike, and was interested then to learn that it was precisely Mr. Bevin whom they feared more than anyone else. Their complaints to me — and later their formal statement of grievances — were concerned almost solely with the effect upon their health of bad schedules and long hours. These complaints were impressive. In times gone by the subject had been dear to Mr. Bevin's heart. But before the government tribunal he presented it inadequately. The men think that he let them down by consenting to a strike which he was unwilling to make effective by allowing it to extend to the trams and subway. Mr. Bevin's insistence in the end upon virtual capitulation has been ascribed to his belief that there were strong Communist influences at work in the strike and in the union, and to his hope that these would be cast out from it by defeat.

In labor circles in Britain the original controversy, and the real grievances of the men against the Transport Authority, a quasi-public body, have been almost forgotten in the bitterness of the internal union struggle. Nevertheless, on the official score card another victory has probably been written down for the government Tribunal of Inquiry, and for the coöperation of "responsible unionism." At all events, the strike was marked by none of the violence which would have occurred during a similar strike in New York City. Whether British patience and restraint would have been as effective if the strike had extended to trams and subways is a matter on which the reader's guess is as good as mine.

Let me recall two turning points in the British attempt to ob-

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tain industrial peace. In 1800 Parliament passed the Combination Law. It made explicit and emphatic the prohibition of combination among workers which from the time of Edward III had been a corollary to the general policy of state regulation of trade and industry. One hundred and six years later the high water mark in reversal of this policy was reached in the Trade Disputes Act of 1906. The act was an answer to the celebrated decision in the Taff Vale case which held unions liable for damages arising out of trade disputes — a decision which was the occasion, if not the cause, of the formation of the British Labor Party. The Liberal Party was then in office. In alarm it adopted the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 prohibiting the courts from entertaining any actions against Trade Unions, their members or officials, in respect to any tortious acts alleged to have been committed on their behalf. This was a decision of great practical importance to labor unions, because if they should be held responsible for damages for every alleged act committed by any individual to the hurt of the employers during a strike, they would soon be ruined financially.

How often we hear men with patriotic enthusiasm justify every war in which their country has ever engaged, and all its accompanying violence, yet unqualifiedly condemn working men for violence in labor disputes. As a matter of fact, it is extraordinary how little violence has attended the rise of the labor movement, especially when one remembers how much nearer to him and his dear ones are the worker's demands concerning wages and hours than are most of the political demands which have provoked wars. The British unions in particular have achieved their present status with an amazing minimum of violence. But not without struggle and suffering. It took a full quarter century, from 1800 to 1825, to win the passage of Peel's Act which legally permitted for the first time the right of combination among workers for the purpose of regulating their own wages and hours of labor. It was not until 1859 that picketing was legalized. Full legal recognition of unions with protection for their funds was given in the Act of 1871. So slow has been the change in law, even in England, to meet the stern realities of the industrial age!

The generation following the adoption of the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 has seen a tendency on the part of the state to depart from the older rôle of self-proclaimed "umpire" in economic and industrial disputes. During this period social insurance has come into a high state of development in Great Britain; there has been

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a fairly successful elaboration of the machinery of mediation, conciliation and inquiry; and, during the Great War, compulsory arbitration received a thoroughgoing trial.

We are concerned with the latter two developments, pausing only to recall how much social security legislation has done in England to diminish bitterness in the economic conflict. Historically, compulsory arbitration is older in England than conciliation and voluntary arbitration. In the year 1800, the same year in which the Combination Law was enacted, the first Arbitration Law was passed. It applied, however, only to the cotton industry. Dr. Ducksoo Chang, to whose excellent study "British Methods of Industrial Peace" every student is deeply indebted, thus summarizes that early Act:

> The act applied to England only, but covered all cases of disputes arising between employers and workmen engaged in the cotton trade, including wage disputes over both future and existing rates. Each party to the dispute was free to demand arbitration and appoint an arbitrator. The arbitrators so appointed were authorized to summon and examine witnesses and to decide the case finally. Should they fail within three days to agree upon an award, they were required to refer the case for final settlement to one of the Justices of the Peace of the locality. Any party refusing to submit either to arbitration or to observe the findings was to be liable either to the payment of ten pounds in damages or three months' imprisonment.

For a number of years the law worked well enough to warrant its extension to other parts of the United Kingdom. Its success was mostly in interpreting existing contracts. Since the workers were unorganized, and combination was prohibited, they were usually at the mercy of the employers. Arbitration was not on even terms. The law was significant because it did away with the old practice of direct regulation of wages by state authorities — a practice already virtually dead with the coming of the machine age. In 1824 the Arbitration Act was extended to all disputes between employers and workmen engaged in any trade, except disputes concerning future wage rates.

It lies beyond the scope of the present article to do more than point out that this act was not a success, and that compulsory arbitration soon became in practice a dead letter. Standardization of industrial conditions greatly reduced the number of individual disputes which had been settled under the cotton arbitration law, and the growth of labor unions made it increasingly necessary to get their assent to working conditions. In 1867, and again in 1872, more elaborate laws were adopted dealing with conciliation, but

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prescribing some measure of compulsory arbitration. These laws concerned the adjustment of disputes under existing contracts rather than the adjustment of future wages. Increasingly that all-important matter was left to collective bargaining between employers and the growing trades unions. By 1896 Parliament got around to making a legal end of the creaking and useless machinery of compulsory arbitration in favor of conciliation. For this it drew up an elastic and comprehensive plan which it committed, so far as the government interests were concerned, to the Board of Trade. Compulsory arbitration in Britain was dead until it was resurrected under the stress of the Great War.

If ever there was a case for compulsion it was provided by the grim logic of war. Industry was necessarily mobilized for war purposes. In a great many industries factory workers were at least as important for the military machine as any soldiers; indeed, many of them were exempt from conscription for this very reason. They were better paid than soldiers, but on the other hand they had a direct responsibility for feeding themselves and their children which the soldiers lacked, and there was a continual tendency for prices to increase faster than industrial wages.

To compulsory arbitration the British war government added the "leaving certificate" as a method of controlling the workers. No employer was allowed to engage a worker without such a certificate. This scheme encouraged so much petty tyranny, engendered so much friction, and required so much red tape, that it perished in a storm of strikes, chiefly among skilled men in the engineering trades, before the end of 1917. An attempt to reintroduce it, or something like it, in the summer of 1918 in the munitions trade also resulted not in peace but in a fresh outbreak of strikes. To meet these and other strikes, compulsory arbitration was quite inadequate. It had, however, a fair degree of success in dealing with more or less routine disputes. It was quicker than the slow processes of conciliation. The government had wisely provided a variety of arbitration tribunals or arbitrators with some choice of reference for the interested parties. In general, the most satisfactory work was done by a permanent arbitration tribunal on a representative basis of workers and employers.

Nevertheless, even under war conditions compulsory arbitration was exceedingly unpopular; and the Whitely Committee, appointed as early as October 1916, reported that "the experience of compulsory arbitration during the war period has shown that

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it is not a successful method of avoiding disputes, and in normal times it would undoubtedly prove even less successful." Compulsory arbitration was therefore abandoned as early as November 21, 1918, except temporarily, as Dr. Chang tells us, "for the purpose of determining cases arising from or in respect to the minimum rates, that might be changed by an agreement between employers and workers concerned with the approval of the Minister of Labor or by an award of the interim Board of Arbitration." Even this limited use of compulsory arbitration was not very successful and played a small rôle in labor adjustments.

Certainly the weight of experience in Great Britain, pioneer in industrial revolution, is against compulsory arbitration and there is nothing at all in our American life to give us greater hope of it here. It is, of course, a form of state interference in the process of collective bargaining. Arbitration tribunals have no such basis of generally recognized law or justice as have the courts in deciding civil and criminal cases. They are not dealing with some norm which by common consent, even of the parties in conflict, is right or wrong. They are dealing with conflicting rights and interests by standards which are largely subjective or born of a desire to compromise. The state which gives them authority is not itself accepted by either of the parties in conflict as necessarily a fountain of justice above suspicion. Compulsory arbitration, in short, is an instrument more appropriate to the totalitarian state than to the democratic capitalist state.

Inquiry and conciliation are, however, different matters, and the British governmental machinery for making them effective may justly claim a very considerable degree of success. As Dr. Chang points out, following an elaborate statistical analysis of disputes and the manner of their settlement, "the primary value of the negotiation machinery . . . lies more in the prevention than the cure of industrial disputes." The machinery in question includes not merely various arrangements under which the government may act as investigator and mediator with power to make public its recommendations for settlement, but also joint committees set up by representatives of employers and workers under collective agreements.

Shortly after the war much was hoped in England from Joint Industrial Councils. The Whitely Committee saw in them a means of establishing self-government in industry. Actually they have achieved no such important purpose, although in a few in-

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dustries they have performed a moderately useful function. Many detailed reasons can be given for their lack of success, but they boil down to two general reasons: one, the fundamental difference in interest regarding the wage question between the employers and workers; and two, the dependence of all industries upon the general economic situation which, of course, Joint Councils cannot control. Precisely in proportion as the workers believe that the answer to their troubles lies in the socialization of such basic industries as coal or the railroads, they are unable to accept for more than limited uses any type of joint council which recognizes the validity of private ownership and the profit system.

Under the present laws, the government uses the Ministry of Labor as the chief office of conciliation. It has set up an Industrial Court as the principal tribunal for voluntary arbitration, but the parties may, if they prefer, use single arbitrators or *ad hoc* courts. The government also has a machinery of inquiry. The resulting recommendations may (as in the busmen's strike), with the aid of public opinion, become the basis of settlement.

Vital in all this is the extent to which British employers, especially in the basic industries, have come to accept the principle of collective bargaining. Great Britain has no Wagner Law or its equivalent, but not for many years has it had a Tom Girdler. British industry has not maintained its own private armies and arsenals of the sort characteristic of American industry for many years. A fairly general recognition of the principle of collective bargaining has certainly not bankrupted British industry. It has not by any means prevented strikes; but it has kept them from taking on the aspect of little civil wars.

Whether these relatively peaceful conditions will continue is another matter. There is much unrest in England, Scotland and Wales, and some dissatisfaction with the conservative union leadership. There are thirteen and a half million insured persons in British industry; there were eight and a half million trade unionists affiliated with the Trade Union Congress in 1920. Today there are only about three and a half million thus affiliated. Union strength is concentrated in mining, textiles, ship building and railways. Geographically it is concentrated in the north but, as my friends in labor circles pointed out to me in England last April, the new industrial development, thanks partly to the diffusion of electric power, is taking place in the south of England, where unionism has always been relatively weak. Harold Laski in

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a recent article entitled "Wanted: a British C.I.O." (*The Nation*, July 3, 1937) gives no less than ten reasons for the decline in union strength. The most important of them spring from the insistence of the British unions on the old craft emphasis. What Mr. Laski writes was, I found, the general conviction of Left-Wing trade unionists and members of the Labor Party.

Any such upsurge of organization as took place in France a few months ago, and is taking place in the United States as I write, would quite likely conflict with the Trade Disputes Act of 1927, one of the consequences of the extensive and dramatic but short-lived General Strike of 1926. Among other things this law forbids sympathetic strikes — a prohibition born of the fact that the general strike was called in sympathy with the coal miners. The unions and the British Labor Party denounce this law at every convention and in every election campaign, but the leaders have shown no great ardor or energy in attempting to change it, not even when a Labor Government was in office. If, last May, the men on the subways and tram lines in London had gone out in support of their fellow-unionists the busmen, the government might have held that strike in conflict with the Act of 1927. Such a ruling was not certain. Everything would have depended on the interpretation of the clause which confines a legal strike to those within the same trade or industry. If the coal miners or textile workers had struck in sympathy with the busmen, it would have been clearly illegal; but are the subway workers, who had their own separate agreement, to be regarded as within the same trade or industry as the busmen? It was a point which Mr. Bevin preferred to avoid, pinning his hopes, as we have seen, on whatever redress of grievances might come out of further investigation.

Sympathetic strikes or political strikes are not the only ones that are illegal in Great Britain. British law imposes many restrictions on strikes, some of them without an equivalent in our American laws. Dean Dinwoodey, editor of the *United States Law Week*, summarizes them in the *New York Times* of July 25, 1937, as follows: "The British law places restrictions upon membership of civil service in labor organization; restricts striking by employees of certain classes of public utilities; makes illegal any strike if it has any object other than the furtherance of a trade dispute within the trade or industry in which the strikers are engaged and is designed to coerce the Government. It limits the scope of picketing, and makes it a criminal offense for a person to

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break his contract of employment where he knows, or should know, that such action will probably endanger human life or cause serious bodily injury or serious damage." The law also specifically forbids attempts to intimidate satisfied workers into joining a strike. Penalties are provided against both individuals and unions which may violate the provisions of the law.

The employing classes in Great Britain seem content with the law as it stands. There is no echo there of the American demand for incorporation. However, employers' associations and most unions are alike registered with the government and make yearly financial reports of revenues and expenditures. In this connection the subcommittee on labor unions of the City Club of New York points out in a recent study: "The filing of these reports seems to be a mere formality, and the published reports of the Registrar show only reports by national unions of a very general nature." A later section of the discussion adds the following observations: "The labor union is not hostile to incorporation; it is hostile only to the implication and possible consequences of a compulsory requirement. In several European countries, such as England, France, and Belgium, statutes confer upon labor unions rights to which they would otherwise not be entitled, provided they undergo what may be roughly compared to incorporation." Of this the British registration is an example. There is no provision in British law compelling unions to live up to their agreements, but the unions have a long record for keeping them. There has been little or no occasion even to ask for legislation to protect the workers themselves from racketeering in their own unions. Racketeering seems to be an American problem born of American conditions and not of trade union theory or practice.

A few words regarding French procedure may now be in order.

Until 1936 the French workers, like their brethren in America, were less well organized than those in Great Britain. The Socialist and Communist Parties in France were strong, but they were not organized, as in Great Britain, primarily by the labor unions as such. From 1892 on there had been some rudimentary machinery of conciliation and arbitration administered on behalf of the state, principally by local judges. The year 1936 saw an amazing change. Politically it saw the triumph of the Popular Front in which the workers were the most important factor. When the Blum Cabinet took office it found itself confronted with widespread sit-down strikes and with a labor union organization in which newly en-

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listed rank-and-file members were taking things into their own hands. The Government allayed this unrest by a series of social laws setting up the forty-hour week, holidays with pay, collective bargaining, etc. M. Blum supplemented these general laws by personal intervention with the growing C.G.T. (Confédération Générale du Travail) and with the employers' association, the C.G.P.F. (Confédération Générale du Patronat Français). His government did not use force, though it finally indicated that its self-restraint might not last forever. It received the help of the Socialist and Communist leaders and of the C.G.T. in ending the strikes and bringing about comparative industrial peace.

In its first months the Blum Government was too hard pressed with immediate emergencies to try to pass a general law of conciliation and arbitration. However, through a paragraph inserted in the Monetary Law it gained temporary power to set up such machinery by decrees of the Council of State. Finally, toward the end of 1936, it introduced a bill which after a sharp fight it managed to drive through a reluctant Senate — but only after the Chamber had conceded a number of changes, including one eliminating agriculture from the scope of the bill. The law requires every collective dispute in industry and commerce to be submitted to conciliation and arbitration before a strike or lockout is declared. Each side chooses an arbitrator; if necessary a third person, as umpire, is chosen from among the "active or retired members of the principal services of the state." There is no sanction to enforce the decision of the arbitrators except public opinion. Since the state imposes no penalties for refusal to accept the decision, "compulsory arbitration" in France means something much less than the words suggest to us in English-speaking countries. It is more nearly analagous to the compulsion under which certain industrial disputes in both England and America must, by law or custom or both, be referred to a tribunal of inquiry or a commission of mediation — as, for example, disputes involving railway labor in America.

The law was approved rather more heartily by the spokesmen of the C.G.T. (which in the space of about a year had grown from one and a half to five million members) than by the leaders of the C.G.P.F. The Blum Government's own defense of the law ends on a rather modest note of hope that it will work well enough to lead to the elaboration of a better law on a broader and more durable base. Certainly it has not laid any sure bases of industrial

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peace in France. The economic issues go too deep to be settled piecemeal by conciliation or arbitration in particular industrial disputes. But the law has nevertheless been a factor in the relative success of the Popular Front Government in maintaining, during the last six months, an uneasy and precarious industrial peace.

It has been the primary purpose of this article to record certain facts concerning British and French experience in efforts to maintain industrial peace. The reader can draw his own moral. Indeed, he will draw his own moral without too much regard for the deductions of the author! Yet I may be permitted to sum up my own conclusions briefly as follows:

The long experience of Great Britain, and the shorter experience of the Scandinavian countries and France, show that there is no panacea for industrial unrest in our capitalist society. However, recognition of the right of the workers to organize their own unions, and to bargain collectively through them, has not only diminished the number of conflicts but the bitterness of those that nevertheless occur. Democracy within the unions and their own recognition of their social responsibility are primarily achievements of the workers themselves. Legislation has played only a minor part. The state has been able to accomplish something in the rôle of peacemaker through setting up a machinery of inquiry, conciliation, and voluntary arbitration. Experiments in compulsory arbitration where the verdicts of tribunals have been enforced by law have not been successful; in Great Britain, indeed, such attempts tended, even under wartime conditions, to increase the resentment of the workers. The more recent efforts of the British Government to declare certain types of strikes illegal have not yet been subjected to the test of such an upsurge of labor organization and struggle for better conditions as has taken place in France and the United States. We have, therefore, no adequate evidence whether the limitations imposed by the British Trade Disputes Act of 1927 will in times of emergency keep the peace or tend to do the very thing which it was designed to prevent, that is, convert a great strike into a struggle against the government. Certainly it is at least in order to advise Americans who are tempted to copy or go beyond the British limitations on the right to strike to take this possibility into account before rushing into a series of prohibitions designed to maintain industrial peace by the police power of the state.

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PROSPECTS OF A TRADE AGREEMENT WITH ENGLAND

By Percy W. Bidwell

THE American tariff bargaining program appears to be in a critical stage. In the two years following its inauguration in June 1934 it scored substantial accomplishments. American negotiators were successful in getting rid of some of the most serious hindrances to the expansion of American trade in foreign markets. Discriminations of long standing in French and Canadian tariffs were replaced by most-favored-nation treatment. In all, fourteen trade agreements were concluded including ones with such important commercial countries as Canada, Cuba, Brazil, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland.

In these new agreements the United States made its first real advance since 1913 in the direction of lower tariffs. To be sure, the steps taken were timid and hesitating; the breaches made in our massive tariff wall were not wide. But certain rates were actually reduced, notably those on sugar, whisky, cigar wrapper tobacco, lumber, linen goods, dyes, watches, cheese, and on one or two types of cotton goods. Continued free entry, during the life of the agreements, was assured for coffee, newsprint paper, wood pulp, pulpwood, bananas and cacao beans. Taken together, the fourteen agreements constituted an achievement in which Secretary Hull and his staff could take legitimate pride. And their significance far transcended the American scene. For they represented the only genuine and effective departure taken by any great nation away from the exaggerated protectionism of the postwar years.

But in the spring of 1936 the bargaining machinery seemed to stall. Since May 1936, when the agreement with France was signed, only two additional agreements have been concluded, those with Costa Rica and El Salvador.[1] Negotiations which had been undertaken with Italy and Spain have been given up. Two explanations for the slump are obvious: the Presidential campaign, which regularly halts constructive effort in foreign rela-

[1] The new one-year arrangement with Soviet Russia, proclaimed August 6, 1937, does not provide for reductions in import duties on either side. The U.S.S.R. agrees to purchase not less than $40,000,000 worth of United States goods and we in return extend most-favored-nation treatment to goods of Russian origin.

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tions; and the fact that in June 1937 the new bargaining powers were to expire unless renewed by Congress.

In the past few months the trade agreements program has given signs of renewed life. In February, Congress extended the President's bargaining powers for an additional three-year term. In May, the State Department announced that an agreement with Czechoslovakia was under consideration and also one with the United Kingdom.

The possibilities of an Anglo-American tariff agreement, and the problems involved, form the subject of this essay. The commercial significance of such an agreement hardly needs emphasis. The United States and the United Kingdom are the leaders in world trade. Between them, they buy 28 percent of the world's imports and sell 24 percent of all exports. To say that the United Kingdom is America's best customer tells only half the truth. Our exports to the United Kingdom in 1936 were valued at $440,000,000, a sum equal to our combined sales to nine European countries, *viz.*, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Czechoslovakia. Forty-seven million Britishers bought more American goods than the thousand million persons who inhabit the continent of Asia.

From the English point of view, world trade, like Cæsar's Gaul, is divided into three parts: (1) trade with the colonies and the self-governing commonwealths that comprise the British Empire; (2) trade with the United States; and (3) trade with other foreign countries. Of every $100 worth of foreign goods brought into the United Kingdom, $18 is supplied by the United States; of every $100 of British goods sold in foreign markets, the United States buys $12.50. No country, not even one of the Dominions, exports as much to the United Kingdom as does the United States; only India, Australia and occasionally Canada outrank the United States as a market for English goods.

Anglo-American trade is no hothouse growth, forced by subsidies or other forms of state aid. On the contrary, it resembles rather the sturdy weed whose survival in the face of discouragement proves its adaptation to its environment. For American tariff policy has not dealt leniently with imports from the United Kingdom. Our upward tariff revisions of 1922 and 1930 were chiefly aimed, it is true, at German and Japanese competitors. The tariff blunderbuss, however, is no respecter of nations. The new high rates applied to imports from all countries; and English

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manufacturers, although innocent bystanders, inevitably suffered. Apologists for the Hawley-Smoot Act may point out that 45 percent of all goods imported from England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland enter our ports free of duty, but that paradoxically is because the free goods are not British. The English sell us each year millions of dollars worth of tin, of furs, tea, carpet wools, rubber, to say nothing of platinum, shellac, goat and kid skins, cacao beans and vegetable oils. None of these goods are of English origin; they are imported *via* England rather than directly because of England's excellent banking, insurance, shipping and merchandising facilities. Most of the transhipped goods, being not directly competitive with American products, are not dutiable. Eliminating them, we find that over 80 percent of the genuinely British goods are taxed at our customs houses.

And our taxes are high. A few items come in at rates of less than 30 percent *ad valorem*, or at specific rates which, at present prices, are equivalent to value rates of less than 30 percent.[2] In this favored group are such items as burlap, leather, tin plate, boots and shoes. The bulk of English goods, including most of the cotton manufactures and linen goods, pay rates between 30 and 45 percent. On many items the rates are much higher. Table damask, wool noils, broad silks, all pay rates varying from 45 to 60 percent; wool carpets, wool hosiery, china and porcelain wares are dutiable at rates between 60 and 75 percent, worsteds at rates between 75 and 90 percent, and earthenware, heavy woolen goods and cotton laces at rates of 90 percent or more.

English trade policy, until the World War, was the antithesis of the American. In solitary eminence among the great trading nations, England maintained her policy of free trade. The doors of her rich markets stood wide open to all foreign goods. Protective duties were unknown; the only taxes on imports were those imposed purely for revenue purposes on tobacco, liquors, and a few other commodities of wide consumption. Imposing no barriers to foreign goods, England could give no preferential treatment to goods from Canada, Australia, or other self-governing parts of the Empire. The policy of the Open Door was steadfastly maintained in the Crown colonies.

Even after the war, with protectionism rampant all over Europe, the traditional English prejudice in favor of free trade

[2] In this paragraph, and elsewhere in this article, the *ad valorem* equivalents of specific rates of duty have been calculated on 1935 import values.

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was overcome with difficulty. A few protective duties were imposed in 1915, dyestuffs were protected in 1920, a few other industries were assisted by "safeguarding" duties in the years from 1921 to 1929. But the practical results of these flirtations with protection were negligible. As late as 1930, only 12 percent of all English imports were dutiable, and only three percent were subjected to taxes whose purpose or result was the protection of British industries.

The great depression, which in the United States was in large measure responsible for shifting trade policy away from protection in the direction of freer trade, had quite the opposite result in England. In 1931, it will be recalled, the gold standard was abandoned and the pound was allowed to depreciate 25 percent in terms of the dollar. Later in the same year, new protective duties at high rates were imposed on a wide variety of industrial and agricultural products. Both the monetary and the tariff policies were urged by the Government and accepted by the English people as emergency measures necessary for dealing effectively with acute economic distress. But now, six years later, we find England still off gold and with protectionism apparently firmly embedded in its commercial policy.

The emergency tariffs of 1931 were supplemented in 1932 by a general tariff act. Raw materials for British industries, certain foods, and all Empire products were placed on a free list; all other imports, not previously dutiable, had a basic 10 percent rate imposed on them. But the 10 percent rate formed merely the groundwork for the new tariff edifice. The superstructure is the work of an unusually effective administrative board, the Import Duties Advisory Committee. As a result of its labors, English dutiable imports are now roughly classified as follows: raw materials, dutiable at 15 percent; manufactured goods, at 20 percent; and luxuries and semi-luxuries paying 25 to 30 percent. Special protection is afforded the iron and steel and automobile industries by rates of 33⅓ percent.

The new tariff structure was given permanence by the Ottawa Agreements, concluded in August 1932. The same agreements augmented its adverse effects on American trade. By these agreements, the system of imperial tariff preferences was put on a contractual basis. The various self-governing commonwealths had already given discounts from their import duties to goods from the Mother Country, but as the latter had nothing to offer in re-

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turn the tariff preferences had been purely voluntary concessions. At Ottawa, Mr. Baldwin, armed with his new tariffs plus a plan for the further protection of English farmers, had something to bargain with, and he used his weapons to good advantage.

Obviously, there were two possible methods of increasing the margins of inter-Empire tariff preferences; (1) by lowering the barriers to trade between the Mother Country and the commonwealths; or (2) by raising all round the Empire the tariff barriers against outsiders. Mr. Baldwin exhorted the delegates to the Conference to aim at lowering rather than raising tariff barriers, reminding them that not even the British Empire could isolate itself from the world. But other counsels prevailed. Manufacturing and labor interests in Canada and Australia blocked moves to lower duties. When the agreements were finally published, it was found that they had raised both Dominion and English tariffs against non-Empire goods.

Nations exporting industrial products were disturbed by another departure from traditional English policy at Ottawa, the abandonment of the Open Door policy with respect to Crown colonies. The agreements extended tariff preferences in non-self-governing parts of the Empire on a wide scale to products of the Mother Country and of the Dominions. The significance of this step was stressed by Sir Herbert Samuel (now Viscount Samuel) who observed that the new policy if continued would convert the colonial empire into "a preserve for British manufacturers."

Two additional features of the new English protectionist policy deserve consideration: agricultural protection, and the new English trade agreements.

English agriculture, despite a long period of decline dating from the middle of the Nineteenth Century, is still, if horticulture is included, Britain's largest industry. English farms and gardens employ more than a million persons and supply more than 40 percent (by value) of England's food consumption. None the less, the United Kingdom is the world's greatest market for certain types of foreign foods. Ninety-nine percent of the world's exports of bacon and hams in 1930 were sold in England, also 96 percent of the world's exports of mutton and lamb, 63 percent of the butter exports, and 59 percent of the beef.

The rapid increase of food imports into the United Kingdom during the early years of the depression furnished the occasion for protective measures more extensive and more drastic than any

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legislation since the repeal of the Corn Laws. The long-standing principle that the Englishman's food shall not be taxed was thrown in the discard; duties were imposed on foreign wheat, barley and rice, fresh and canned fruit, dairy products, fresh and canned fish. Import quotas, far more destructive to normal foreign trade than tariff duties, were fixed for beef, lamb and mutton, hams and bacon. The wheat duty was supplemented by a bounty to English growers. In all this legislation the guiding principle has been: "Home producers come first; Empire producers come second; foreigners take what is left."

The new English tariffs have been used not only as a barrier against foreign goods but also as bargaining instruments to open foreign markets more widely to English goods. They also have been used to protect the interests of English holders of foreign securities. Twenty-three new trade agreements have been concluded which involve still further departures from traditional English policy, particularly with respect to the application of the most-favored-nation clause. Aside from a few reductions in duties, the undertakings of the United Kingdom have consisted principally of guarantees not to worsen the treatment accorded to other countries. In some of the agreements, the United Kingdom has secured trade advantages at the expense of third parties. Her insistence, for example, in making treaties with Scandinavian countries upon having minimum shares in their purchases of coal handicaps German and Polish producers. Discrimination of a different type is found in the agreement with Argentina which guarantees "that there shall be available, for the purpose of meeting applications for current remittances from Argentina to the United Kingdom, the full amount of the sterling exchange arising from the sale of Argentine products in the United Kingdom, after deduction of a reasonable sum annually towards the payment of the service of the Argentine public external debts." Both this agreement and that with Soviet Russia are based on the idea that payments between pairs of countries should be equalized. But international trade is not normally bilateral, it is multilateral; and attempts to equalize payments between pairs of countries inevitably discriminate against third parties and tend to force trade into unnatural channels.

Attempts to measure statistically the impact of the new British policies on the trade of the world, or even on that of a single country such as the United States, are foredoomed to failure.

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There are too many variables in the equation. It can be demonstrated, for example, that since the Ottawa Agreements went into effect, England's trade with the Empire has increased more rapidly than her trade with foreign countries. But preferential tariffs, alone, cannot be held responsible. Monetary policies, and shifts in English demand during the depression from luxury goods to larger proportional purchases of necessaries, have played their part. With respect to imports of food, England's policy of protecting home producers, and of favoring Empire sources for outside supplies, seems definitely to have accomplished its purposes. In the four-year period 1931–1935, English food imports from all sources declined 12 percent in volume. In this period purchases from foreign countries shrank by 30 percent, but imports from Empire countries gained 17 percent.

American trade, judging merely by the proportion of our total exports marketed in the United Kingdom, appears not to have suffered. The United Kingdom statistics tell the same story; about the same proportion of total English imports (11 percent) was bought from the United States in 1936 as in 1932. But these averages are misleading. Closer examination of the trade statistics shows that exports of American food have suffered severely. For example, English purchases of American flour and wheat fell from £3,919,000 in 1931 to £210,000 in 1935; purchases of hams from £2,381,000 to £1,910,000, of condensed milk from £422,000 to £8,000. Similar declines were shown in purchases of American barley, rice, apples, grapefruit, salmon, canned and dried fruit. American exporters of these goods lost not only absolutely but relatively. English consumers took a smaller proportion of their food supplies from the United States and a larger proportion from Empire countries.

Here, again, there is no simple relation of cause and effect. Tariff policies were not the sole nor the most important factor in these changes. The drought of 1934 and the crop restriction policies under the Agricultural Adjustment Administration cut American food exports to all countries. But tariffs, and particularly imperial preferences, cannot be acquitted of blame. American farmers would not have found the English 6-cent tariff on their wheat a serious obstacle to sales in the British market if Canadian wheat had also paid 6 cents. But with Canadian wheat entering free of duty, the 6 cents became a real handicap. Similarly, two cents a pound on rice would not mean much if Indian rice also

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paid two cents. The English rates on barley, condensed milk, apples, canned and dried fruit, tobacco, all are of concern to our exporters and producers, not because of the absolute amount of the duties but because competing producers in Canada, Australia, South Africa, and elsewhere in the British Empire pay either lower duties or no duties.

American exports to the United Kingdom, of course, include industrial as well as agricultural products. English tariffs check the sales of American electrical apparatus, refrigerating machinery, machine tools, and a great variety of miscellaneous manufactures. Preferences are accorded to Empire producers of these goods. But in this area our competitive position is stronger. We are industrially more mature than any of the Dominions, and the larger scale of our manufacturing operations, together with the established reputation of American specialties, more than offsets the handicap of preferential tariffs. It seems, therefore, that a successful Anglo-American agreement, from the American point of view, hinges upon the possibilities of modifying the Ottawa Agreements, so that American foods and raw materials may enter British markets on more even terms.

What concessions can American negotiators offer in return? Our Trade Agreements Act authorizes the President to offer reductions of 50 percent from the Hawley-Smoot rates, in return for what he considers equivalent concessions from foreign tariffs. To be of interest to the English, our reductions must obviously apply to manufactured goods. Also, since by the terms of the Act all our concessions must be "generalized," *i.e.*, applicable to imports from all countries, they will be valuable to English exporters principally in so far as they are confined to products which are English specialties. Among the dutiable imports from England, some 60 odd items appear to be distinctively English. For them, in tariff bargaining parlance, England is the "principal supplier." This group forms the basis for tariff bargaining operations. The next question is: "Where shall the rate cutting begin?"

Naturally, American manufacturers who believe their interests endangered will protest, and American negotiators will have to give attention to their protests. The problem will be to reduce rates so as to make possible substantial increases in sales of English goods in our markets, at the same time avoiding real injury to efficiently conducted American industries. This sounds like the

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old problem of having one's cake and eating it, too. But actually it is not so impossible.

When we examine the 60 commodities, we find among them a considerable number on which tariff duties could be reduced without serious results. There are, first, the goods not directly competitive with any American product. Take table damask and handkerchief linens for illustrations. Neither is produced in American factories; our entire supply is imported, principally from northern Ireland where the linen industry profits by an abundance of skilled labor and large supplies of yarns of all grades and qualities. In the light of these facts our tariff rates averaging about 45 percent are difficult to justify. Here is an excellent opportunity for the use of tariff bargaining shears.

It would not be difficult to spot other non-competitive imports in the cotton and woolen schedules of our tariff. We levy substantial duties on fine English yarns, mule-spun from Egyptian cotton; they do not compete directly with the American yarns which are the product of ring spinning. Certain types of cotton cloth imported from England, such as those produced on swivel looms, find no counterpart in the products of American mills. English worsteds and woolens are, typically, high-grade fabrics of advanced styles and colorings. They are not directly competitive with the bulk of American production. Other items which might be added to the non-competitive group are razors (the dangerous kind), kaolin, jute burlaps, ground yellow mustard, and flax.

A second group of distinctively English goods deserving the attention of tariff bargainers are those which supply only a small proportion of American consumption. Inlaid linoleum is one such item; others are anthracite coal, pig iron, tin plate, linen yarns, thread and twine. English goods which have been losing their place in the American market might next be examined. In 1928 we bought 25 percent of our imports of ferromanganese and other ferroalloys from the United Kingdom; in 1935 these imports had disappeared. Imports of English iron and steel wire, iron and steel pipes, golf balls and carpets show great losses. What are the causes? Have competitive conditions changed so that the 1930 tariff rates can now be safely reduced?

Finally, the imports dutiable at high rates should be scrutinized. The average *ad valorem* rate on all dutiable imports in 1935 was 42 percent. About one-third of the 60 distinctively

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English commodities paid duties higher than this average. Our negotiators might begin with questioning the necessity for the very highest rates. Why, for example, should imported machine-made cotton laces, raw wool, wool wastes, heavy woolens, and earthenware pay duties equivalent to 90 percent or more of their foreign values?

From this brief analysis it should be evident that there is no lack, in the tariff of either country, of opportunity for making concessions of value to the other. But the area of practical bargaining is more limited. The negotiators are not free. The extent of the concessions they can offer depends, in general upon the attitude of public opinion, and in particular upon the intensity of the "heat" applied by protectionist groups to party leaders. On this side of the Atlantic, the tariff bargaining program so far has had easy going. It has been subjected to less criticism than any other prominent feature of the New Deal. No effective opposition was offered by either industrial or agricultural groups when the renewal of the Presidential bargaining powers was under consideration. All this augurs well for the successful negotiation of an agreement with England. But it must be remembered that in none of the agreements so far concluded have the interests of great protected industries, such as steel or woolens or chemicals, been challenged.

On the English side, the American proposal for a trade agreement has received strong support by organs of liberal opinion. The eventual attitude of the Government is still uncertain; Mr. Runciman has praised the idea in principle, while emphasizing practical difficulties. The difficulties are of two sorts, the commitments made by the Government to English farmers in its ambitious agricultural program, and the pledges made to the self-governing commonwealths in the Ottawa Agreements. But with the return of prosperity in England the fervor for tariff reform has abated. Liberals, who reluctantly supported emergency import duties in 1931 and 1932, are now vigorously criticizing "full-blooded" protection. They are calling attention to the administrative weaknesses of import quotas and marketing controls. Business interests, exporting industries, bankers, insurance and shipping companies contend that permanent prosperity depends not on promoting inter-Empire trade but on the revival of international trade. English commercial policies since 1932, they claim, have worked in the opposite direction. This view was strongly

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urged by Sir Arthur Salter in a recent speech in the House of Commons. "If we take into account," he asserted, "the place which Great Britain occupies in the trade of the world, the size and importance of the British market, and the novelty of the new commercial policies that have been introduced, and then consider the cumulative effects of Imperial preference with the Dominions, the new protective system here, the abandonment of the Open Door, the establishment of agricultural quotas, it is literally and absolutely true to say that in the last 5 or 6 years . . . the commercial policy of no single country has had so great an effect in restricting and deflecting the trade of the world."

But economic considerations explain only in part the strong support given in England to the proposal for a trade agreement with the United States. There is, in addition, a political reason. English believers in democracy are alarmed at the spread of autocracy on the Continent. Recent events in Germany, Italy and Spain make them wonder how long their own institutions can be maintained. Where, outside of England, can they find support? At present only in France and the United States. France has already signed a trade agreement with the United States. An Anglo-American trade agreement would perhaps unite the three democracies even more closely against the encroaching dangers of Fascism and Communism.

It must be remembered, however, that a trade agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom cannot be simply bilateral; it is bound to be multilateral, involving bargaining not only with the Mother Country but with the self-governing Dominions as well. Furthermore, the attitude of the Dominions may determine the success or the failure of the negotiations. For the reduction of English duties on certain farm products, and the liberalization of quotas, concessions of vital importance to the United States, involve modification of the Ottawa Agreements. Will the Dominions assent?

The question was raised opportunely by Secretary Hull's proposals. The five-year term of the original Ottawa Agreements ends in August of this year. The Agreement with Canada has already been renewed on terms which give England freer rein to bargain with the United States. Action on the Australian agreement has been postponed until next year; the terms of new agreements with India, New Zealand and South Africa are now under discussion. The London Imperial Conference which followed the

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Coronation gave an opportunity for Empire prime ministers to discuss the American proposals. The favorable attitude which they are reported to have taken may have been based on a growing realization that the British Empire cannot be made economically self-sufficient. The annual "exportable surpluses" of wool, rubber, tin, copper, wheat and meats is greater than can be sold profitably in the United Kingdom. Outlets in other industrialized countries are essential to the prosperity of the Dominions. On this account they will not be adverse to bargaining with the United States. But they will want to get real concessions from us. Canada would like to sell us more milk and cream, New Zealand more butter, and Australia more wool.

What will American wool growers and dairymen have to say to such proposals? Naturally, they will object that their interests are being sacrificed to those of agricultural exporters, grain farmers, fruit growers, corn and hog farmers. Conflicts of interest such as these inevitably arise when any modification of tariff duties is undertaken. They are usually settled on political rather than on economic grounds. An economist might point out that the injuries suffered by American wool growers and dairymen as the result of moderate reduction in their tariff duties would not be severe. The import duties on clothing and combing wools are equivalent, at present prices, to about 100 percent of the foreign value of imported wools. Wool production in the United States, which not long ago was considered a stationary or declining branch of farming, has recently shown marked recovery. The dairymen have less cause to worry about tariffs than the wool growers. In the gigantic American market, imports of butter, cheese, fluid milk and cream form only a minute proportion of total supplies.

Special and local interests notoriously predominate when Congress revises the tariff; the national interest is submerged. But the President controls the making of trade agreements. Representing all the people, he is free to raise the national interest to the dominant position it deserves. The experience of the last three years gives ground for confidence that, so far as the United States is concerned, neither the special interests of industrial nor of agricultural groups will be able to prevent the conclusion, in the national interest, of an agreement with the United Kingdom.

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THE "UNITED" KINGDOM

By Kingsley Martin

WHEN Hitler's troops reoccupied the Rhineland a member of the German delegation at the London Conference tackled a prominent Labor Member of Parliament. "The Labor Party has always been sympathetic to Germany's cause," he said. "What attitude are you taking up?" The Labor Member replied that in such a matter his party would undoubtedly support the attitude of the National Government. The Nazi threw up his hands in astonishment. "You in England," he said, "seem to have accomplished Hitler's work of unification without any revolution at all. You are united in spite of your party labels and without any National Socialist creed."

This is a revealing conversation. It provides the most important clue to that appearance of unity which has been commented upon by so many visitors to England during the period of the Coronation and of the Imperial Conference. Party bitterness and class antagonism have been even less in evidence than usual in Britain — where they have always been comparatively mild. And the main reason is the menace and the warning of Fascism on the Continent. This, which might not at first seem strange, is in fact surprising; because it has come about under a Government which has not been hostile to the Fascist Powers, but, on the contrary, strikingly complacent before their aggression. In this article I want briefly to show how this anomaly has occurred.

I

Let us first take the example of the abdication of Edward VIII. From a distance it seemed that England could scarcely fail to be torn by so remarkable and shattering an event. British worship of George V had reached astonishing heights; to the outsider, British idolatry of Edward VIII seemed scarcely less extravagant. But the incredible happened. The King of England was dismissed "like an office-boy," as one Member of Parliament put it, or, if we prefer romantic language, he abdicated like a prince in a novelette because he preferred love to the throne. Could anything be more disturbing than his final broadcast? American visitors to England have asked me with astonishment how it was possible for the King to be driven off his throne in such a way and yet to

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leave no bitterness or party dissension behind him. Another King had "gone across the water." Yet in a few months, by the time of his successor's Coronation, there was no whisper of a King's Party in England or in the Commonwealth, no thought of a possible line of Pretenders. On the contrary George VI, emerging from something like obscurity and lacking those peculiar graces that had made Edward into a sort of fairy-story Prince Charming, had been built up to a peak of popularity to which his father had only gradually climbed after years of successful kingship.

In a recent book [1] I have tried to analyze the complicated factors that led to the surprising demonstration of unity at the Coronation. Here I am only concerned to stress one point — the influence of foreign Fascism on the British mind. I do not refer to the story that gained currency in the final stages of the abdication crisis that Mrs. Simpson and her friends were too much at home in pro-Nazi circles in England. This had influence, but it was a minor factor. I refer to the far more important constitutional aspect of the story — an aspect which has been widely missed by the world's press in its anxiety to exploit to the utmost the romantic possibilities of a great love-drama. Yet the constitutional point was the conclusive one in producing national unity.

When the King first stated his intention of marrying Mrs. Simpson, Mr. Baldwin — as he still was then — had no constitutional means of opposing his decision. He could merely make it plain that the marriage would be in his view disastrous and perhaps add that he would feel himself unable to go on as Prime Minister under such circumstances. This no doubt amounted to coercion of the King who, accepting it as impossible to make Mrs. Simpson Queen, suggested a morganatic solution. This proposal involved legislation and a Cabinet decision. After the Cabinet had refused to introduce the necessary legislation, any struggle to make Mrs. Simpson the King's wife without making her Queen would have been a struggle between the King and Cabinet and, since the Cabinet is a committee of the House of Commons, between King and Parliament. The final issue, therefore, was between a small "Cavalier" Party consisting mainly of irresponsible press lords and a handful of Fascists, and the Parliamentarians, who included the Labor Opposition. The Labor Party would have dearly loved a weapon with which to fight the Government, and

[1] "The Magic of Monarchy." New York: Knopf, 1937.

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there were advisers who urged the Opposition to snatch for itself the prize of royal prestige which had always been exploited by the Conservatives. Perhaps that was impossible in any case, since the Labor rank and file is still predominantly Puritan. But the decisive factor which made the party's official organ, the *Daily Herald*, support the *Times* and Mr. Baldwin was the constitutional issue. Professor Laski's articles, arguing that to support the King's request against the advice of his Prime Minister was to strike at the root of our democratic system, were splashed all across the *Daily Herald*. It was this same consideration — that in view of the destruction of democracy abroad nothing should be done to weaken it in England — that finally led Mr. Attlee and other Labor leaders to support the Prime Minister. I can speak with feeling on this subject because I edit a paper which has always taken an "advanced" view about divorce, and which yet in the end agreed that Edward's abdication was the lesser evil. I disliked giving way to the Archbishop, whose moral attitude seemed to me the worst possible morality. Everyone knows that he would have agreed to solemnize a conventional marriage with some important personage with a respectable past whether the King loved her or not. I disliked concurring with the Conservatives and with Mr. Baldwin, who were anxious to get rid of the King because of his failure to fit into his expected rôle as the conventional symbol of the status quo. But I could not range myself with the Fascist supporters of the King. In the issue between Cavaliers and Roundheads, in days when Parliament is in danger, I have to be a Parliamentarian, even though it again means being on the side of the Puritans.

II

The oddest part of this story is that the Left was induced to support the Right because of the threat to democracy, even though it was well aware that the Right's loyalty to democracy is by no means certain. The Ulster crisis of 1914, when the Conservative Party supported and encouraged the mutinous army officers who were prepared for civil war rather than submit on the Home Rule issue, was sufficient proof of the lengths of unconstitutionality to which the gentlemen of England will go if their position is seriously threatened. Yet the Left, which really cares for democracy, had to support the Right because to fail to do so seemed likely to weaken Parliamentary government.

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The same curious situation, in which the National Government has profited by the enthusiasm of the Left for a cause for which Conservatives cared very little, has occurred in each of the great international issues of the last six years. The postwar strength of the Labor Party arose out of the general hatred of war more than out of any other cause. Mr. MacDonald's immense popularity in 1924 was primarily due to the fact that he had been a pacifist during the war. Labor's greatest asset was pacifism. The nature of this pacifism was not clearly tested until the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Thousands of pacifists had been muddle-headed enough to pledge themselves never again to fight under any circumstances, and at the same time to support the League of Nations, which, if it was ever called upon to stop an aggressive war, could only do so if the signatories were prepared to run some risk of having to fight the aggressor. If the League Powers had held together the risk would have been negligible, and on that ground many pacifists, who could not face the prospect of having to fight again, were able to support the League.

The Japanese invasion of Manchuria called this bluff. It might be true — indeed, I think it was true — that firm diplomatic action by the League Powers in coöperation with the United States would at the outset have stopped Japan. And with Mr. Stimson as Secretary of State the United States was prepared to go a long way in coöperation. Moreover, Japan was not in a good position to withstand the threat of economic sanctions. But any such threat involved the possibility that Japan would turn round and attack British possessions in the Far East. This possibility had to be faced, and the Labor Party for the first time therefore confronted the actual danger that its peace policy of supporting the League might mean a war. The result was a searching of hearts in the Labor Party and a sharp division of opinion between those who saw that the cry of "collective security" might be used as a means of justifying a war, just as "poor little Belgium" and "the sanctity of treaties" had been in 1914, and those who pointed out that to hold by the League and run the risks envisaged in the Covenant was the way most calculated to lessen the risks of war and the only way of building up a peaceful system for settling international disputes. The latter argument won, and the resolution in favor of a "general strike" against all war which was carried in addition to and in spite of a resolution in favor of collective security at the Annual Conference of the Labor Party in

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1932, was dropped in favor of definite support of the League at the Conference of 1933.

The significant thing was that the National Government openly supported Japan throughout the dispute. Sir John Simon at Geneva was so skilful in his interpretation of the Covenant, and so ardent in defending Japan, that the Japanese Ambassador remarked as he came out of the Assembly that the British representative had "put over" the case for Japan's aggression which he himself had tried for many weeks to put over without success. The story may be read from the American angle in Mr. Stimson's "The Far Eastern Crisis." [2] Here my concern is to point out that its effect was to show the Labor Party that to implement the Covenant of the League might possibly mean having to go to war. The Party's pacifism was undermined. But it was a fruitless sacrifice. The National Government had not the slightest intention of risking any struggle with Japan; as Conservatives openly explained in the House of Commons, the Japanese aggression might produce order and better trading conditions in Manchuria. They soon discovered their mistake. Japan showed no tendency to share her loot in Manchuria. But from the point of view of British national unity the result was to put Labor in a position of having to admit that had the Government done what Labor demanded, and put sanctions on Japan's exports, a war might possibly have occurred in which Labor would have been bound to coöperate since it would have been the outcome of Labor policy.

Japan had laughed at the League, violated her signature of the Covenant and the Nine Power Treaty, and proceeded unchecked to the conquest of Manchuria. With this precedent to quote, Mussolini invaded Abyssinia in September 1934. He had given Britain and the League Powers ample warning of his intentions. Britain raised no strong objection when he broached the subject in January 1934, and did not even discuss the matter at the Stresa Conference a few months later. Official British policy was never at any time calculated to overthrow Mussolini. Negotiations, which culminated in the Laval-Hoare proposals, went on continuously between Italy and the British and French Foreign Offices. But the public was gloriously deceived. In the summer of that year the Peace Ballot was completed — an inaccurate test of opinion perhaps, but an important indication that League of Nations propaganda had at last begun to have a real effect on the public

[2] New York: Harper, 1936.

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mind. So seriously did the British Government take the 11,000,000 signatures of the Peace Ballot in favor of sanctions against the aggressor that Sir Samuel Hoare promised at Geneva unswerving opposition to unprovoked aggression. In the belief that the National Government was determined to stop the Duce's adventure, the electorate again swept it into power. But no sooner did it come to office than an old-fashioned imperialistic business arrangement emerged in the Laval-Hoare proposals. The Government had only adopted a League policy for the period of the election; it betrayed the League as soon as it was once again securely in office.

Logically, the effect of this betrayal should have been to intensify the war-resistance element in the Labor Party. The opposite, however, took place. Anger against the Government was weakened by fear of the Fascist Powers. In 1933, as I have said, the old war-resistance attitude of the Party, which alone means the possibility of real opposition in case of international danger, gave way finally to a demand for "collective security." The decisive reason was the triumph of Hitler. The Trade Unionists who in 1932 were prepared to vote for resistance to all capitalist war began to wonder whether any other than a warlike resistance was possible in face of Hitler's treatment of the German trade unions. By 1935 the mass of the Party no longer had doubts; they were prepared, if challenged, to run the risk of fighting against Fascism. At the Labor Party Conference at Brighton in that year the whole issue was debated in classical style. Mr. Lansbury's eloquent plea for pacifism was swamped by Mr. Bevin's vigorous exposition that pacifism meant a world safe for Hitler.

The final test was the question of rearmament. The Government which had sold out the League, thus in Labor's view making war more likely, now asked, in spite of electoral promises of "moderate rearmament to enable it to fulfil the duties of collective security," for money for the greatest expenditure on armaments the world has ever seen. Labor resisted this demand; and though it no longer votes against this expenditure, it still in 1937 abstains from voting for it. It argues that only in this way can it show its detestation of the Government's policy.

In the Spanish war the British Government's attitude is exactly what it was in regard to Abyssinia. Once again it temporizes, bargaining first with one dictator and then with another. Whether in the end the Foreign Office will prove to have been correct in

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assuming that it would have sufficient influence with Franco or with Italy and Germany to secure Britain's strategic position in the Mediterranean remains to be seen. The Foreign Office made a similar calculation in China and in Africa; in both cases it was wrong. Unquestionably the British Empire has been weakened both in the Far East and in the Mediterranean. Thus a strange and unreal situation has arisen today. The class interests of the British ruling class have been so far in conflict with its normal patriotism that the announcement of the capture of a British food ship in Spanish waters by General Franco arouses no anger on the Government side of the House of Commons, while the Opposition, anxious to enlist the influence of British imperialism upon the side of Spanish democracy, show a very conservative concern about the heavy guns reported to dominate Gibraltar and the German submarine base which is said to be under construction in the Canary Islands.

This clearly is an unstable and unnatural state of affairs. Determined though they are not to quarrel with Italy, and ready for any humiliation in preference to becoming engaged in a serious dispute with the dictators, the British Government will not be able to stand by and watch its entire Mediterranean position lost to the new imperial power of Italy or the growing naval strength of Germany. Sooner or later, if negotiations with the dictators prove fruitless or if Franco proves unable or unwilling to yield to British rather than to Italian or German influence, the National Government will be compelled to take a stand. If that occurs it will presumably find the mass of Labor ranged behind it in spite of six years of betrayal of all that Labor holds dear. For Labor, having demanded firm League action against the Fascist Powers, and having bitterly complained that the Government has yielded to the Fascist Powers, will no longer be in a position to object to a stand against these Powers, even if the League is gone, killed by the National Government, and even though the issue no longer is collective security or Spanish democracy but simply the British Empire.

This, to anyone who remembers Labor's fervent oath "never again" to fight for a capitalist régime, never again to be trapped by spurious war cries about defending "small nations" or fighting "a war to end war," seems a remarkable dénouement. It has occurred partly because in aiding the Fascist cause, as in effect it has done in China, Abyssinia and Spain, the National Govern-

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ment has driven Labor farther and farther into the position of demanding strong action against Fascism. The psychological basis of the change, however, lies in the fact of Hitlerism. Hitler has destroyed pacifism and forced every "war resister" to ask himself whether in the event of a war with Germany he dare weaken Britain by opposition to his own Government. As a French Communist said in 1914 at the final meeting of his party: "Moi, je suis communiste, mais s'il y a question de la patrie, je suis français!" And so the mass of the French and British Left would say once again if war broke out. The one important difference is that the small disciplined Communist Party would today judge the situation by its effect upon the U.S.S.R. At the beginning of a war today with Fascist Italy or Hitlerite Germany, British Communists would be forced to support the war; they would no doubt make their own war demands and be ready to challenge the Government at the first opportunity, but like everyone except the extreme pacifist group, they would necessarily support the war against a Fascist state. The difference between the trained Marxist and the ordinary Labor Party Member would be that the former would be looking for a chance to turn war into revolution.

Fascism on the Continent, then, in spite of the character of the so-called National Government, has succeeded in producing something like a "United" Kingdom. What of the Empire? Have not the constituent members of the Commonwealth criticized the astonishing vacillations of British foreign policy? Once again the answer is that it is just these vacillations and the desperately dangerous situation to which they have given rise that have united the Empire.

The agenda of the Imperial Conference of 1937 included proposals for modifying the Ottawa Agreement in favor of freeing world commerce and in particular of including the United States in the circle of English-speaking nations with special trading terms. Of these wise and mutually beneficial proposals nothing came. The vested interests built up under Ottawa were too powerful, and it was Britain herself, the least willing party to the original Ottawa Agreement, which now proved the severest stumbling block to instituting freer trade relations. The constitutional discussions of the Conference were similarly fruitless: the Dominions are still too jealous of their new freedom to be ready to form coöperative institutions which might limit their new

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sovereignty. But on the main question that came before the Conference the Empire proved as united as the United Kingdom itself. New Zealand, with a Labor Government and a genuine belief in the League, was vehemently critical of the policy of the British Government which has betrayed the League. Australia, fearful of the effect of allowing Japan a free hand in the East, proposed a non-aggression pact in the Pacific to conciliate Japan, and at the same time discussed plans for developing an Australian navy. South Africa, seriously perturbed by the growth of the Italian Empire in the Mediterranean and East Africa, and critical of the policy which had failed to stop Mussolini when the League Powers were compelled to be Britain's allies for that purpose, yet found it too late for recriminations and discussed with the British Government the development of an African air route and the construction of a naval base at Simonstown. Thus once again the British policy of drift, of refusing to use the League to prevent war or to build a system which could prevent it in the future, has had the odd result of detaching Britain from her potential allies and so weakening her position that the Dominions, faced with the danger of war in isolation, are compelled to drop their complaints and unite in defense not of the League and world peace, but of the British Empire.

III

The result of external weakness and international failure, then, has been to strengthen the National Government. If there is anarchy abroad and a danger of Hitler and Mussolini dominating the Continent, the Englishman tends to forget how far the success of the dictators may be the result of his own government's past policy; he instinctively decides to support a cautious and Conservative administration that is intent on rearming. What this Government means to do with arms when it has them, on which side it is likely to exert diplomatic pressure, the average voter does not ask. He asks to be kept out of war — which the Government has so far done — and to be in a position to act in case vital British interests are attacked. These are simple, old-fashioned ideas with centuries of tradition behind them; they tend to unite people, while novelties like Leagues of Nations, pooled armaments and international economic agreements cause sharp divisions of opinion and therefore, in their early stages at least, fail altogether to produce the feeling of security which is the voter's

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principal concern. The new prosperity, due to rearmament, puts the desire to experiment at a minimum; supposedly Socialist leaders become more and more satisfied with reformism. Those few who have a thorough and theoretical grasp of Socialist doctrine and who realize that we shall certainly have another depression and probably another war before long, find it increasingly difficult to obtain a hearing. In these circumstances Labor's electoral appeal is not powerful, as recent bye-elections show. Some Labor leaders admit in private that they can scarcely hope to make much headway while the boom is on, and one may find in private conversation with the weaker Labor M.P.s something like relief that, in the present difficult stage of international affairs, the upper classes who have "muddled through" in the past should be in charge of the business of muddling through again. Of course there are more courageous ones who would welcome the chance to try to build up a system of collective security and to try to strengthen the forces opposed to Fascism on the Continent; but there are certainly many, among the Trade Unionists especially, who maintain a secret feeling of inferiority in everything outside their own sphere of industrial organization and who are very content for the time being to be in a minority. Hence their Opposition to the National Government is more vehement than sincere; while the full force of their hatred is directed against Communists and left-wing Socialists who expose their political weakness and who, in their opinion, jeopardize democracy by untimely attacks on the whole existing order.

This state of mind is ably encouraged by the leaders of English Conservatism. A revolutionary movement would have developed long ago had not the ruling class evolved a technique of dealing with emergent Labor leaders. American employers still fight against the recognition of trade unions. British employers took the same stand for a century; but for the last sixty years they have known a better tactic.

Take the case of Mr. Ernest Bevin, famous as "the dockers' K.C.," a powerful and dominating personality. Once he seemed a potential revolutionary who might be dangerous to the ruling class. There seemed a chance of that even as late as 1931 when contempt for the futilities of the Labor administration drew him into association with Sir Stafford Cripps and others who are usually counted left-wing Socialists. Today Mr. Bevin is on the extreme right of the Labor movement. What happened? No one

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attempted to bribe Mr. Bevin. Instead they gave him a position of responsibility. They brought him into the complex task of solving the new problems of British transport. By coöperating with the Ministry, Mr. Bevin was able to secure better and more uniform conditions of labor and pay for the transport workers. At the same time he became a kind of unofficial civil servant, in a position of authority and responsibility, completely unable, even if he wished, to maintain a militant Socialism. Thus it came about that when a left-wing "rank and file movement" which had grown up among the busmen demanded a strike for shorter hours in London, these found themselves fighting much less against the London Passenger Transport Board than against Mr. Bevin. For a time just before the Coronation this left-wing movement had its way. It was strong enough to force a strike, and Mr. Bevin by virtue of his position was compelled nominally to lead it. It was unsuccessful, and in the end the strikers accepted terms which they could have had without striking. As soon as a settlement was reached it was Mr. Bevin who turned round and disciplined his unruly followers. The leaders of the left-wing revolt were expelled. In other words, the official Labor leader's authority and influence keep left-wing discontent in order, and do it far more effectively than could be done by bands of youths with rubber truncheons or by repressive legislation that would provoke widespread resentment throughout the working-class movement if it were introduced by a Conservative government.

The technique of conciliating and flattering Labor leaders and leaving it to them to suppress extremists works as satisfactorily in the political as in the industrial field. In some countries Labor leaders are silenced by being put into concentration camps; in others by bribery and corruption; in England by being asked to dinner. Mr. J. H. Thomas is the classical example of the change that can be induced by a white tie and tail coat. And men who would indignantly refuse "jobs," men whose integrity is unquestioned, can yet be bought by kindness.

One can see precisely how the process works in the autobiography, published two years ago, of David Kirkwood, the proudly independent Scottish engineer who first came into prominence as a shop steward in Glasgow during the war. He fought the authorities, was dismissed from the works, refused to make any promise of good behavior and looked like developing into a revolutionary. Then Mr. Churchill had the sense to get him reinstated at

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Beardmore's without conditions and he was so pleased with the victory that he kept all his comrades producing munitions as hard as they could until the end of the war. Then he was elected to the House of Commons with other Clyde-siders; they all came to London determined to revolutionize the social system. Kirkwood knew all about "the aristocratic embrace" and from the beginning was bent on showing the big nobs that he was not to be put down or bamboozled. He started off by calling Baldwin "Uriah Heep" and then felt thoroughly ashamed of himself when Baldwin very gently asked him afterwards if that was how he really appeared to him. He hurled every abusive epithet that Parliament allows (and probably some that it does not) at Neville Chamberlain. He says that he meant to hurt Chamberlain, but Chamberlain came up to him afterwards and said he was afraid he must have said something to hurt Kirkwood. And then Davie gave notice that he was going to make a bitter attack on Lloyd George, who promptly wrote him a note apologizing for not being able to be in his place in the House when Mr. Kirkwood made his speech! Kirkwood, whose notion was that one knock deserved another, was flattened out by all this courtesy. And finally he wrote an autobiography with a nice introduction by his old friend, Mr. Churchill, and another by George Lansbury (to show that he was still a Socialist and a hundred percent Labor man), and a concluding chapter in which he pointed out how much better things were for the poor than they used to be when he was a boy, and described with proper pride a long conversation he had had at Lady Astor's with Edward, then Prince of Wales.

There is an old saying that the House of Commons is the best club in England. So it is, in the sense that it is an astonishingly good mixing bowl for very different types of people. It is well understood that the success of Parliament depends on adhering to the rules of the game, on a certain superficial give and take, on courtesy in private, whatever may be said in public. If you've called a man an agitator and sedition-monger in the House and he's called you a blood-sucker and battener-on-the-poor, you must have a drink with him afterwards or you might begin to believe what you've said. This personal touch is the salvation of the Tory Party and the worst enemy of Socialism. Every now and again someone arrives who is difficult to manage. There is your Jimmy Maxton, the revolutionary orator, more on his guard against flattery of the conventional type than David Kirkwood

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and who resolved to maintain his political purity. He makes a rule always to refuse to dine with rich men. But the House of Commons found another way of dealing with him. They made a pet, a character of him, called him their raven-haired pirate, their "Captain Hook" who sounded very ferocious but who, everyone knew, was the most lovable of good fellows. They showed him off to foreigners as a proof that England could produce orators too, and made it a point of honor to appreciate Maxton's "sincerity" and "idealism." Everyone listened to Maxton, applauded, and forgot all about what he said — really a much more effective way of destroying his influence than hitting him over the head.

The most troublesome Opposition leaders have always come from the well-to-do middle-class. They are used to good manners and do not confuse the small change of courtesy for real payment. Parnell, the great Irish leader, is the one conspicuous case of a really determined revolutionary who maintained his position in the House of Commons. Fortunately for the Tories, he committed political suicide by becoming involved in a divorce scandal. Joseph Chamberlain might have been dangerous to British Conservatism if Gladstone's lack of tact had not driven him out of the Liberal Party. The most recent example is Sir Stafford Cripps, whom the Tories hate because he is serious about his Socialism. He might have been difficult if he had ever become leader of the Labor Party. But he was too uncompromising, and once again, according to the behavior-pattern that I have been describing, it has been the Front Bench of the Labor Party, not the Conservatives, who have pushed Sir Stafford on one side. To work for a "United Front" of the working classes in England involves collaboration with Communists and for that crime the members of Sir Stafford's Socialist League were threatened with disaffiliation from the Party. The League was disbanded and Sir Stafford is once again merely a private member of the Party, personally influential, but a lone wolf without organized followers.

I have taken enough examples to make my point. The Abdication showed the Left even refusing to criticize the Prime Minister for fear lest in doing so they might damage democracy. In the story of six years of half-hearted and vacillating foreign policy in which Fascism has scored a long series of triumphs, we have seen Labor deploring the sabotage of the League of Nations, but compelled to abandon its pacifism, first by the theoretical need of perhaps having to fight for "collective security" and then by the

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very practical fear of perhaps having to fight against Fascism. Its last phase is to declare through the mouth of Sir Walter Citrine, the recently knighted Secretary of the Trades Union Congress, that if the Government abandons non-intervention in Spain and becomes involved in a war against Italy in the Mediterranean, Labor would be prepared to support it. Which is something of a joke, because the Government seems not to intend seriously to oppose Italy. Finally, I have explained how even the beginnings of serious potentially revolutionary opposition are either tactfully dealt with by the Conservatives or successfully disciplined by the machine of the Labor Party itself. The most recent proof of the friendly relations that exist between the Government and the Front Bench of the Opposition is the enactment that the leader of the Opposition shall receive a salary of £2,000 a year for his services. This is not a bribe; it is merely a recognition of the fact that His Majesty's Opposition, as the political alternative to the Government, would be unlikely to adopt a very different policy from the Government's if it came into power; its opposition is not to be regarded as dangerous but paid for as licensed criticism.

The impression of unity produced at the Coronation was correct. There are today more young men and women in Britain than ever before who are aware of the meaning of the class-war and who could pass an examination in the works of Marx and Lenin. Given a rising cost of living, followed by another economic depression comparable with the last, we should no doubt find that there were also a large number of working-class men and women who were not satisfied to accept a reformist Labor Party and who might follow a revolutionary lead. But, even so, as long as the spectre of Fascism remains unappeased on the Continent, the party of property will have little to fear. Hitler and Mussolini have united Britain at least as successfully as they have united Germany and Italy.

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JAPAN ATTACKS: CHINA RESISTS

By Walter H. Mallory

ON JULY 7, 1937, Japan resumed her march of conquest on the mainland of Asia. Her army, as I write, is advancing in an ever-widening circle in North China; and once again her navy, supported by a large military force, is hammering at the defenses of Shanghai, China's largest city and most important seaport. It is difficult in such a time of crisis to take a "long view." But it is necessary. For this is not another case like Ethiopia. Japan is not going to swallow a country as populous, extensive, and rich as China at one gulp. And if she attempts too large a bite at this time the problem of digestion and assimilation — an inkling of which she should have had in Manchuria — may well be too much for her system. In fact, the inordinate appetite of her military leaders seems to be rushing Japan into a dilemma from which she will require more than military successes to extricate herself. But the purpose of this article is to analyze China's problem, not Japan's. And first we must review the course of events which set the stage for this historical drama.

I

On the night of July 7, during a manœuvre near Fengtai, a railway center a few miles south of Peiping, Japanese troops made contact with a local unit of the 29th Chinese army and a conflict ensued. We shall never know which side fired the first shot. It is difficult also to say whether the incident was planned in advance by the Japanese or whether it was an accident which, involving their vanity, stirred to vigorous action the warlike spirit which has been their outstanding characteristic during the past several years. Either the leaders provoked an incident which would give them an excuse for belligerency and the assurance of popular support, or the incident itself created a situation which for questions of prestige the Japanese Army could not allow to pass without challenge. In either case the result has been that Japan resumed her drive.

The presence of Japanese troops in the Peiping and Tientsin area was justified by the stipulations of the protocol of September 7, 1901, which provided the settlement for the Boxer disturbance of the previous year. In Article VII of the protocol, China recog-

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nized the right of each of the eleven signatory Powers to maintain a permanent guard in Peiping for the defense of its legation; and in Article IX she conceded the right to the Powers "to occupy certain points, to be determined between them, for the maintenance of open communications between Peking and the sea."



The above map shows the five northern provinces of China (Hopei, Shansi, Shantung, Chahar, and Suiyuan), control of which seems to be Japan's immediate objective. Fengtai and Tungchow, often mentioned in the news, are in effect suburbs of Peiping, the former to the south and the latter to the north; Nankow, also often mentioned, is located between Peiping and Kalgan where the railway line pierces the Great Wall

Japan was a signatory of the protocol, and has maintained a military force in the Peiping-Tientsin area for the past thirty-six years. The troops which started the trouble were stationed at Fengtai, the railway junction on the southern outskirts of Peiping. Although Fengtai is not mentioned in the protocol as one of the places where garrisons were to be stationed, it is a strategic

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point and has been previously occupied by foreign troops. The actual fighting took place not along the railway between Peiping and the sea, but at Lukochiao, just southwest of Fengtai.

The speed and thoroughness with which the Japanese leaders utilized this insignificant exchange of a few shots as the basis for a major move is significant. Japan was at once put on a war basis. Troops were poured into China, both from Manchuria and from Japan proper. Chinese forces were at first quickly subdued and retreated from the Tientsin-Peiping district. Japanese military planes dominated the entire area of North China, and the army moved south from Peiping and Tientsin along the two parallel railways (the Peiping-Hankow and the Tientsin-Nanking lines) and northwest from Peiping along the Peiping-Suiyuan railway toward the Great Wall and Chahar.

Subsequently at Shanghai two naval men, one an officer, were killed by guards who sought to bar their entrance to the Chinese airport. A deadlock quickly developed in the negotiations between the Japanese naval commander at Shanghai and the Chinese mayor of the city. The Japanese augmented their fleet and landed a naval party and the Chinese countered by concentrating large military forces in the area around the city which had been defined as a neutral zone after the settlement of the Shanghai battle of 1932. A conflict quickly ensued and Japan opened a combined military, naval, and air attack on the Chinese troops.

In searching for the reasons which prompted Japan to attack at Shanghai, I am inclined to emphasize four:

1. She feared for the safety of her twenty thousand nationals resident there, and struck before the enemy was prepared in order to ensure her control of the city.

2. She wished by this digression to divert attention from her main objectives in North China.

3. She wished to threaten the Central Government and put herself in a strong bargaining position in order to force a favorable final settlement.

4. The Japanese Navy wished to have a part in the operations in China which, up to that time, had been carried on solely by the Army.

Unless Japan meant to provoke a major war, which does not seem to have been her plan, the first reason is the most tenable. Only a short time earlier she had retreated from Hankow, on

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the Upper Yangtse, a position which she had held for years with considerable tenacity. Obviously she felt unable to remain there without the danger of a severe military defeat. The threat which she felt so keenly at Hankow must have been equally evident at Shanghai. Yet she could not retreat from that port without surrendering very large interests and without great loss of prestige. The first overt act on China's part was thus a signal to the local commander to take what he thought would be effective measures to protect Japanese lives and property in Shanghai.

It is obvious that the action which followed the incident on July 7 was the result of a careful plan. But the people of China and of other countries, and indeed the people of Japan themselves, do not know how far the Japanese army plans to advance. The precision and wholehearted vigor with which the movement was launched, however, indicate that the Japanese leaders have certain clear aims which they mean to attain.

It is interesting to note, also, that the international situation in July seemed to indicate that there would be little interference from other Powers in any course that Japan might wish to pursue in China. Russia was having internal difficulties which involved the "liquidation" of a number of her important army leaders. A border incident on the Amur River in North Manchuria between Japanese and Russian troops had been settled in Japan's favor on June 29. This showed that the Soviet was not looking for a *casus belli*. Great Britain and France were deeply occupied in Europe with the Spanish conflict. Germany had signed with Japan a treaty of alliance "against Communism." The United States had given every sign of her desire to remain aloof from foreign entanglements of any nature.

Another factor which might well have hastened Japanese action, if she were intent on further conquest, was the growing unity and strength of China and a definite stiffening of her resistance to outside pressure. The Nanking Government had been adamant to Japan's bid for control in North China. National consciousness was growing rapidly [1] and the Chinese people were considering not only whether they could prevent further encroachment by Japan but whether in fact they could drive her out of North China entirely. Demands on the Central Government to fight Japan were increasingly numerous and insistent.

[1] See "The Changing Balance of Forces in the Pacific," by Hu Shih, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, January 1937, and "China Prepares to Resist," by Lin Yutang, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1937.

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It will be remembered that following a somewhat similar "incident" on the South Manchuria Railway in 1931, Japan dislodged the Chinese authorities and troops from the three Northeastern provinces of China, commonly called Manchuria, and set up there the puppet state of Manchukuo. Subsequently, the eastern portion of Inner Mongolia — including Jehol province — was conquered and annexed. Manchukuo is slightly larger in area than France and Germany combined and has a population of some 30,000,000. It is bounded on the north by Soviet Russia, on the west by Mongolia, and on the south by the Chinese province of Hopei where the recent disturbances started.

In 1935 Japan sought by military and political action to establish herself in North China by setting up a second autonomous state comprising the provinces of Hopei, Shantung, Shansi, Chahar, and Suiyuan — an area of nearly 400,000 square miles (about the size of Manchukuo) with a population of more than 75 millions. The effort was only partly successful and resulted merely in the formation of an autonomous East Hopei régime comprising 22 counties in the eastern and northern portion of the province. During last winter a force of Manchukuoan troops invaded Chahar and Suiyuan through Jehol but was defeated in Suiyuan by the forces of the Chinese Government.

In the early stages of the current strife, Japan sought to gain greater control of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council by pressing for a "local settlement" of the issues, not with the Central Government at Nanking, but with the local Council. The Council, however, challenged the authority of the Japanese. Troops under its command turned on the Japanese garrison at Tungchow. After the Japanese army had gained control of Peiping, General Sung Cheh-yuan, the Chairman of the Council and Commander of the 29th army, which had by then been driven out by the Japanese, resigned, and his place was taken by a pro-Japanese politician. Thus the basis for a "local settlement" favorable to Japan was laid. But meanwhile the conflict had assumed proportions which indicated that Japan would considerably broaden her objectives.

What those objectives are has not been entirely divulged at Tokyo. Premier Konoye told the Japanese press on August 21, according to the *New York Times*, that "North China had inseparable relations with Japan and Manchukuo and any new

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Chinese Administration set up there must keep in close connection with Japan." It thus seems clear that Japan means if possible to dominate the northern provinces of China proper and develop their natural resources, and from that point of vantage to dictate terms to the rest of the country. Also it appears that she will endeavor to establish a buffer area between China and Soviet Russia. This she was unable to do by the attack on Inner Mongolia from Manchukuo last winter. She found the salient too narrow, the means of communication through the mountains of Jehol too meager, and the flank too exposed on the Chinese side. By basing her operations on Hopei province, with the port of Tientsin and the Peking-Suiyuan railway in her hands, she can proceed with less danger of defeat.

Japan has long urged the Central Government of China to take united action with her in exterminating the Chinese Communist armies. This Chiang Kai-shek has been unwilling to do. But he has fought the Communists himself, and last winter he had driven them into Kansu and Shensi. When he went to Shensi in December to press the campaign he was taken prisoner by Chang Hsueh-liang at the behest of the Communist forces. The Communists said in effect: "We are all Chinese. Why should we fight one another? The real enemy of China is Japan. Let us bury our differences and unite our forces to defeat the Japanese. If you will cease your attacks on us and will agree to fight Japan we will let you go."

Chiang Kai-shek was released. The war on the Communists was not continued. Japan may have felt that Chiang fell in line too fully with the Communists' proposals. This might well have had an influence in strengthening her determination to establish herself in Inner Mongolia before it was too late.

II

Chinese leaders have said for some time that their patience was exhausted and that they would not yield further without a fight, even if it might mean a major war. But how effectively can China fight Japan? What are the elements of her strength? What are her weaknesses? First we shall take her military position.

The topography of China makes her vulnerable to attack from the northeast and east. She is protected by rugged mountains or arid desert areas in the north, northwest, west, and southwest. Her coast, where her great plains run down to the sea, is un-

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defended and open to attack by a hostile fleet, for her navy is limited to a few ineffective gunboats. Three broad rivers link the coast with the interior, and these are undefended also. The Yangtse is patrolled by foreign ships of war which penetrate many hundreds of miles into the interior of the country. Control by a hostile navy of any one of these rivers would greatly hamper Chinese resistance; and effective control of all three would so divide her forces and paralyze their mobility as to make impossible any resistance at all except in the form of guerilla warfare.

The Government of China is nominally a republic, but actually it is a political-military dictatorship under General Chiang Kai-shek. The Generalissimo has undisputed control of the region around his capital at Nanking; the measure of his control of outlying provinces is in inverse proportion to their distance from the capital. In recent years he has increased his power in the distant provinces. But, regardless of his strength in domestic matters, indications are that he would have almost universal support in standing up to Japan — at least in the beginning. The Japanese menace is the greatest unifying factor in China today.

China has almost unlimited man-power; her population is more than four times that of the Japanese Empire. Further, she has a very large number of men under arms. Estimates which have been compiled from reliable sources during the past year indicate that her army totals 1,650,000. In addition, there are municipal police and railway guards which constitute a reserve outside the army proper, and large numbers of provincial soldiery — lacking in cohesion and of dubious value. Then, too, in case of war with Japan the Chinese Communists could probably be counted on; they are said to comprise a well-trained and disciplined force of some 150,000 men, though they are deficient in military supplies. In all, then, China has forces of something over 2,000,000.

Of the 1,650,000 men just mentioned, 1,200,000 are said to be loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. The core of the army — both in loyalty and ability — is made up of Chiang's personal troops. These have been with him for ten years and number more than 350,000. Another group of 350,000 can be counted on as entirely reliable, since they are officered by men loyal to Chiang. The rest, immediately responsible to the provincial authorities and not to the Generalissimo, can be depended on only to varying degrees. In this latter group are included the soldiers of Chang Hsueh-liang who have a score to settle with Japan for driving them out

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of Manchuria in 1931, and from North China in 1934, and the Communists who have been crying for war against the Japanese these many months. Surely there is no single impulse which would weld the whole force together so effectively as resistance to foreign aggression.

In considering the real strength of China's army we must not fall into the error of placing much emphasis on numbers. A more important criterion is loyalty. Large numbers are of little avail under the divided leadership which has been the rule in China since the revolution of 1911, though the situation has undoubtedly been improving under Chiang Kai-shek.

The Chinese army is composed of divisions and corps, with the division organized on the pre-war German basis. Its effectiveness, in China as elsewhere, depends largely on the training and ability of the officers. There are about 180 division commanders, of whom only a score are considered by foreign observers to be of better than average competency. The training of officers, however, has been a major preoccupation of Chiang during recent years. There are some 80 German military advisers in China for training purposes. The Army School has been moved from Canton to Nanking, its curriculum revised, and the whole course stiffened. But it cannot think of being able to train the officers needed for an army of such size. China is undoubtedly deficient, then, in proper leadership of her troops. Not only is this true for the junior grades, but also as regards staff officers and a general staff.

The efficiency of the Chinese army as a combat unit is low. Between the artillery and infantry there is no coöperation whatever. The cavalry are few in number. Such Mongol cavalry as serve the Chinese are under their own banners and are of questionable allegiance. The equipment of all branches is scanty. The field artillery has but 1,900 guns of which no more than 1,000 are usable. Anti-aircraft defense is insufficient. Chemical warfare has only just begun to enter Chinese strategy.

The infantry is armed with rifles of all makes and ages. Each soldier carries his own ammunition and there are no appreciable reserves. Literally almost the entire supply of small-arms ammunition at a given moment is contained in the ammunition belts of China's million-odd troops. While she could quickly mobilize 2,500,000 men, she has serviceable weapons for less than a million.

The primary problem of the Chinese air force has been to

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train a sufficient number of pilots. Until 1927 most of the training was done by Chinese; since then the Government has enlisted the services of foreigners. The Chinese are reputed to have ability as aviators, but their instruction thus far has been mainly in the art of flying, not in military aviation or the use of war formations. For equipment, when hostilities broke out at Shanghai, the Chinese had about 500 airplanes, of which 100 were obsolete; 150 were old types that nevertheless could be used; of the remaining 250, 80 were pursuit planes, 80 were for light bombardment, and 90 were for moderately heavy bombardment. In comparison, the Japanese Army was reputed to have 1,000 planes and the Japanese Navy 400. There is a large air base in Japan proper, one in Manchukuo, and one in Korea.

Competent observers believe that despite the size of China's army she could not concentrate and sustain more than 400,000 men in North China, about 350,000 men in the coastal portion of Central China, and only 250,000 in the south. Thus only a fraction of her total strength could be thrown into a given area. This is due mainly to the problem of transportation. It is customary for Chinese troops to live off the countryside; but although China is essentially an agricultural country, there are few districts which raise a surplus of foodstuffs, and the necessary railways to bring in supplies from other areas or abroad are inadequate. This same problem would face an invading army, but Japan, having the necessary shipping, might make better use of the waterways, and she of course is also more amply supplied with motor transport.

At the outbreak of hostilities in July, Japan had 5,000 troops in Formosa, 10,000 around Tientsin, some 90,000 in Manchukuo exclusive of railway guards, and 20,000 in Korea. In Manchukuo there was organized in 1932 a local force of 100,000. The Manchukuoan troops proved ineffective in Japan's advance into Jehol and Chahar, however, and so she has reduced the number to a corps of 30,000 men, well drilled and staffed with Japanese officers. Nominally it was formed for suppressing bandits. Actually it is developing into a first class army. But these Chinese troops could not be depended on for war against their own people in China.

III

The resources and economic development of China do not encourage one to believe that she could successfully sustain a major

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war. Her economy is essentially agricultural. There are the beginnings of industrial growth, but these center chiefly in the large port cities which are particularly vulnerable to attack. Also, her industries are producing consumers' goods primarily. The heavy industries necessary for the support of modern war practically do not exist.

In raw materials China is no more deficient than Japan; but she does not have the naval force necessary to protect her imports. In foodstuffs she could be self-supporting if crops were anything like normal. This does not mean that she could provide what Westerners would consider a proper diet for her people. But frequent famines have accustomed the Chinese to sustaining life on short rations. Even during the past few years of flood and famine the importation of food has been small in comparison with the total consumption of the country. The 2,000,000 men who are now under arms would eat no more if they were fighting Japan, and so war would not greatly affect the food problem.

If we give a cursory glance at China's mineral resources, we find that while she has many important minerals she has not yet developed the means of using them. She has ample supplies of coal, but little coking coal. She has iron ore, but no adequate means of producing pig iron and steel. There are a number of small blast furnaces, but many of them are lying idle. As a matter of fact, China exports nearly all her iron ore — about a million tons annually. Japan is the principal buyer and secures a third of her total requirements from China.

China has large deposits of antimony, tin, and tungsten, and some lead and zinc; but nearly all of it is sold abroad. She is deficient in copper — it is found only in Yunnan province — and she has no oil. But minerals are unimportant so long as they remain in the earth, and it is futile for our purposes to make any assessment of China's mineral wealth until there is some prospect of its utilization. It counts hardly at all in the present crisis.

Scattered over the length and breadth of China are scores of arsenals or depots for the manufacture of munitions. Only about 30 of them, however, are worthy of the name of "arsenal" and of these only 15 are really serving war needs. A survey completed last year showed that the daily capacity of the larger arsenals for manufacturing small-arms ammunition was as follows: Hangchow, 200,000 rounds; Hanyang, 130,000; Nanking, 70,000; Tsinanfu, 60,000; Liuchow, 50,000; Taiyuanfu, 40,000 to 100,000.

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Kunghsien is said to be better managed and equipped than the foregoing, but there are no data on its capacity. When the total is cast up it will be seen that China can scarcely furnish a round a day for her million rifles. Some of the arsenals can produce limited quantities and types of equipment — mostly rifles and small guns — but nothing approaching heavy artillery. A recent interesting development is that all new arsenals are being constructed far inland at a considerable distance from the ports and larger rivers. This shows that China has profited by the lesson of 1931. For when she lost Manchuria she lost her best arsenals also.[2]

Engineering factories and machine shops are also important, for in time of war they can be converted to the manufacture of war supplies. Although China has many of these at widely scattered points throughout the country, no one knows their number. She also has ship-building plants at Shanghai and Fuchow, but they are vulnerable to attack because of their location.

If we assemble all of China's munitions resources, then, the result is not impressive. The most that can be said is that she might be able to meet the needs of guerilla warfare. To wage a major conflict with Japan she would have to import ever-increasing quantities from abroad. It is unlikely that the Japanese fleet would permit these supplies to reach her by sea. She might secure some munitions from Russia through Mongolia, but the problem of transportation would be a limiting factor of first magnitude.

Effective mobilization of men and materials presupposes adequate transportation facilities. Let us consider first the railways. China's railroad history can be divided into three periods. First were the years down to the World War, which were ones of expansion. Over half of all the mileage now existing in China was laid at that time. Second was the period from the war until 1932, which saw no new construction and a deterioration of the existing roads. The low point in rolling stock and efficiency was in 1931–32. Third is the period extending from 1933 to the present. It has been characterized by extensive repairs and a great deal of new construction. Exclusive of Manchuria, China during the last four years has built some 2,000 miles of new railways and has 1,500 additional miles under construction.[3]

The topography of China makes the natural routes of com-

[2] There were two at Mukden. One of them, employing 15,000 men, was one of the largest single arsenals in the world.

[3] Japan has also undertaken new construction in Manchukuo, but these roads of course are under Japanese control.

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munication run east and west. That is the way the river valleys run. The first railway lines built took a north and south direction to supplement the east-west waterways. Recently Chiang Kai-shek has insisted that the new lines built (with the exception of the recently-completed Hankow-Canton link) should run east and west. Almost all the new roads are standard gauge and many of the narrow-gauge lines are being widened.

Unlike the earlier lines, which were built and run by foreign companies as concessions, the new railways are purely Chinese. Most of the capital still comes from abroad, but is granted in the form of loans. The Chinese control construction and operation. To finance the lines built in recent years, loans have come from Germany, Czechoslovakia, France, and Belgium. Despite the quite amazing recent progress, the Chinese railway system is still very deficient. In 1936 the mileage was 7,500. Even if we add the lines which have since been completed and those now under construction, China from this point of view is still one of the most backward countries in the world.

The building of highways began in 1920 with the so-called famine roads. Their utility was at once recognized, and construction was continued by provincial and governmental authorities until in 1932 China proper had 31,000 miles of highways. The Central Government established a bureau in that year to coördinate roads already built and to see that every province was connected with its neighbors by at least one main highway. During the past five years the bureau has encouraged the building of 15,000 miles of new roads, for the most part inter-provincial routes, giving China a present total of 46,000 miles. Only 27 percent of the mileage is surfaced, and this is mainly in South China. Bridges are woefully lacking, and often several times a day a motorist must use ferries. The upkeep of dirt roads is difficult and in the rainy season well-nigh impossible.

Sun Yat-sen once remarked that to be strong China must have 100,000 miles of railways and a million miles of roads. When we compare this with the present 7,500 miles of railways and the present 46,000 miles of highways, we have an idea of the adequacy of China's transportation facilities.

IV

China has often been invaded and conquered in war. She has never stayed conquered. Invaders, usually from the northeast,

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have set up alien dynasties and ruled the Chinese; but their occupation has had only an incidental effect on the life and habits of the people. Chinese ways of life have always proved stronger than the ways of the would-be masters. Throughout recorded history China has maintained her own cultural solidarity.

Invaders have come, tarried awhile, intermarried, gradually adopted Chinese customs, and found after the passage of a few generations that they had become Chinese. It happened to the Huns who swept down from the North in the Fourth Century A.D. It happened to the Mongols who did likewise in 1280. It happened to the Manchus who established themselves in Peking in 1644. They all conquered China and ruled her for centuries. But in the process they lost their own souls. Where are the Huns and the Mongols and the Manchus today?

But the Chinese would be wrong if they took satisfaction in their immemorial record of having maintained their cultural identity as more than simply an encouragement to meet the present threat. Japan's strength and purpose are not to be underestimated. If she conquered them she would be far more difficult to assimilate than former conquerors proved, because she has a citadel of power outside the territorial limits of the Asiatic mainland.

With the past history of China in mind, how can anyone imagine that she will not resist Japan? As a matter of fact, she has resisted every minute of every day since Japan set foot in Manchuria. And she will continue to resist with whatever strength she can muster. But the measure of her resistance is not to be found in terms of iron and steel, in guns and planes or in marching armies with bayonets fixed. It is represented by the spirit of a people whose supreme belief in the superiority of their race, their culture, and their ability to survive has never yet been shaken.

But we must not forget that the means which the Chinese adopt to meet attack is often passive. It is like the attitude of a farmer who would not fight a neighbor who claimed and occupied one of his fields, but called in others to help him settle the dispute by negotiation, and when that failed, married his son to the neighbor's daughter and so eventually brought the joint properties under his own family's control. I remember asking Admiral Tsai Ting-kan in the 1920's how long he thought the unsettled conditions then existing in China would last. "Not long," he said,

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"perhaps a hundred years. That is not long in the life of China." A people so convinced of their integrity and so willing, if need be, to bide their time, are no mean foe.

As this article goes to press, Japan is still on the march. We still do not know whether China's challenge to this advance will mean a major war. But no one, least of all any Japanese, doubts that China will resist in her own way and in her own good time. All the assessable factors indicate that in a major military encounter she could not defeat Japan. But the Japanese, by overextending themselves, may engender their own downfall. Conquests are costly, as Nathaniel Peffer shows in another article in this issue in discussing the effects of Japan's course in Manchukuo.

Writing in these pages several years ago (April 1931), Colonel John Magruder gave an excellent picture of the Chinese as a fighting man. He described his distaste for the profession of arms, but his ability under proper leadership to make a good soldier. There is not the least doubt that the Chinese lacks an aggressive military spirit. He does not have the will to attack. But the defensive fighting qualities of individual units have been proved — for example at Shanghai in 1932 — to be of a high order. A general bent on winning a war of aggression would not choose a Chinese army. But to fight a protracted rear-guard action to save their territory from invasion, or to fight a guerilla warfare — an art in which Chinese bandits have had plenty of training — the Chinese possess qualities which Japan would do well to take into account.

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THE PALESTINE REPORT

ALTERNATIVES TO PARTITION

By Viscount Samuel

WHEN the representatives of a war-weary world met at Paris in 1919 the problem of Palestine seemed one of the simplest of the many that confronted them. Turkey made no claim for the retention of her sovereignty. The system of Mandates was established with general approval, and Palestine was obviously a case for its application. As to the choice of a Power as Mandatory, there was only one candidate. Great Britain was willing to accept the duty; her strategic interests would have made the establishment of any other Power in that territory unwelcome to her; it had been the British armies which, after a brilliant campaign, had conquered the country, and were still in occupation. There had been a tentative suggestion in some quarters that the United States might undertake the task; but her traditional policy of avoiding foreign entanglements had ruled this out from the beginning. France and Italy, the only other possible candidates, offered no competition. All agreed to honor the pledge to the Jews of the world which in November 1917 had been given by the British Government, under the signature of Lord Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, favoring the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish National Home.

The Arab peoples were represented at the Conference by a Delegation under the leadership of the Emir Feisal, one of the sons of the King of the Hejaz. Feisal had been the leader of the Arab Revolt during the war and was destined to become the first King of an independent 'Iraq. Although most of its members were against Zionism, the Arab Delegation itself made no official protest either against the conferment of a Mandate for Palestine on Great Britain, or against the Balfour Declaration. On the contrary, the Emir Feisal publicly referred to Dr. Weizmann, the leader of the Zionists, and himself as being "in perfect accord" and engaged in a "common cause." Into the tangle of knotty problems which harassed the Paris Peace Conference for so many arduous months, the question of Palestine did not enter. There at least no serious difficulties arose. The country was launched on its new career without controversy, almost

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silently, with good prospects of peaceful and rapid development.

II

The Zionist Movement, which for thirty years had been struggling, slowly and painfully, to found colonies of Jews in Palestine in the face of stolid Turkish obstruction, now took a leap forward. Year after year, with immense energy, the Zionists collected funds from their co-religionists all over the world. They bought land, trained young men and women as colonists, organized emigration from the crowded and often unfriendly countries of Europe to the promised land, so old and so new, that was at last opened to them. Although many of the leading Jews in all countries were doubtful about the enterprise, or even opposed to it, the Jewish people as a whole, now more numerous in the world than ever before, gave Zionism enthusiastic support. They felt that in their dark history there had once more been kindled a shining light.

During the seventeen years that have since elapsed a considerable part of the cultivable land of Palestine has passed into Jewish ownership, bought, often from absentee landlords, at prices many times its previous value. The Jewish population of Palestine has risen from some 60,000 to over 400,000. Voluntary contributions have been collected all over the world, largely in small amounts from poor people, to a total of seventy million dollars. This money has been spent on land purchase, house building, the training and transport of immigrants, the erection of schools and hospitals, the preparation of the land for cultivation and a score of other purposes. In addition there has been invested more than three hundred million dollars in industrial and agricultural enterprises.

But meanwhile there had also been growing a movement of nationalism among the Arabs. Simultaneously with the striking progress of the Zionist Movement, a spirit of Arab patriotism, previously almost non-existent in Palestine, had arisen. The younger generation especially became fired with the same nationalistic idea which had inspired the Arab revolt against the Turks. It had swept over the whole Arabian peninsula, and was destined to establish independent Arab Kingdoms and Principalities in the Hejaz, Yemen, 'Iraq, Trans-Jordan and Syria. Those in Palestine looked upon themselves as an outpost of the Arab world, specially

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charged with the guardianship, within the old city of Jerusalem, of one of the three most sacred shrines of Islam. They viewed with apprehension the Jewish incursion (for so it appeared to them) and feared that at no distant date they would be swamped altogether by it. If the time came when Great Britain should decide to surrender a mandate which was avowedly only temporary, they feared that they would find themselves under the permanent rule of an eager, capable Jewish majority, whose constant professions of goodwill might or might not be fulfilled. Under these conditions they gave little weight to economic considerations. The fact that many of the Arabs had been enriched through the high prices they had received for their lands; that the taxation upon most of their peasantry had been reduced by two-thirds; that ample employment at higher wages had been given their artisans and laborers — all of which had resulted from the general prosperity diffused throughout the country by the sudden and vast expenditures accompanying the Jewish immigration — all these economic factors weighed little in comparison with their political fears. Moslem Arabs and Christian Arabs, moderates and extremists, united in opposition to Jewish immigration, to the Balfour Declaration, and often to the British Mandate itself.

It was claimed that, prior to the Arab Revolt, the British Government had assured the Arab leaders that, if the Allies were successful in the war, Palestine would be included in a great Arab dominion which the victorious Powers would help to establish. This claim was based mainly upon a letter written in 1915 to the King of the Hejaz, then Sherif of Mecca, by Sir Henry McMahon, who had been charged by the British Government with the conduct of the negotiations that had led to the Revolt. Even apart from that, said the Palestine Arabs, the Mandate itself clearly contemplated the establishment of self-government in Palestine, as in other mandated territories of the same class. All the others were, in fact, on the road towards independence. If no advance was made in Palestine, this was not due to any exceptional incompetence on the part of the people, but to the consequences of the Balfour Declaration. But had self-government been granted, this would certainly have resulted in blocking the development of the Jewish National Home. The Jewish National Home was therefore taken as blocking the establishment of self-government.

As a result of the nationalist movement among the Arabs, disorders had broken out on a small scale as early as 1920, and on a

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somewhat larger scale in 1921. Then for a period of eight years there was tranquillity, though there continued to exist an undercurrent of political tension. In 1929 serious and widespread disturbances occurred in many parts of the country, resulting in some hundreds of deaths. Finally in 1936 disorders broke out again, and lasted for many months, reaching almost the dimensions of a rebellion and requiring the dispatch of two divisions of British troops to Palestine.

III

Public opinion in Great Britain had by this time become seriously perturbed, and the Government determined to review the whole situation. The first stage was to order a thorough inquiry into the facts. Observers in other countries may not fully realize how large a part is played in the British governing system by Commissions or Committees of Inquiry. Important legislation or administrative measures at home, or changes in colonial policy in any part of the Empire, are seldom undertaken without an impartial and thorough investigation having first been made. Men of experience as ministers or administrators, in business or in the professions, are always ready to take part without remuneration of any kind in these honorable tasks. The highest grade in the hierarchy of these inquiries is the Royal Commission: the members are chosen by the Government of the day, but with an understanding that no bias shall enter; the appointment is made by the Crown; the Commissioners proceed with their investigation in whatever way they think fit, are not subject to any kind of Government control or influence, and report at the end directly to the King.

Such was the form of inquiry that was set up in the case of Palestine. Six Commissioners were appointed; their competence and impartiality were acknowledged on all hands. They went to Palestine; spent several weeks in visiting all sections of the country and in hearing the views of all parties; and on June 22, 1937, presented a unanimous Report.

It is a comprehensive survey of the whole situation: sincere, impartial, written with understanding, and in a lively and human style not often found in official reports.

The Commissioners speak in most appreciative terms of the work already accomplished by the Jews in Palestine. They write: "It is impossible, we believe, for any unprejudiced observer to see

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the National Home and not to wish it well. It has meant so much for the relief of unmerited suffering. It displays so much energy and enterprise and devotion to a common cause." They praise highly its achievements, both economic and cultural. And they declare, repeatedly and with emphasis, that the Arabs have greatly gained in a material sense from the Jewish immigration. While the Jewish population has grown since the Mandate by 350,000, the Arab population has increased by exactly the same figure. Nevertheless, the conclusion reached by the Royal Commission is pessimistic. On the political side they consider that the problem as hitherto presented is insoluble. "The obligations Britain undertook towards the Arabs and the Jews some twenty years ago . . . have proved irreconcilable, and, as far ahead as we can see, they must continue to conflict. . . . We cannot — in Palestine as it now is — both concede the Arab claim to self-government and secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home." Yet neither of these aims can be discarded. "Arab aspirations towards a new age of unity and prosperity in the Arab world" are legitimate and praiseworthy; to those aspirations "British public opinion is wholly sympathetic." On the other hand, it is out of the question that, having encouraged the intense Jewish effort in Palestine by assurances of the most formal character, Great Britain should now merely wash its hands of the whole matter and discard responsibility. "Manifestly," the Commissioners say, "the problem cannot be solved by giving either the Arabs or the Jews all they want. The answer to the question 'Which of them in the end will govern Palestine?' must surely be 'Neither.' We do not think that any fair-minded statesman would suppose, now that the hope of harmony between the races has proved untenable, that Britain ought either to hand over to Arab rule 400,000 Jews, whose entry into Palestine has been for the most part facilitated and approved by the League of Nations; or that, if the Jews should become a majority, a million or so of Arabs should be handed over to their rule."

The Commission criticizes some aspects of the British administration of the country. In particular they comment on the almost complete removal of military force during the years of tranquillity prior to 1929. All the troops had been withdrawn. A corps of British Gendarmerie, which I had found invaluable during my High Commissionership, had been disbanded. There was nothing left but a police force, mostly Arab and not highly trained, sup-

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ported by a small number of armored cars and airplanes, which are in any case almost useless for the suppression of disorders in the intricate streets of oriental cities. For a government to rely merely upon force and repression is indeed the negation of statesmanship. On the other hand, for any administration, whether in an eastern country or a western, to be denuded of armed support is to invite disaster. The Commissioners point out that the disturbances of 1929 were quite unimportant at the outset, and could easily have been stopped. The conflagration spread among a highly inflammable people because there was no one to stamp it out at the beginning. In the end much blood was shed, and from that moment the political position rapidly deteriorated.

The Commission imply in their Report that the fomenters of the disturbances of 1936 had been allowed too much scope. They understand the desire of the local Administration not to adopt ruthless measures, not to suppress the expressions of political discontent — however destructive or even murderous those expressions might be — by shootings and hangings on a large scale. At the same time they strongly urge that any renewed outburst should be met by the prompt declaration of martial law.

The Commission are inclined to criticize also the choice of officials for the British service in Palestine. The administration of that country requires very special qualifications: a wide sympathy and an understanding of the deep emotions aroused among the peoples of three faiths by the historical associations and the present appeal of the Holy Land. Those qualifications have not always been present. Many of the officers of the British administration have been sent to Palestine in the ordinary course of promotion in the colonial service. They have regarded their few years there as they had regarded their previous service in Africa, eastern Asia, the West Indies, or wherever it might be; they have known nothing of the languages of the country, and have taken no special interest in its past history or future destinies.

The Commission, again, repeatedly express their regret that more had not been done to promote Arab education. After seventeen years of British administration, only one in five of the Arab children of school age receive any education at all. And this in striking contrast with Jewish education. All the Jewish children go to elementary schools, a considerable proportion to secondary and elementary schools, and some go on to the admirable Hebrew University at Jerusalem.

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My own experience in Palestine leads me to endorse fully these criticisms as to the lack of sufficient force and activity in the maintenance of public security; the failure to recognize the need of specialists in the higher ranks of the administration; and the insufficient provision made for Arab education, which has led the Arabs, however unjustly, to doubt the sincerity of the British professions of a desire to advance their culture and raise the standards of their civilization.

But the Commissioners are clearly of opinion, that, even if all those things had been different, even if none of these mistakes had occurred, the underlying problem would have remained. There would still have been the essential antagonism, as they regard it, between the Jewish aims and the Arab aims, and still the impossibility of finding any policy, along the lines hitherto pursued, that would end it. So they have devised a wholly different plan, not previously advocated in any quarter. Their proposal is a division of the country into three parts: a new Jewish state; an Arab section which would be united with the existing Arab Principality of Trans-Jordan; and a neutral section which would remain under the administration of Great Britain as mandatory.

IV

The accompanying map, reproduced from the Commission's Report, shows the new boundaries that are suggested. The reserved area is to comprise Jerusalem and Bethlehem and a corridor down to the sea, which would serve as an outlet from the Arab state to the Mediterranean at Jaffa. That town itself, however, would be an outlying part of the Arab state. The Mandatory would also remain responsible for Nazareth and the waters of the Sea of Galilee, on account of their religious associations; and for the four towns of Haifa, Acre, Safad and Tiberias, which although geographically within the Jewish State would need a special régime on account of their mixed populations. Each of the two new states should be wholly independent and eligible for membership of the League of Nations. Each should have complete control of its own finances, including tariffs, but the Jewish State would be required to pay a subvention to the Arab, on account of the severance of valuable territory; and the British Treasury would also make it a grant of £2,000,000 to help it on its way. Each State would decide the character and the number of the immigrants it would admit.

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The new régime would be set up through the conclusion of Treaties of Alliance between the Mandatory Power and each of the two states; following the precedents of the Treaties of Alliance between Great Britain and 'Iraq, and between France and Syria and the Lebanon. "The Treaties would include strict guarantees for the protection of minorities in each State . . . Military Conventions would be attached to the Treaties, dealing with the maintenance of naval, military and air forces, the upkeep and use of ports, roads and railways, the security of the oil pipe line [from the oil-fields of 'Iraq to the Mediterranean at Haifa] and so forth." The practical problems of administration that would arise from the severance are lightly touched upon in the Report. Indeed the whole scheme of partition is presented as little more than a sketch, occupying only twelve pages in a volume of four hundred.



The British Government, simultaneously with the publication of the Report, declared its general acceptance of these recommendations. It announced that it would forthwith approach the League of Nations with a view to the ending of the present Mandate, and the substitution of a new one on the lines proposed. Meanwhile

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Great Britain would continue to bear responsibility for the government of Palestine; if serious disorders should again break out, martial law would be declared; land sales by Arabs to Jews would be restricted during the period of transition; Jewish immigration would only be allowed to continue at a rate not exceeding in any circumstances the figure, suggested by the Commission, of 12,000 a year.

The declaration of the British Government was prompt, definite and uncompromising. Nevertheless it did not command general acquiescence. The British press, indeed, gave it almost unanimous support. But the situation was different when the matter was debated in the two Houses of Parliament, and when it was considered by the bodies representing the Arabs and the Jews.

V

As the only member in either House who had held the post of High Commissioner for Palestine, it fell to me to take part in the debate in the Lords and to offer an examination of the conclusions of the Royal Commission. I could not but agree with their judgment that it was necessary to make a fresh start. Undoubtedly the present situation is a deadlock. There is no reason why a British Government should consent to engage in a policy of repression and coercion; to sacrifice the lives of British soldiers and policemen; to be exposed to active, and sometimes bitter, criticism from the Jewish side, while they found that they were alienating at the same time the whole of the Arab world and offending Moslem opinion in India and elsewhere. The British Government, I held, were right to say that this could not continue indefinitely.

The scheme of partition, however, is subject to grave objections. It does not effect, and no scheme of partition possibly could effect, a clear severance between the Arab and the Jewish populations of Palestine: the geographical conditions do not allow it. From the Jewish State as now proposed, one-third of the Jews of Palestine would be excluded, and within it would be included one-fourth of the Arabs. Its population would consist of 250,000 Jews and 225,000 Arabs. The Commission recommended that a large number of the Arabs should be induced to remove to Trans-Jordan or elsewhere, and be settled on land to be provided, with the help of generous financial assistance; in the last resort the Arabs in the districts of the plains should be transferred com-

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pulsorily. But, in my view, it is exceedingly doubtful whether any such transfer, on a considerable scale, could be effected. And how could compulsory removal of people whose families had been established in their present towns and villages often for a thousand years be reconciled with the "strict guarantees for the protection of minorities?"

The land frontiers of the Jewish state would extend for two hundred miles, crossed at a thousand points by roads and paths, with the railways repeatedly passing in and out again. How would it be possible to maintain any customs control, or immigration control, along such frontiers? How could crime be suppressed when any criminal, political or other, could come from one state into the other, commit his offense, and in a few minutes, perhaps, disappear again across the frontier into the jurisdiction of another police authority — possibly suspicious and unhelpful? The Commission had said nothing on any of these points.

Most of the towns of Palestine were to be enclaves surrounded by Jewish or Arab territory. What was to be the national status of their inhabitants, the system of law under which they were to be governed, the fiscal régime to which they were to be subject? The Commission seemed to have picked out all the most awkward provisions of the Peace Treaties of Versailles, and to have put a Saar, a Polish Corridor and half a dozen Danzigs and Memels into a country the size of Wales.

I ventured to suggest an alternative plan: not to end the existing Mandate, not to regard as altogether hopeless the policy of coöperation, remembering that since peace and tranquillity had reigned for eight years it was not impossible that it might be restored, though on a new basis. The alternative might embrace five points: First, a recognition by the Jews that they must make some sacrifice in order to reassure the Arabs and arrive at a reconciliation; and this sacrifice should take the form of a limitation of the Jewish population of Palestine, during a period of years, to an agreed percentage of the whole. (I suggested, tentatively, forty percent; the present percentage is about thirty.) Secondly, the aspirations of Arab nationalism should be recognized and should be assisted, and efforts made to promote the formation of a great Confederation in the Middle East, in which Palestine should be included, to which it would bring wealth, and in which the industries of Palestine would find a vast and valuable market. Thirdly, Trans-Jordan should be opened by agreement to the settlement

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of both Jews and Arabs, and a loan arranged to promote that object. Fourthly, the ownership of the Moslem Holy Places in Palestine should be guaranteed by the League of Nations in perpetuity. Fifthly, the Jewish Community in Palestine as now organized, and the Arab Community, provided with a new organization, should each be given large powers over the education of their own peoples and over public health and other matters, and be provided with adequate revenues from taxation. A new Advisory Council should be established, in which each Community would be represented as such; the Council should also contain the principal British officials: it would be consulted by the High Commissioner on all matters of common concern. I agreed that, if Jews and Arabs did not come to an agreement on some such basis as this, the only alternative would be to face partition with all its disadvantages and risks.

In the House of Commons matters took an unexpected turn. Although the Government commands there a two-to-one majority, the House on this occasion showed a large measure of independence. The Government had given notice of a motion approving the recommendations of the Royal Commission and their own acceptance of them; but this motion was subjected to vigorous criticism on the part of both the Labor and the Liberal Oppositions. These criticisms were supported from the Government side by two ex-Colonial Secretaries — Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. Amery. It was urged that the Government were acting too hastily; that the plan of partition raised very grave issues, and, even if accepted in principle, might have to be modified in many points of application; time should be given for the reactions of both the Jews and the Arabs to be ascertained. Ultimately these views carried the day. The motion proposed by the Government was modified by an amendment framed by Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. Lloyd George, and in that form was unanimously accepted. It provided that the whole matter, after being considered by the League of Nations, should come back to Parliament, which would then be prepared to consider a plan from the Government drafted in more definite terms, and not necessarily embodying but "taking into full account" the recommendations of the Royal Commission.

At the time when this article is being written the whole matter is under the consideration of the Congress which is the final authority in the Zionist Movement; of the two sections of the

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Palestine Arabs — the more intransigent, led by the Mufti of Jerusalem, and the more moderate, led by Ragheb Bey Nashashibi; and of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. Before it is published, decisions are likely to have been reached by all those bodies. Then it will be for the Council of the League to express its opinion, and after that for the British Parliament. Nor are the Governments of the United States and of European Powers interested in the matter from various aspects likely to withhold the expression of their views. It will be some months before the question of principle is decided. If the judgment is in favor of partition, two years perhaps will elapse before a Boundary Commission will have fixed the frontiers, before the many technical questions relating to the defense, trade and finances of the new states will have been settled, even in outline, and before the new régime will actually come into being.

The Mandates Commission of the League have always given the most conscientious care to the duties entrusted to them. They have kept in close touch especially with the vicissitudes of Palestine during the last fifteen years. They will certainly examine in a spirit of impartial detachment not only the proposals of the Royal Commission, which have been commended to them by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the Colonial Secretary, in the name of the British Government, but also all the possible alternatives. They will listen, with critical attention, to the authorized spokesmen of the Arabs and of the Jews. This survey, and the manner in which they will present it to the Council of the League, will be of the highest importance. Although the League of Nations cannot compel a Mandatory Power to accept a policy of which it disapproves — for after all it is the Mandatory which has to provide the men and the resources necessary for the execution of the task — the moral effect of any opinion expressed by the Council of the League, after consideration of the findings of the Mandates Commission, must carry great weight. No one is enamored of the solution by partition. Its difficulties and dangers are recognized on all hands. The Royal Commission would undoubtedly have preferred to recommend an alternative based upon coöperation between the two parties if they had regarded such coöperation as a possibility. It cannot be doubted that the British Government would still welcome that solution if it were attainable. But whether either of the parties directly concerned would consent to such a sacrifice of its particular aims as would be necessary to win the assent of

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the other party, is very doubtful. Both dislike the very idea of the partition of Palestine, but neither shows — as yet — any sign of such a change of attitude as would permit an escape from that drastic solution.

Among some of the leading Zionists, indeed, partition is definitely regarded as preferable to any of the alternatives that are within sight. They press for the attachment to the Jewish state of an enclave that would include the large Jewish population in the new quarters of Jerusalem outside the walls of the Old City; a re-adjustment of the frontiers in the north that would bring in the great hydroelectric station on the Jordan and some of the Jewish settlements in the same region; the inclusion also of a large sparsely-inhabited district in the south-west of Palestine. Given these conditions, they would welcome the independence that is offered to them — the prestige of a real Jewish state — however small, and the opportunities that it would open. Among the Arabs, the more moderate party might accept partition in default of any willingness to compromise on the part of the Zionists, and then await future developments. It would be futile to attempt to forecast the outcome of these conflicting forces. Events will show — and soon.

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THE ARABS AND THE FUTURE OF PALESTINE

By H. St.J. B. Philby

THE Report of the Royal Commission on Palestine closes an episode for whose origins we have to go back nearly a quarter of a century. In 1913 Abdullah, second son of Sherif Hussein, the Emir of Mecca, was passing through Egypt on his way to Constantinople, where he and his younger brother Feisal represented the Hejaz in the Turkish Chamber of Deputies. Lord Kitchener, then British Agent in Egypt, took advantage of Abdullah's temporary presence at Cairo to pay him a semi-formal visit of courtesy. Accompanied by Mr. (now Sir) Ronald Storrs, the British Agent thanked the representative of the Hejaz for his father's kindness and consideration towards the pilgrims visiting Mecca from British India. Nothing more was said. A friendly foundation had been laid for future parleys. Abdullah hastened to inform the Turkish High Commissioner at Cairo of what had passed at an interview which was sufficiently unusual to occasion comment — and suspicion.

A year passed. Abdullah again passed through Cairo, in July 1914. The forward policy of the Turks in the Hejaz was causing a good deal of friction and trouble. The clouds of war were gathering fast. Lord Kitchener again met Abdullah and this time discussed politics — cautiously. The British Government was anxious for the continuance of its friendly relations with Turkey. Subject to this it was ready to help the Arabs in pursuance of its traditional policy. Abdullah was at Constantinople on the outbreak of war. On August 22, 1914, he was back at Cairo. Lord Kitchener was away on more important business, but Mr. Storrs handed to Abdullah a letter for his father from the British Government. Friendly sentiments this time accompanied a statement that Great Britain "would not oppose the restoration of the Caliphate to the Arabs." A month passed and Mr. Storrs sent to Abdullah by the hand of a trusty messenger the following letter: "Lord Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War, has directed me to write to your lordship, enquiring whether you are still of the same opinion in regard to the defence of the rights of the Arabs. Though he formerly replied to you that he was unable

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to assist you in securing them, it is now within the power of His Majesty's Government to afford you all the assistance required in view of the determination of the Turkish Government to join the ranks of the enemy and to sever the traditional friendly relations between the two countries." No reply was sent to this letter. A fortnight later Mr. Storrs wrote again: "Whereas the Turks have finally determined to enter the war on the side of the Germans and, whereas the opportunity is favourable for the achievement of the aims of the Arabs, I regret that you should have left my letter without reply and hope that you will hasten to send a reply to my question." A short and cryptic reply to this produced a third letter from Mr. Storrs: "Now that the Turks have entered the war on the side of the enemy we are wholly prepared to help the Sherif of Mecca in his cause and to afford him all the help he desires." The Emir Abdullah replied evasively that "it was not in his father's power to do anything until he had consulted the Arabs and asked their opinion;" but he promised to forward definite proposals in due course.

It will be seen from the foregoing that the initiative and pressure for an Anglo-Arab understanding were British. The Arabs, nervous of staking all on a doubtful throw — the military reputation of Germany was a legend in the East — preferred to keep a foot in either camp until the issues were clearer. The Turks, with German advice, had much to offer, short of complete independence of the Arab territories. It is very important to realize this if we would understand the implications of the Anglo-Arab negotiations of 1915–16. British recognition of the independence of the Arabs in all the Arab territories except Aden was the first and principal stipulation of Sherif Hussein in his first formal letter of July 14, 1915. Sir Henry McMahon accepted this condition with certain modifications in his famous letter of October 24, 1915. Sherif Hussein knew that the British had promised more than the Turks ever would or could. No one doubted that that promise would be fulfilled in the event of ultimate victory. The retreat from Ctesiphon and the siege of Kut impaired British military prestige, but Sherif Hussein proceeded unmoved with his negotiations and preparations. When Kut fell at the end of April 1916, he was ready to act. A month later he was in the field — a rebel against his spiritual and temporal sovereign. He staked all — confident that Britain would win the war and never doubting that she would honor her engagements.

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Yet 1916 witnessed the signing of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in virtue of which Great Britain, France and Russia sought, without consulting King Hussein (as he now styled himself), to modify the promises made to the Arabs in the McMahon correspondence. And who can doubt that at this very time the British Government was in touch with the Zionist leaders with a view to some arrangement for the return of the Jews to Palestine? Certain it is that, for nearly eighteen months, the Arabs were allowed and encouraged to coöperate with the Allied forces against the Turks without so much as a whispered suggestion that the independence they were fighting for had already been whittled down or modified to their detriment by the principal Allied Powers. Disillusionment came only in November 1917. In that month the Russian Bolshevik Government published the text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, not without a shrewd suspicion that it might embarrass the Allied Powers. In the same month the publication of the Balfour Declaration filled Hussein's cup of bitterness and humiliation to the brim. A month later Jerusalem fell. As the Royal Commission records, the Arabs' "coöperation was unquestionably a factor in the success of the campaign which culminated in" its capture. King Hussein had gone too far on the road of revolt to draw back. His coöperation had helped to win the first round. Protestingly he reserved his right to claim the full reward in the event of victory in the second and last round, in which the Arabs coöperated with energy. With the fall of Damascus the war virtually ended. The council table took the place of the battlefield. The Allies quarrelled among themselves over the prostrate body of the enemy.

In Arabia the two principal Allies, Great Britain and France, have ever since been in armed conflict with the least of them — the Arabs, who had contributed in no small measure to the success of the most decisive campaign of the whole war. The Allies in council held themselves free to deal with the Arab countries at their discretion. The McMahon promises were interpreted to suit their convenience. The "fertile crescent" was withheld from Arab sovereignty under a system of Mandates differing only in theory from actual annexation. A part of it was reserved for Jewish colonization at the discretion of the Mandatory. The Mandates and the National Home — and particularly the latter — were anathema to the Arabs. The armed might of the Mandatory Powers was the only guarantee of the execution of the obligations

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of their mandates. They hoped, by patience and perseverance, to secure the acquiescence or coöperation of the Arabs in a policy that the Arabs have consistently regarded as a breach of the promises which the British Government has steadily refused to publish. Slowly but surely Arab intransigence has won back some of the losses.

'Iraq was the first to rebel in 1920. In the following year it became a Kingdom under mandate; and, thanks to Feisal's personal influence and prestige with the British Government, the Mandate was terminated a few years later, to be replaced by an alliance with Great Britain. This pattern has now been adopted for Syria, where an alliance with France is to put an end to the Mandate and the periodic rebellions it has occasioned. Only Palestine remained — its eastern section beyond Jordan peacefully under Mandate administration through an Arab prince, but barred to the Jews; its western part the scene of recurrent revolts occasioned by periodic floods of Zionist immigration. That the British Government has persisted gallantly in a most intractable task is sufficiently proved by the fact that today there are 400,000 Jews settled in Palestine in comparison with the 55,000 of twenty years ago. That its task is an unenviable one is shown by a long series of Arab risings against the Mandatory Power, culminating in the undisguised rebellion of last year. Small wonder that the British Government, impressed at last by the suspicion that there might be something radically wrong with this Palestine business, should have had recourse to the sovereign remedy of a Royal Commission. In framing the terms of reference, however, the Government seemed to assume that the trouble lay in the personnel or methods of the administration or, alternatively, in the innate unreasonableness of the Arabs or Jews or both. It is indeed difficult to read the terms of reference of the Commission without feeling that the British Government did not specifically intend the Commission to challenge the Mandate itself. The Royal Commission has evidently felt that this was the case. It has devoted no fewer than 368 pages of its Report of 397 pages to an examination of the problem on the assumption that the Mandate itself is sacrosanct. It is, indeed, only with a parting shot of despair that it brings the whole fabric of the Mandate toppling down in irretrievable ruins. The Commission has certainly succeeded in its efforts "to ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances which broke out in Palestine in the middle of April," though scarcely in the way suggested

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for its guidance in the remainder of its terms of reference. Lord Peel and his colleagues are to be warmly congratulated on their courage in going beyond their reference in search of ways and means of removing and preventing the recurrence of grievances whose reality is sufficiently proved by the chronic outbreak of disorders in the Holy Land.

The Royal Commission's verdict is that, owing to the mutually incompatible and hopelessly irreconcilable ambitions of the Arabs and Jews, the Mandate is unworkable and ought to be terminated in favor of another arrangement. The Arabs in general accept the premise of the unworkability of the Mandate but object to the solution proposed by the Commission. The Jews also object to the proposed solution, but strongly deny that the Mandate is intrinsically unworkable. They blame the vacillation of the Mandatory and the inefficiency of its agents on the spot for the present impasse in Palestine. This charge requires examination. It challenges the whole foundation of the Commission's Report. If it is made out, the Report goes by the board with its recommendations. In fact the Commission itself has fully answered the charge in advance. It has carefully and laboriously analyzed the course of events in Palestine and the measures taken by the Government to cope with them. It has criticized the tendency of individual officials to betray at times a personal bias. It has criticized the inadequacy of the public security arrangements to cope with serious trouble. But it says explicitly: "We doubt, indeed, if anywhere else the principle of impartiality between different sections of a community has been so strictly applied." Implicitly it condemns the Palestine administration as "government by arithmetic." But it explains that the arithmetical balance is inherent in the very terms of the Mandate itself which "was framed mainly to realize the nationalist ideals of Zionism." That of course is exactly why the Mandate is unworkable. The desire to do justice to the Arabs under an instrument so strongly biassed in favor of the Jews created the system of mechanical calculation, which in its turn dulled the wits of officials constantly confronted by a clash of loyalties. That those officials have failed to discharge the task to which they were set is undeniable. But the fault is not theirs. It rests rather with the framers of the task — the British Government, which can blame nobody but itself for the terms of the Mandate which it drafted in consultation with none but the Zionist leaders and piloted without alteration through Geneva. The

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Commission has rightly condemned the Mandate and not the officials confronted with an impossible task. It has even put forward elaborate proposals for coping with the inevitable troubles of the future in the event of the continuance of the present Mandatory arrangements. But it courageously recognizes that such recommendations are useless. "The disease is so deep-rooted that, in our firm conviction, the only hope of a cure lies in a surgical operation."

And so we come to Partition and the termination of the British Mandate. Cantonization under the Mandate is rightly rejected as presenting "most of the difficulties presented by Partition without Partition's one supreme advantage — the possibility it offers of eventual peace." There is indeed only one possible alternative to Partition — an alternative which the Commission does not even mention, namely the annexation of Palestine as a Crown Colony of the British Empire. The Jews would welcome such a solution, the Arabs decidedly not. Yet the Arabs have to consider whether their continued intransigence in face of so substantial a verdict in their favor by the Commission may not ultimately force the British Government to adopt an alternative which would be the death-knell of all their hopes. In effect the Commission has recognized the justice of the Arab claims arising out of the McMahon promises. To meet those claims it has gone as far as it reasonably could in view of the fact that to meet them in full would involve a grave injustice to the nearly half million Jews settled in Palestine as the result of an error of British judgment. To remove those Jews is clearly unthinkable. To leave them to the tender mercies of an Arab Government is impossible. The only alternative is to give them the tract they are settled in, to have for their own. They would like more — but they cannot have it. In what is now left to them in sovereign independence they cannot develop on the lines envisaged by Zionist idealism. The Jews will yet learn that by the surrender of their empty sovereignty and restricted territories to the Arabs they can secure a field of useful and honorable activity in an area vaster than Zionism has ever dreamed of. The Partition arrangements should provide full liberty to both parties to come to such an understanding and, if the Arabs will only look far enough into the future, they must see that Partition, while being the only possible solution of the present deadlock, will be but a stepping stone to the realization of their full national aspirations. In Syria, 'Iraq and the Yemen —

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and even in a corner of Sa'udi Arabia — Jewish minorities live on friendly terms with the Arabs. In Palestine it will be the same, but the Jews themselves must be left to take the initiative. The power that placed them in Canaan cannot place them under the heel of the Amalekites. The Zionist policy germinated peacefully under the ægis of Ottoman Turkey. Under British protection its field has been swept by the whirlwind. It may yet ripen under the sunny zephyrs of Arabia — but in no other wise. The Zionist leaders are fully aware of such a possibility but cannot yet bring themselves to put faith in the Arabs. Today they see that the faith they put in Great Britain has been sorely strained.

As for the Arabs, their hostility to the Commission's proposals is a little difficult to understand. The purely religious difficulty must not be underrated — it is difficult for any Moslem to ignore it; it is a theme calculated to rouse all the passions of fanaticism. The answer is surely: (1) that elsewhere than in Palestine the Jews are tolerated by Arab governments; and (2) that in Palestine itself the Arabs desire not to exterminate the Jews but to rule them. And on religious grounds it might easily be argued that continuance under the rule of an infidel (Christian) Power is not less objectionable than acquiescence in a Jewish self-governing enclave. At any rate it is significant that none of the existing independent Arab states — apart from the shortlived and ill-advised outburst of the 'Iraq Government actuated by motives unconnected with the merits of the proposed solution — has publicly denounced the proposal for Partition on religious grounds. Admittedly none of them regards Partition with favor, and some of them have represented their views on this question to the British Government in the ordinary diplomatic manner in the hope of securing modifications of the scheme now under discussion. No one indeed questions that some modifications will be necessary. But the root-and-branch opposition of the Palestine Arabs and their supporters can only be regarded as manœuvring for position. The Arabs are bad bargainers. In this case nine-tenths of their full demands have been conceded. They reject the concession in the hope of getting ten-tenths. It is inconceivable that they should get that. It is conceivable that they may lose what is now offered. Yet they persist in their obstinate refusal. By accepting the scheme in principle they could secure substantial modifications in their favor. By opposing it tooth and nail they may find

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themselves confronted with the choice between the scheme as it stands and nothing at all.

The Arab attitude is, of course, all important. The Partition scheme cannot go forward without their approval. No true friend of the Arabs could advise them to reject it. It is, indeed, remarkable that it is from Jews — like Lord Samuel — that the most serious constructive criticism of the report has come. Lord Samuel has made objection to the 225,000 Arabs of the northern area being left in the proposed Jewish state. He has objected to the baiting of the Mufti who is the greatest opponent of the proposed scheme. He has objected to the dangerous corridor between Jerusalem and Jaffa. He clamors for the continuance of the British Mandate and persistence in an experiment which has been tried and found impracticable. In general, Lord Samuel's specific criticisms are perfectly sound and can be incorporated in the ultimate scheme of Partition. But the Arabs should not be deluded into the belief that criticisms of this kind, however reasonable and however skilfully handled, are intended to advance their claim for the restoration of the whole of Palestine to Arab rule. For the Jews it is neck or nothing to secure the continuance of the present Mandatory system, to intensify their plans for immigration, colonization and development, and to await the not-distant day when a Jewish majority can face the future without British assistance. And they have a second string to their bow to be used at need. When all else fails they will turn to the Arabs. With Arab goodwill they can secure the substance of Zionism.

For Great Britain and the Powers within and without the League peace in Palestine is now a primary consideration. The Commission has demonstrated with impressive logic that peace is unattainable under the present system. To secure peace the British Government has announced its willingness to forgo its privileged position in Palestine. But neither the British Government nor the Royal Commission appears to appreciate the point that British privilege in Mandated territory is but the consequence of British responsibilities. In theory, at any rate, the Mandate system confers on the Mandatory no strategic, economic or other interests in Mandated territories. In practice both England and France have not only claimed but secured a special position in 'Iraq and Syria respectively with League approval. The Royal Commission has missed a great opportunity of pointing out so striking an anomaly. Explicitly it recognizes certain strategic in-

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terests of Great Britain in Palestine and makes suggestions for their protection under the new régime. This is perhaps regrettable, though unavoidable unless the League is prepared to assume certain responsibilities which the British Government has refrained from thrusting upon it.

Here again it is the opponents of the Partition scheme who put forward the most cogent arguments against the retention of strategic privileges (and responsibilities) in Palestine after the termination of the Mandate. Chief among them is Mr. Winston Churchill who criticizes the dangerous experiment of the Jerusalem-Jaffa corridor and other doubtful military commitments. His arguments are apparently sound from the military point of view. They can easily be met by a simple modification of the proposed arrangements. The Arabs would not object to a special autonomous régime for the holy cities under British or League control. The Haram tracts of Mecca and Madina provide an analogy and precedent for such an enclave, immune from molestation. Arab acceptance of such an enclave, with free access to all intending visitors, would do away with the risks involved in the corridor, which would thus become an integral part of the Arab state with Jaffa as the seaport, wholly under Arab control. An arrangement with the Jews not to develop the rival harbor of Tel Aviv would be balanced by the acceptance of full Jewish sovereignty over Haifa, while Acre and the northern Arabs, included under the Commission's proposals in the Jewish state, should obviously be allowed to amalgamate bodily with the soon-to-be-independent state of Syria. Indeed, the prospect of union between Syria and Arab Palestine may be envisaged with confidence in the not distant future. The whole of the military problem faced by the Commission primarily in the interests of Jerusalem's security thus solves itself. If the single guarantee of Arab Palestine is not sufficient, it could easily be reinforced by a joint guarantee of all the Arab states. And there is something definitely attractive in the idea of reserving the holy cities area in perpetuity as a haven of peace and goodwill.

One little difficulty arises in respect of Rehovoth and other Jewish colonies south of the corridor. Their separation from the Jewish state is certainly undesirable if it can be avoided. Would it not be possible to exchange this area for another of equal merit contiguous to the Jewish State, preferably in the northern area? In any case this is a minor matter, capable of resolution by agree-

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ment between the two parties. Another matter of minor importance arises out of the proposed Mandatory arrangements for the port of Aqaba. It is difficult to see any justification at all for such a proposal except as a sop to British strategic interests. No Arab-Jew question is involved. When the Arab state comes into being Aqaba will be surrounded by Arab territory. It belongs legally to Sa'udi Arabia in virtue of the Wahhabi conquest of the Hejaz, of which it formed a part in 1925 when the British Government occupied it by force. Ibn Sa'ud has never recognized such British occupation. He has now, in consequence of the Commission's report, definitely put forward his demand for the restoration of Aqaba to his jurisdiction. In the interests of future friendly relations between Sa'udi Arabia and Arab Palestine this bone of contention should certainly be restored to whom it belongs.

With the modifications proposed above, practically all the serious objections to the Commission's proposals disappear, so far as Arab and Jewish differences are concerned. Apart from the area inevitably reserved for the Jewish state and the neutralization of the holy cities the Arabs receive payment in full on the McMahon bonds. The British Government is wholly relieved of its obligations in return for the surrender of its strategic privileges. And there remains only the question of the future security of the Jewish state. By implication the Jews will have to assume full responsibility for the protection of their frontiers. Under a conscription system, by no means alien to their communal tendencies, this responsibility should occasion no difficulty. If it does, there is nothing whatever to prevent the Jews from arranging with the British Government for the accommodation of a British garrison on Jewish soil. Indeed, this might be a satisfactory solution of the strategic problem from the British military point of view.

For better or worse the British Government's proposals on the recommendations of the Royal Commission are now before the League for examination and decision. From every side those proposals are being vigorously assaulted. The British Government finds itself in an altogether unusual position of isolation. In the League generally and in America the Jewish point of view is better understood and more strongly supported than the Arab case. In the League there is a danger that the Moslem elements, inevitably favoring the Arab standpoint, may play into the hands of the Powers who are more concerned to promote the Zionist interest. The League is not an impartial judicial body like the Inter-

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national Court. Its members, one and all, are inevitably swayed by political considerations. The British Government has confronted it with responsibility for deciding one of the gravest political problems of our time. But the British Government has approached the League with clear and definite proposals — confessing its failure in a task assumed under the auspices of the League fifteen years ago and condemning the League's Mandate as unworkable and impracticable. The League, responsible for a decision, cannot complain that it is left without guidance by its Mandatory. It can, perhaps, complain that in one aspect the Mandatory failed to take its fellow members into its confidence at the beginning or at any subsequent time during the currency of the Mandate. It can complain that the position as regards the promises made to the Arabs was never made clear to it. The British public itself has only within the last months learned what those promises were. Those promises make all the difference. The Royal Commission has placed them on record for the first time. Its recommendations envisage the redemption of those promises so far as is practically possible. The position today is very different to what it was a few months ago. The League cannot ignore the now ascertained rights — moral and legal — of the Arabs. Only the Arabs themselves, by rejection of what is in effect the fullest possible measure of reparation now offered them, can release Great Britain from the obligations incurred in 1915–16. They alone can now relieve the League of the obligation to give effect to that measure of reparation which the British Government has proposed as reasonable and unavoidable.

It is for the Arabs to show statesmanship at this important crisis of their fortunes. In five and twenty years the wheel has come full circle back to the point where Lord Kitchener led the Arabs to hope that their independence might be secured by British help. At long last, after many lapses, British credit is restored by the offer of that independence in all but a tiny corner of the Arab world. If the Arabs accept the offer the League cannot but endorse the scheme. They will surely accept.

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THE RECONSTRUCTION OF LIBERALISM

By C. H. McIlwain

THE GOOD SOCIETY. By Walter Lippmann. Boston: Little, Brown, 1937, 402 p.

THE present generation is rightly concerned, and concerned far more deeply than its immediate forbears ever were, in the ending or mending of the monstrous economic and social inequalities and iniquities which permit and even foster the distress we see about us in the midst of plenty. In sharp contrast with the older notions of an inevitable progressive development that had best be let alone, or even with the recent naïve belief that depressions were a thing of the past, there is a determination among men of the present day, particularly the younger ones, to do something about this; and some would even go so far as to threaten the very existence of plenty itself, in their hatred of the glaring unevenness of its distribution. There is a divine discontent in the air, a discontent which may lead us on to reform if it is wise, or to chaos if it is misdirected. Which shall it be? This is the burning practical question; and it must have an answer very soon, for we are now in the dangerous state of readiness to accept and to act on any suggestion whatever, bad or good, rather than not act at all. Unquestionably one cause of our confusion and bewilderment is the suddenness with which events have thrust this question upon us. We have been faced unexpectedly with the necessity of making a quick decision which may in all likelihood involve the fate of our race, and we have had no time to think the question through.

One thing is clear enough: the world in its present mood will never put up with a mere "muddling through" as an answer. The preservation of the *status quo* is a solution that can satisfy none but the contented; and just now most men are not contented. Whether the answer to be made shall be for reform or for annihilation of our institutions, that answer will be given by those who are dissatisfied with existing conditions. These are the ones whose decisions and actions will either mend or end the ingrown abuses of our present social and economic system, will make or mar any

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system replacing it; and these are the ones therefore to whom all arguments, to be effective, must be directed. The quietists and reactionaries, though they are always with us, have become, for the time at least, practically negligible. Meantime an increasing number of us have grown conscious that these imminent decisions and actions are likely to determine for us and our children no less a question than whether we shall be freemen or slaves in the times to come — and times not far distant. We are becoming more and more concerned that no decision be made that could enslave us all, and, with the present state of Europe in mind, we fear that some present proposals might have that effect.

It is a principle of equity that he who seeks a remedy must come with clean hands. Now we "liberals," advocates of reform, but a constitutional reform, do not come with hands entirely clean. Among our fellows there are doubts of our sincerity, and not altogether without reason; so any cautions or suggestions that may come from us are likely to be received with some suspicion. Why did suspicion of this kind arise? Is it a justifiable suspicion? If not, can we do anything to remove it and thus get a fair hearing for warnings that we believe might, if heeded, save us all from disaster? These are some of the preliminary questions to which the liberal of today must make answer as best he can. I take it, the sum of all the answers, to be effective, will be a plea in confession and avoidance: a frank and full confession of wrongs and blunders past and present — but the wrongs and blunders of liberals, not of liberalism.

If he believes this, it is the liberal's business — or his duty rather — to try to demonstrate it to a discontented, impatient, and hostile world; no easy task, for past mistakes have laid upon him a heavy burden of proof.

Liberals do not differ from others in their conception of the true end of the state, for to all parties at all times the end, actual or professed, has been the good life of the whole; the differences come in determining what is "good" and how this is to be attained. True liberalism can never countenance, even if some "liberals" have, the sacrifice of individual well-being to "reasons of state." There can be no good life for any state whose members live in wretchedness and misery, material or spiritual. National glory or national wealth at the cost of individual welfare is the mark of no true commonwealth, but of a tyranny. The well-being of any state — the common weal — can only be a weal that is

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common to all. For a state, in the only proper sense of the term, as Cicero said long ago, is not any chance aggregation of men but a multitude united in the common purpose of securing this common good, and that can mean nothing less than the individual good of all, not some, of its members.

But Cicero did not stop there, nor does liberalism stop there. He also said that this multitude must be joined together in consent to law (*juris consensu*), and by law he meant no mere fiat of government. These are his words, among the most memorable in political literature: "True law is right reason consonant with nature, diffused among all men, constant, eternal; which summons to duty by its command and hinders from fraud by its prohibition. . . . To make enactments infringing this law, religion forbids, neither may it be repealed even in part, nor have we power through Senate or people to free ourselves from it."

This, of course, is an idealistic statement to which the sober facts of human life can never fully reach, yet reduced to the level of actual experience its central principle still holds good. It means that "what pleases the prince" may temporarily "have the force of law," but is not law; for the common good for which the state exists requires a stronger guarantee than the nod of any prince or any government. Now this is liberalism pure and simple. For, stripped of all its husks, liberalism is constitutionalism, "a government of laws and not of men," a common weal of individual rights that neither prince nor magistrate nor assembly has any authority to impair. In a word, liberalism means a common welfare with a constitutional guarantee. I maintain that not one part, but both parts of this definition — in essence, Cicero's definition — must be translated into working fact if we mean to live in a true commonwealth and hope to keep it in being. So-called liberals have ignored the first part of the definition and have fouled the nest by invoking the guarantee for privileges of their own, conducive only to the destruction of any true common weal. None have ever prated more of guarantees than these so-called liberals; but they have forgotten, if they ever believed, that these guarantees must secure the rights of all, not the selfish interests of a few. They are the traitors within the gates who have probably done more than all others to betray liberalism to its enemies and put it to its defense. Of all the errors of "liberals" theirs seems the worst; for it is largely the result of greed, and a principal cause of man's recent inhuman exploitation of man.

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It is unlikely, however, that this exploitation could ever have reached the proportions it did without more protest, had really liberally minded men not been beguiled by the extreme doctrine of *laissez-faire*, surely one of the strangest fantasies that ever discredited human reason. Thus the self-seekers and the doctrinaires were drawn together into an alliance to maintain the *status quo*, and all its abuses and inequalities were made sacrosanct. This pseudo-liberalism usually exhibited itself in the ineffectiveness of legal guarantees for almost every human right except the right of property, and the acceptance of an unhistorical definition of contract under which the sanction of the law could be obtained for almost any enormity to which men could be induced to agree.

A contract is "an agreement" to do or not to do a particular thing, according to a definition once laid down by Chief Justice Marshall. According to the Roman jurists, a contract is a bond of the law (*vinculum juris*) which the state sees fit to attach to agreements of which it has no reason to disapprove. Between these two definitions the practical difference may not seem great, but in theory and emphasis it is profound.

Under *laissez-faire* and our distorted notions of contract, a lunatic may be protected against the results of his agreement, but of economic inequalities the law can never take notice — *De minimis non curat lex;* there is little or no safeguard for the weak against the strong; protection of the public against an adulterated product would be unthinkable — *Caveat emptor.*

Now this is a return toward Hobbes's "war of every man against every man," without the equality that Hobbes premised. Yet, we are told, the state cannot and should not do anything about it. State interference in such matters would be a violation of a sacred right. What a caricature of liberalism! Few illusions have been more disastrous than the one arising from an uncritical acceptance of Sir Henry Maine's sweeping generalization that human progress has been a development from status to contract.

No doubt conditions such as the ones mentioned above have long been accepted as "natural," or normal, or even desirable by liberals without number. It is equally true that this belief has often led to a callous indifference on their part to many forms of human misery. The indictment that might be drawn against them is a long one, though in fairness it ought to be remembered that this indictment would have been against the great majority

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of us all, if it had been drawn before the Great War and the awakening caused by that event. The number certainly included more than the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Two wrongs do not make a right; no more do two errors make a truth. The question before us now, the decision we shall have to make before long, is whether we shall renounce these errors and remove these abuses that liberals have allowed to grow up, or whether, once and for all, we shall level with the ground all the bulwarks of our liberty, because some traitors have crept in behind them. This is what the decision we must make really means, for between constitutionalism and despotism there is no tenable middle ground. Of that the recent history of Europe leaves no reasonable doubt for any intelligent man who chooses to look into it.

The men in a hurry are trying to tell us that the only cure for economic inequality is political slavery. They would have us believe that regimentation is the only practical form of liberty. Stripped of all its idealistic phrases, their creed is a creed of pure despotism, and these dreamers could not believe in it if they had not persuaded themselves somehow — honestly enough, no doubt — that despotism will always be altruistic and never selfish. They are willing to entrust to a government without legal limits, and only imperfectly responsible, not only their own present welfare but their childrens' future fortunes. What a sublime faith in human benevolence! What an opportunity for an adventurer! Much of the bloodshed and misery that history records has been the direct result of this kind of honest, idealistic, but impractical, wishful thinking.

That it should crop up again in this twentieth century is one of the disastrous results of our unfortunate divorce of history and politics. Our public men and even our professed students of government are woefully ignorant — shall I say "blissfully" ignorant? — of the historical "struggle for law," and what it has meant; and they seem equally blind to what it means now. Almost any day they might read in the newspapers of confiscations and banishments and concentration camps and castor oil, of blood-purges and "liquidations" (what a polite term!), of the imprisonment of religious leaders and the beheading of "traitors." But these every-day horrors slip over their minds like water over a duck's back. Terrible as the crimes of liberals have been, are they as bad as these? "You must trust me," this is the whole sum of the

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"constitution" under a dictatorship. And we are now asked to accept it in place of our bills of rights! With the past and the present before us, dare we then accept as our guides men who thus show that they are unable or unwilling to face the ugly facts, in human nature, in history, and in our world today?

An acceptance might, of course, be not quite irrevocable. History shows cases where such despotic governments have been finally overthrown. But seldom has it been done without distress and bloodshed following a period of intolerable oppression. Would the cost of redressing the wrongs of liberals be likely to be as great as this?

If we look at our present situation, its most ominous aspect is in the cross purposes, the divisions, and even the conflicts we find among those who ought to be presenting a solid front against the forces of reaction. The faults of our liberals and the blindness of our reformers have thus broken up the historic alliance of reformer and constitutionalist through which alone we have gained and kept what little of liberty we still enjoy. And we underrate the present strength of the forces of greed, corruption, and the lust for power, if we think we can hold what we have won from them, to say nothing of winning more, while our own forces are thus divided and weakened. Before we advance to new positions we must secure the ground already won; we must consolidate our gains, and to do it we must restore the old winning combination of reformer and constitutionalist. In the past the reformer may have made these gains, but the constitutionalist enabled him to hold them. The economic and political rights wrested from oppressors have been rendered secure by making them *legal* or constitutional rights, by adding to them the sanction of the law. Only one of two other sanctions is ever possible: physical force, or the acquiescence of the government. The former amounts to a permanent state of civil war, or at best, of armed peace; the latter is a benevolent despotism. Can we then, dare we, exchange our constitutionalism for either of these?

Constitutionalism is more a method than a principle. It is the method of law as contrasted with force or with will. If this law has perpetuated some abuses, it has also preserved all our liberties. The abuses are eradicable and in no way essential to it; without it, the liberties are ours only on sufferance. The moral seems to be that we should guard our legal rights, but see to it that they shall never be economic wrongs. To strip of legal sanction all such

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wrongs as still exist, to add this sanction to all reforms our times require, this is a program that should enlist the support of every forward-looking man; not half this program, but the whole of it. Before such a program can be realized we must scrap much of the current nonsense about "popular sovereignty." We must discard our traditional notions of sovereignty itself, derived from Hobbes and Austin, and substitute sounder ones. We must strike at the corruption that is eating at the vitals of our body politic. We must modify some of our so-called "checks" that only enfeeble government and that make it responsible to selfish minority groups instead of to all the people. But in it all, and above all, we must retain those legal limits of governmental action which now exist in our bills of rights to protect the personal as well as the proprietary rights of the humblest and even the most hated of our citizens. Not only must we retain them; we must revive and revise, we must clarify and even extend them, for only so can we ever hope to give permanence to our needed reforms themselves. If they are to last, these reforms must have a better guarantee than the passing whim of any dictator; and the only guarantee that men have ever been able to devise, short of actual physical force, is the guarantee of constitutional limitations.

Much of our thinking on these points has been confused, and this has been and is one of the greatest obstacles to sound practical progress. Among the confusions is our conception of what we choose to call "popular sovereignty."

We live under a government in which the "sovereign" is limited by a superior law, a constituent law, made directly by the whole people themselves, not made and not alterable by the "sovereign" who exists only by virtue of that same constituent law. This is the system which the founders of our state deliberately established and this we think we are trying to preserve. And yet there are many among us today who would emasculate that system by destroying the only means by which it can work or endure, namely, a judicial review which makes sure that no act of the "sovereign" shall exceed the legal authority conferred upon it by the people in the constituent law, or constitution.

In the main, this destructive attitude is not a reasoned one, but in so far as it has any basis at all in thought or theory it seems to come from the common acceptance of the delusion of "popular sovereignty." Popular sovereignty, at bottom, is an identification, contrary to fact, of the government and the people.

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Now "We the people" do not govern ourselves; we have established a government to do it, and it does it. If the people really governed, it would, of course, be both absurd and impossible to try to limit governmental action by any law. The notion that our government *is* the people, therefore naturally leads to the conclusion that the government has no limits. The logic is sound, the premise is utterly untrue. This unwarranted belief, necessarily destructive of all constitutionalism and of all bills of rights, has been fostered by a strange unhistorical conception of "sovereignty." We are only able to accept "popular" sovereignty, because of our peculiar notions of what sovereignty itself is. Blind followers of the blind have persuaded us — mostly lawyers who have taken Blackstone literally and uncritically — that sovereignty is might, not right, and that this might could not conceivably be the might of any true sovereign if it had any legal limits whatsoever. These men have hopelessly confused authority with power, and apparently have been entirely oblivious of the fact that their conception of political supremacy, fathered by Hobbes and nurtured by John Austin, is completely subversive of the constitutional system under which we all live and to which they themselves have usually paid the most extravagant lip-service.

This is not the place to try to expose the fallacy of Austinianism and its incompatibility with past constitutional development or with the present safeguarding of minority and individual rights, but I do believe that this kind of crooked and dangerous political thinking, though the extent of its influence is hard to estimate, has been one potent cause of our "present discontents."

The generation now at the height of their political activity have been called by Mr. Walter Lippmann "the lost generation." They certainly have no monopoly of the errors and confusions that I have tried to outline above, but it is true that upon them in a peculiar sense has fallen the accumulated burden of these traditional abuses, prejudices, and heresies. They are truly a "lost generation." And not the least interesting aspect of Mr. Lippmann's remarkable book, to a student of contemporary politics, is its autobiographical character. It is nothing less than an *apologia pro vita sua*, the life story of one of the most thoughtful members of this lost generation; an idealist, perplexed and appalled by the present outcome, so sadly different from his earlier confident hopes and expectations, groping for an explanation of

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this debacle, and finally finding it, not in the defects inherent in liberalism, as some other present-day idealist reformers have, but in the perturbations which have thrown liberalism out of its only true orbit, the fulfilment of the "good life" for all.

The brief summary which I have given above does not follow Mr. Lippmann's discussions very closely, but I hope it contains the gist of his political arguments and conclusions. On the other hand, it conveys no idea whatever of his treatment of the economic aspects of his subject. Much of his book deals with the economic side of the degradation of liberalism and the economic aspect of the changes necessary to restore its integrity. To assess the value of this important part of Mr. Lippmann's work would require the knowledge of a trained economist, to the possession of which I lay no claim. The general inference seems to be that the recrudescence of authoritarianism in our time comes in large part from the belief "that the new machine technology requires the control of an omnipotent state," a belief based on the prior assumption that the concentration of control in modern industry is the result of technical change. The history of industry, however, completely disproves this assumption. "Concentration has its origin in privilege and not in technology." It is "a creation of the state through its laws." As for the rights with which legislatures and courts have gradually invested the modern business corporation, they are conditional only and are subject to alteration by the state. "There is no reason whatever for the assumption, made both by individualists and by collectivists, that corporations must either be allowed to enjoy all their present rights or be taken over and administered by the state." "There is only one purpose to which a whole society can be directed by a deliberate plan. That purpose is war, and there is no other." Hence, "a directed society must be bellicose and poor. If it is not both bellicose and poor, it cannot be directed. . . . A prosperous and peaceable society must be free. If it is not free, it cannot be prosperous and peaceable."

For reactionaries whose liberalism is only protective coloring, there will be scant comfort in this book. It is addressed to sincerely forward-looking men. If these remain deaf to the appeal presented here with such telling force, then the victory of autocracy over liberty seems assured. And let the reformer bear in mind that a victory for autocracy is in the end a victory for reaction.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political and Legal

THE CONQUEST OF POWER: LIBERALISM, ANARCHISM, SYNDICALISM, SOCIALISM, FASCISM, COMMUNISM. By ALBERT WEISBORD. New York: Covici, 1937, 2 v. $7.50.

These two volumes (1200 pages) represent a *tour de force* of Leftist exegesis. And for all its ponderousness it is an eminently readable work, filled with facts and arresting interpretations. Mr. Weisbord closes with chapters on the rôle of Communism in the United States and on the necessity of the "Fourth International's" taking up the torch of world revolution, cast away by Stalin.

COLLECTIVISM: A FALSE UTOPIA. By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN. New York: Macmillan, 1937, 265 p. $2.00.

A well-known American journalist, the author of several important volumes on Soviet Russia, turns his attention to dictatorship in general. Fascism, Nazism and Communism he regards alike as collectivist enemies of democracy, to be fought by timely economic and social reforms in lands still democratic.

A GOOD WORD FOR DEMOCRACY. By S. E. FORMAN. New York: Appleton-Century, 1937, 136 p. $1.50.

Several good words by one who has studied democratic processes for many years.

THEORY OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE. By MARIE COLLINS SWABEY. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937, 229 p. $2.50.

The philosophical implications of democracy reconsidered in the light of contemporary political, social and economic phenomena.

THE STORY OF DICTATORSHIP. By E. E. KELLETT. New York: Dutton, 1937, 232 p. $1.75.

Believing that tyrannies have always arisen from the same fundamental conditions, the author outlines the careers of dictators from Biblical times to the present.

FAŠISMUS. By JAN KAPRAS, JR. Prague: Maźač, 1936, 306 p. Kč. 25.

An analysis of the Fascist system, better in its juridical than its sociological approach.

LE COMMUNISME ET LES CHRÉTIENS. By FRANÇOIS MAURIAC AND OTHERS. Paris: Plon, 1937, 264 p. Fr. 15.

A symposium by six Christian writers, less passionate than most books of the sort.

THE PRESS AND WORLD AFFAIRS. By ROBERT W. DESMOND. New York: Appleton-Century, 1937, 421 p. $4.00.

An important and useful book that everyone interested in public opinion and international relations will want to read. The author, a member of the editorial staff of the *Christian Science Monitor*, first traces the history of foreign news reporting and of the international news gathering services, then describes the world press of today country by country.

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE THE PEACE TREATIES. By E. H. Carr. New York: Macmillan, 1937, 285 p. $2.75.

A concise commentary on postwar history by a former Foreign Office official, now professor of International Politics in the University of Wales.

WORLD REVOLUTION, 1917–1936. By C. L. R. James. New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1937, 429 p. $3.50.

A Trotskyite interpretation of the rise and decline of revolutionary movements throughout the world during the last two decades.

PEACEFUL CHANGE: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES. By Frederick Sherwood Dunn. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1937, 156 p. $1.50.

Important as a realistic discussion of the possibility of changes in the *status quo* by methods other than those of force. Due attention is given to such matters as prestige, national honor, racial differences, population pressure, and the rivalry for markets and raw materials. In spite of the recognized shortcomings of existing international agencies, the author does not regard the outlook for peaceful change as altogether hopeless.

A HISTORY OF PEACEFUL CHANGE IN THE MODERN WORLD. By C. R. M. F. Cruttwell. New York: Oxford University Press, 1937, 221 p. $3.00.

Historical examples of international disputes that have been settled without resort to war or threats of war.

PEACEFUL CHANGE: AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM. Edited by C. A. W. Manning. New York: Macmillan, 1937, 193 p. $2.50.

A symposium by C. K. Webster, A. J. Toynbee and six others.

DAS REVISIONSPROBLEM. By Heinrich Rogge. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1937, 124 p.

A German view of the problem of peaceful change of the *status quo*. The author, a German legal expert, finds much fault with the usual approach to this question.

THE LEAGUE AND THE FUTURE OF THE COLLECTIVE SYSTEM. By Herbert S. Morrison and others. New York: Oxford University Press, 1937, 254 p. $2.75.

Lectures delivered in August 1936 before the Geneva Institute of International Relations by twelve authorities, among them Stefan Osuský, Fritz Berber and Clarence Streit.

WHAT IS AHEAD OF US? By G. D. H. Cole and others. New York: Macmillan, 1937, 192 p. $2.00.

A group discussion of the future of our civilization, leading to the conclusion that all hope need not be abandoned.

PEACE OR WAR? Edited by Harold S. Quigley. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1937, 205 p. 50 cents.

Eleven Americans, most of them professors, discuss the chances of peace.

THE PRICE OF EUROPEAN PEACE. By Frank Darvall. London: Hodge, 1937, 181 p. 5/.

Proposals for at least partially satisfying the demands of the alleged "have-nots."

WHICH WAY TO PEACE? By Bertrand Russell. London: Joseph, 1936, 224 p. 7/6.

The English philosopher follows the rational route to absolute pacifism.

FOREIGNERS AREN'T FOOLS. By Christopher Hollis. New York: Stokes, 1937, 183 p. $1.50.

The national problems of Britain, Italy, Germany, Japan, Russia, France and the United States as viewed by intelligent men in those countries and as interpreted by an English investigator.

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WE COVER THE WORLD. Edited by Eugene Lyons. New York: Harcourt, 1937, 441 p. $3.00.
High-lights from the experiences of sixteen American foreign correspondents.

FLOOD-LIGHT ON EUROPE. By Felix Wittmer. New York: Scribner, 1937, 540 p. $3.75.
International relations popularized with a vengeance. Many of the author's facts and interpretations are highly dubious, and his style is tiresomely jaunty.

BLOOD ON THE MOON. By Linton Wells. Boston: Houghton, 1937, 418 p. $3.00.
Another correspondent confesses all — or nearly all. Mr. Wells seems always to have been everywhere.

EUROPA UND DIE WELTPOLITIK. By Gregor Bienstock. Karlsbad: "Graphia," 1936, 84 p. Kč. 15.
A brief but competent bird's-eye view of the zones where peace is in danger.

WHAT IS THIS MOSLEM WORLD? By Charles R. Watson. New York: Friendship Press, 1937, 207 p. $1.00.
A rapid survey of the present state of Islamic civilization and its relations with Christendom, by the president of the American University in Cairo.

ATTACHÉS MILITAIRES, ATTACHÉS NAVALS ET ATTACHÉS DE L'AIR. By Captain Beauvais. Paris: Pedone, 1937, 213 p. Fr. 40.
The institution of *attaché* examined in its historical, military and juridical aspects.

ABHANGIGE MITGLIEDER VÖLKERRECHTLICHER VERBÄNDE. By Friedrich Apelt. Leipzig: Rohrer, 1937, 211 p. M. 7.
The legal position of non-sovereign territories in such international organizations as the League of Nations, the International Labor Office, etc.

THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK: 1937. Edited by M. Epstein. New York: Macmillan, 1937, 1502 p. $5.50.
The latest edition of an indispensable reference book.

General: Economic and Social

ECONOMIC PLANNING AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER. By Lionel Robbins. New York: Macmillan, 1937, 327 p. $2.50.
This lucid critique, by the author of "The Great Depression," shows *inter alia* that international economic planning under the conditions of world-wide Communism would be impossible. Professor Robbins favors a return to laissez-faire and the gold standard.

PLANNED SOCIETY: YESTERDAY, TODAY, TOMORROW. Edited by Findlay MacKenzie. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1937, 989 p. $5.00.
A *mélange* of widely disparate essays by thirty-five "economists, sociologists, and statesmen," including Mussolini and Stalin.

SOCIALISM. By Ludwig Von Mises. New York: Macmillan, 1937, 528 p. $5.50.
This work by an Austrian economist was originally published in German in 1922 and revised in 1932. The author is an old-fashioned liberal and a rationalist. He believes that capitalism is the only feasible economic system and that "all efforts to realize Socialism lead only to the destruction of society." Facts which do not fit in with his logic either are ignored or denied.

AUTARCHIE, ÉCONOMIE COMPLEXE, POLITIQUE COMMERCIALE RATIONNELLE. By Charles D. Hérisson. Paris: Librairie Technique et Économique, 1937, 206 p. Fr. 35.
A contribution to the theory of international trade.

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LE CAPITALISME EN DÉROUTE: VERS UN ORDRE NOUVEAU. By Marcel Meneault. Paris: Dillen, 1937, 224 p. Fr. 25.

A French manufacturer realizes that capitalism needs overhauling, but has only a very verbose and confused plan to offer as a remedy.

ECONOMIC BALANCE OR WORLD WAR. By Scoville Hamlin. New York: Richard R. Smith, 1937, 302 p. $2.00.

Rather incoherent and unsystematic essays on numerous political and economic issues.

STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE. By Jacob Viner. New York: Harper, 1937, 650 p. $4.50.

A valuable addition to the literature of economic theory by a recognized authority, professor in the University of Chicago.

LES ENTENTES ÉCONOMIQUES INTERNATIONALES. By Laurence Ballande. Paris: Librairie Technique et Économique, 1937, 374 p. Fr. 30.

A compendium of useful facts and statistics, many of them gathered through the author's personal investigations.

THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT. New York: Oxford University Press, 1937, 371 p. $7.50.

A study group report of the Royal Institute of International Affairs analyzing the movement of long-term capital between countries since the war and the lessons that are to be drawn from this experience.

WORLD FINANCE, 1935–1937. By Paul Einzig. New York: Macmillan, 1937, 342 p. $3.00.

A sequel to the author's "World Finance 1914–1935," written in his usual lively style. Sanctions and the French crisis occupy the center of the stage.

INVENTAIRES. VOLUME II. L'ÉCONOMIQUE ET LE POLITIQUE. By R. Aron and others. Paris: Alcan, 1937, 243 p. Fr. 15.

Papers on current economic and political problems by eight French and Russian authorities.

GOLD DEPOSITS OF THE WORLD. By William Harvey Emmons. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937, 562 p. $6.00.

A thorough work accompanied by numerous maps and figures.

VOLK OHNE JUGEND. By Friedrich Burgdörfer. Heidelberg: Vowinckel, 1937, 536 p. M. 6.50.

The author is a division director in the Statistisches Reichsamt and has written several works on population questions. In this volume, originally published in 1932 and here brought down to 1935, he examines, with an elaborate array of statistics, population trends in Germany and in Europe as a whole. He warns against the drop in birth rates, for which he offers remedies.

INTRODUCTORY ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY. By Lester E. Klimm, Otis P. Starkey and Norman F. Hall. New York: Harcourt, 1937, 492 p. $4.00.

Though intended primarily as a textbook, this volume will prove an excellent reference book for students of international economic relations. There are numerous well-chosen maps, graphs and photographs.

The World War

L'ITALIA ALLA VIGILIA DELLA GUERRA. Volumes I–III. By Francesco Tommasini. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1934–1937, L. 82.

Tittoni was the most important of the Italian foreign ministers during the prewar decade. These three volumes constitute a detailed chronicle of his diplomatic activities

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and are especially valuable in that the author had access to unpublished documents in the Italian Foreign Office, a privilege accorded to few.

LES ORIGINES ORIENTALES DE LA GUERRE MONDIALE. By Jean Pichon. Paris: Lavauzelle, 1937, 240 p. Fr. 12.50.

A compact synthesis, based largely on secondary sources, of diplomatic manœuvres in the Near East during the decades prior to the World War.

SCHLIEFFEN: MANN UND IDEE. By Eugen Bircher and Walter Bode. Zurich: Nauck, 1937, 240 p. M. 6.

A German officer sketches the career and military philosophy (with the aid of numerous battle maps) of the man who conceived the plan followed by the German Army in the West at the outbreak of the World War.

DE UITBARSTING. By Nicolaas Japikse. Utrecht: Kemink, 1936, 125 p.

An historical monograph on the weeks from June 28, 1914, to the outbreak of the war, prepared for the Dutch Committee Investigating the Causes of the World War.

GUERRA DIPLOMATICA. By Luigi Aldovrandi Marescotti. Milan: Mondadori, 1936, 478 p. L. 22.

The author was *capo di gabinetto* to Sonnino from 1915 to 1919. These fragments from his diary, especially those relating to the Peace Conference, are important in view of the paucity of memoirs from the pens of responsible Italian statesmen.

I ROVESCI PIÙ CARATTERISTICI DEGLI ESERCITI NELLA GUERRA MONDIALE, 1914–1918. By Ambrogio Bollati. Turin: Einaudi, 1936, 703 p. L. 35.

An Italian general examines the strategy of defeat as exemplified in some two dozen cases on various fronts in the World War.

LE COMMANDEMENT EN CHEF DES ARMÉES FRANÇAISES DU 15 MAI 1917 À L'ARMISTICE. By General Laure. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1937, 132 p. Fr. 18.

Marshal Pétain feels that certain lessons learned during the last year of the war should not be overlooked and has therefore authorized the issuance of these chapters from a "Vie Militaire du Maréchal Pétain," which may some day be published.

POSTE 85: LES SECRETS DE LA T. S. F. PENDANT LA GUERRE. By Alain Boursin. Paris: Michel, 1937, 250 p. Fr. 16.50.

A romantic account of the hitherto unpublished secrets concerning French wireless operations during the War.

DEUTSCHES SCHICKSAL, 1914–1918: VORGESCHICHTE UND GESCHICHTE DES WELTKRIEGES. By Bernhard Poll. Berlin: Weidmann, 1937, 495 p. M. 8.50.

A history of Germany's part in the World War, based on official publications.

DIE KÄMPFE IN KAMERUN, 1914–1916. By Heinrich Mentzel. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1936, 102 p. M. 4.20.

A scholarly monograph on the unsuccessful German struggle to retain the Cameroon.

ÖSTERREICH UNGARNS LETZTER KRIEG, 1914–1918. Volume VI. Parts 1, 2 and 3. Edited by the Austrian Ministry of National Defense. Vienna: Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1935–1937, 150 Schillings.

This volume of the official Austrian history of the war covers the campaigns of 1917 on the Italian, Macedonian, Rumanian and Russian fronts. There are 36 large maps illustrating the operations in detail.

LA BATAILLE DE CAPORETTO. By Colonel Conquet. Paris: Plon, 1936, 320 p. Fr. 36.

A French officer who has long studied Italian military history reconstructs the Italian defeat of 1917. He concludes that there were serious shortcomings in the Italian higher command.

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UN CENTRE DE GUERRE SECRÈTE: MADRID 1914–1918. By P. Louis Rivière. Paris: Payot, 1936, 131 p.

A French judge lifts the curtain on the little known activities of the Germans in Spain during the World War.

The International Relations of the United States

IS AMERICA AFRAID? By Livingston Hartley. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1937, 462 p. $2.50.

A challenge to America to give up the fiction of isolation and join in with the other democratic nations (including Russia) to prevent the expansion of "international autocracy." The author was formerly an official in the State Department.

BULWARK OF THE REPUBLIC. By Burton J. Hendrick. Boston: Little, Brown, 1937, 465 p. $3.50.

A history of American constitutional development, sound but not pedantic.

THE UNITED STATES AMONG THE NATIONS. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937, 184 p. $1.50.

Lectures delivered at the University of California by seven experts.

GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. By Claudius O. Johnson. New York: Crowell, 1937, 735 p. $4.00.

This revised edition of a well-constructed treatise on the anatomy and physiology of American government, federal and local, takes into account the many changes wrought by the New Deal.

AMERIKAS SCHICKSALSSTUNDE: DIE VEREINIGTEN STAATEN ZWISCHEN DEMOKRATIE UND DIKTATUR. By Colin Ross. Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1936, 314 p. M. 4.85.

How the United States appears to a Nazi. He brings out all the seamy sides of American life.

THE INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZED LABOR ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. By Margaret Hardy. Liège: Vaillant-Carmanne, 1936, 270 p.

Much useful information but not all of it well digested.

THE SETTLEMENT OF CANADIAN-AMERICAN DISPUTES. By P. E. Corbett. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937, 134 p. $2.50.

How the United States and Canada have since 1798 settled their differences by arbitration.

TWENTY YEARS AS MILITARY ATTACHÉ. By T. Bentley Mott. New York: Oxford University Press, 1937, 342 p. $2.50.

Most of Colonel Mott's career has been devoted to smoothing the path of political and military missions in various parts of the world. He served on Mr. Root's staff during the latter's visit to Russia in 1917 and on General Pershing's staff during the war. He thus has many intimate things to say about important personages and events.

FROM BRYAN TO STALIN. By William Z. Foster. New York: International Publishers, 1937, 352 p. $3.00.

The autobiography of an American Communist leader, thrice candidate for the Presidency, whose life has been largely spent in abortive attempts to organize American labor under radical auspices.

Western Europe

LABOUR CONDITIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1820 TO 1935. By Jürgen Kuczynski. New York: International Publishers, 1937, 118 p. $1.50.

An exiled German economist finds real wages an insufficient basis for measuring

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labor conditions. Unemployment and part-time employment figures, together with health and accident statistics, should also be considered. This method he applies to conditions in England, France and Germany during the last century.

LA GUERRE ET LES HOMMES. By General Debeney. Paris: Plon, 1937, 382 p. Fr. 20.

Reflections by a former Chief of the French General Staff on the military position of western Europe. He believes that with the great development of mechanized warfare the aggressor has the advantage. In the political sphere he favors an alliance system to keep Germany within bounds.

RAYMOND POINCARÉ: L'HOMME, LE PARLEMENTAIRE, L'AVOCAT. By Fernand Payen. Paris: Grasset, 1936, 444 p. Fr. 25.

A personal friend of Poincaré chronicles his career up to the outbreak of the war. This is a very human story, treating the statesman's private and cultural life as well as his political activities. Included are some of his hitherto unpublished letters and memoranda.

PAUL CAMBON: AMBASSADEUR DE FRANCE (1843–1924). By a Diplomat. Paris: Plon, 1937, 322 p. Fr. 40.

A sympathetic biography of a great French diplomat, one of the architects of the *Entente Cordiale* with Britain, where he served as Ambassador from 1898 to 1920.

LA C. G. T. CE QU'ELLE EST, CE QU'ELLE VEUT. By Léon Jouhaux. Paris: Gallimard, 1937, 187 p. Fr. 10.

The author is Secretary General of the *Confédération Générale du Travail* and as such is the leader of the organized labor movement in France. This little book, written with the collaboration of M. Harmel and J. Duret, after briefly reviewing the history of the C. G. T., proceeds to criticize the evils of modern capitalist economy. To alleviate these evils it offers a "plan," demanding among other things the increase of purchasing power among the masses through public works and the nationalization of the key industries and of credit facilities. M. Jouhaux stresses the necessity of destroying the financial oligarchy without at the same time alienating the middle classes.

JOUHAUX ET LA CONFÉDÉRATION GÉNÉRALE DU TRAVAIL. By Raymond Millet. Paris: Denoël et Steele, 1937, 136 p. Fr. 7.50.

The development of the C. G. T., the career of its General Secretary and proposals for future labor policy in France.

DORIOT ET SES COMPAGNONS. By Raymond Millet. Paris: Plon, 1937, 105 p. Fr. 3.

A brief and fairly objective history of the man and his movement.

LA BELGIQUE NEUTRE? By Henri-A. Rolin. Brussels: Larcier, 1937, 125 p. Fr. 10.

A law professor and member of the Belgian Senate examines Belgium's international position and concludes there should be no return to prewar neutrality because that would favor Germany and paralyze collective security.

LA CRISE DU SYSTÈME BANCAIRE BELGE ET SA RÉORGANISATION RÉCENTE. By Michel Charvet. Paris: Sirey, 1936, 226 p. Fr. 30.

A model of clarity and of penetrating analysis into a complicated subject.

THE THIRD REICH. By Henri Lichtenberger. New York: Greystone Press, 1937, 392 p. $3.00.

The original French edition of this book has already been favorably commented on in these pages. In this American version there are additional sections by the author, as well as notes, appendices and a bibliography supplied by the editor and translator, Koppel S. Pinson. Professor Lichtenberger, of the University of Paris, has succeeded better than almost anyone else in explaining Nazi Germany in a way that inspires confidence in the author's credibility and impartiality. After sketching the rise and

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consolidation of Nazi power, he examines its foreign, social, racial, religious and economic policies.

THE SPIRIT AND STRUCTURE OF GERMAN FASCISM. By Robert A. Brady. New York: Viking, 1937, 420 p. $3.00.

This is the most up-to-date vivisection of Nazism. The author, Associate Professor of Economics in the University of California and a convinced Marxist, explains the phenomenon of Hitler primarily as an intensification of German capitalism to the monopoly point. This doctrine is not new and its constant reiteration here may annoy many readers. Nevertheless, Professor Brady's thorough command of the subject he treats will inspire respect from the most hardened of old-fashioned liberals. His chapters on cultural and other non-economic matters are recommended.

EUROPA UND DIE DEUTSCHE FRAGE. By Friedrich Wilhelm Foerster. Lucerne: Vita Nova Verlag, 1937, 517 p. Fr. 12.

A plea by the seasoned (and of course now exiled) German pacifist for a South German federation separated from Prussia and under Austrian leadership. The author, formerly Professor in the Universities of Berlin and Munich, believes that Germany was guilty of the war, that the Versailles Treaty did not go far enough, and that in the Weimar Republic, as in the Third Reich, Prussianism formed the political basis of the state.

GERMANY: THE LAST FOUR YEARS. By "Germanicus." Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1937, 116 p. $1.75.

These articles, contributed by several anonymous German economists and originally published in *The Banker* of London, seek to penetrate to the reality of present German economic and financial conditions.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF GERMANY UNDER NATIONAL SOCIALISM. By Vaso Trivanovitch. New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1937, 141 p. $3.50.

The data and conclusions contained in this monograph derive from the author's personal study of conditions in Germany. He found that unemployment had been almost entirely eliminated, that labor organizations had been destroyed, that industry had lost most of its freedom of action, that economic self-sufficiency is proving impossible, that the armament program has cost 22 billion marks and that the public debt is around 38 billions. This latter figure, however, assumes that there is no secret debt.

SCHACHT. By Franz Reuter. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1937, 234 p. M. 4.80.

A biography by the present editor of the *Deutsche Volkswirt* on the occasion of Schacht's sixtieth birthday. It contains no disclosures. This book was originally published in 1933. The new edition has been altered to meet the demands of the present régime.

PROBLEME DES DEUTSCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSLEBENS: ERSTREBTES UND ERREICHTES. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1937, 860 p. M. 13.

This massive tome, dedicated to Schacht on his sixtieth birthday, contains contributions by some two dozen economists and public officials in Germany.

SCHACHT IN SEINEN ÄUSSERUNGEN. Edited by the Volkswirtschaftliche und Statistische Abteilung der Reichsbank. Berlin: Druckerei der Reichsbank, 1937, 174 p.

Short extracts from Schacht's speeches and writings, topically arranged.

LES SYNDICATS OUVRIERS ALLEMANDS APRÈS LA GUERRE. By Robert Goetz-Girey. Paris: Domat-Montchrétien, 1936, 314 p. Fr. 40.

A clear, orderly exposition of the postwar history of the German organized labor movement, prepared by a French scholar after two years' study in Germany

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CHRIST VERSUS HITLER. By William Kraft. New York: Lutheran Press, 1937, 152 p. $1.50.

A Lutheran pastor defends Nazi racial policy and denies that Hitler is an enemy of Christianity.

LA GERMANIA RELIGIOSA NEL III° REICH. By Mario Bendiscioli. Brescia: Morcelliana, 1936, 310 p. L. 10.

A history of the church-state conflict in Nazi Germany. The author does not regard the resurgence of paganism as a blessing.

ADOLF HITLER: SCHÜLER DER "WEISEN VON ZION." By Alexander Stein. Karlsbad: "Graphia," 1936, 118 p. 80 cents.

A German Socialist exile shows the influence of the apocryphal "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" on Hitler and his collaborators.

DER PARTEITAG DER EHRE. VOM 8 BIS 14 SEPTEMBER 1936. Munich: Eher, 1936, 309 p.

The official record of the Nazi Congress, verbatim reports of the more important speeches, and numerous photographs showing with what consummate skill the Nazis organize these mass demonstrations of loyalty to the régime.

AUSLANDDEUTSCHE ERNEUERUNG. By Hans R. Wiese. Berlin: Volk und Reich, 1936, 88 p. M. 3.

Germany must preserve the ties with her children abroad, but this does not need to involve irredentism if national minorities are protected by bilateral treaties.

DENMARK: KINGDOM OF REASON. By Agnes Rothery. New York: Viking, 1937, 275 p. $3.00.

A delightfully informative book about one of Europe's most democratic and civilized peoples.

DAS DÄNISCHE SCHICKSAL. ZWISCHEN LÖWEN UND HERZEN. By Louis von Kohl. Berlin: Volk und Reich, 1936, 125 p. M. 3.50.

A Dane of German family dwells on the close Teutonic ties between the two countries.

DOES NORWEGIAN LABOR SEEK THE MIDDLE WAY? By Finn Moe. New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1937, 40 p. 25 cents.

A candid, critical study by a Norwegian labor editor.

THE GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND. By William E. Rappard. New York: Van Nostrand, 1936, 164 p. $1.25.

An excellent description and interpretation of the Swiss federal political system by the Rector of the University of Geneva.

L'ITALIA. Edited by Assunto Mori. Milan: Vallardi, 1936, 565 p. L. 125.

With the collaboration of several of Italy's outstanding geographers, Professor Mori of the University of Rome has compiled a scientific description of the Italian land and people, particularly valuable to those who wish to go to the root of Italy's economic and social problems.

MUSSOLINI ET SON PEUPLE. By René Benjamin. Paris: Plon, 1937, 260 p. Fr. 18.

A somewhat ecstatic view of Fascist Italy and its Duce.

LA DIFESA NAZIONALE. By Benito Mussolini. Rome: Pinciana, 1937, 218 p. L. 7.

Selected speeches and articles on Italy's preparedness for war.

POLITICA MARINARA E IMPERO FASCISTA. By Edoardo Squadrilli. Rome: Lega Navale, 1937, 208 p. L. 12.

An exaltation of Italy's maritime power and destiny.

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IL MEDITERRANEO E LA CIVILTÀ MONDIALE. By Guido Vannutelli. Bologna: Cappelli, 1936, 254 p. L. 15.

An Italian admiral's summary of Mediterranean history.

GLI EBREI IN ITALIA. By Paolo Orano. Rome: Pinciana, 1937, 221 p. L. 12.

A prominent Fascist journalist discusses the place of Jews in contemporary Italy. His demand, stated in his concluding chapter, that the 40,000 Italian Jews choose between Fascism and international Zionism led the representatives of Italian Jewry in June 1937 to declare unreservedly against Zionism.

THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE IN ITALIAN THOUGHT FROM CAVOUR TO MUSSOLINI. By S. William Halperin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937, 115 p. $2.00.

A compact, well-informed study.

THE PAPACY IN POLITICS TO-DAY: VATICAN PLOTS IN SPAIN AND OTHER COUNTRIES. By Joseph McCabe. London: Watts, 1937, 196 p. 7/6.

A bitter indictment of the political and social policies of the Vatican, by a former Franciscan monk, author of numerous anti-Catholic works.

SPAIN: A TRAGIC JOURNEY. By F. Theo Rogers. New York: Macaulay, 1937, 241 p. $2.50.

An American journalist visits both sides in Spain and confirms his preconceived notion that it is Franco who is fighting for civilization and justice.

SINGLE TO SPAIN. By Keith Scott Watson. New York: Dutton, 1937, 264 p. $2.00

One of the best of the journalistic accounts from the Loyalist side during the early months of the Civil War.

AFTER THE REVOLUTION: ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION IN SPAIN TODAY. By D. A. de Santillan. New York: Greenberg, 1937, 127 p. $1.25.

An anarchist leader's blueprint of Spain's economic reconstruction.

LA SPAGNA RISORGE. By Nello Enriquez. Milan: "La Prora," 1937, 302 p. L. 10.

Unrestrained enthusiasm for Franco and his cause.

ISPANIYA V REVOLIUTSII. By E. Varga. Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1937, 119 p. 15 cents.

An analysis of the social forces engaged in the Spanish civil war, by a leading Soviet economist and former minister in the Hungarian Soviet Government.

PORTUGAL. By Gonzague de Reynold. Paris: Spes, 1936, 348 p. Fr. 18.

The country, the people, their history and culture, and the "new state" of Salazar, about whom the author is quite enthusiastic.

A VERDADE SOBRE PORTUGAL. By Alfredo Thomé. Rio de Janeiro: Edicões "Luzitana," 1936.

A Portuguese exile paints a very unflattering picture of the Salazar dictatorship.

Eastern Europe

THE LETTERS OF LENIN. Edited by Elizabeth Hill and Doris Mudie. New York: Harcourt, 1937, 499 p. $4.00.

The most representative letters of Lenin, 340 in all, from 1895 to his death.

THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN. New York: International Publishers, 1937, lvi, 671 p. $1.75.

An official statement, detailed and supported by many statistics, on the fulfillment of the second *Piatiletka* in 1937.

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FROM LENIN TO STALIN. By Victor Serge. New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1937, 112 p. 50 cents.

A Trotskyite interpretation of two decades of Russian history.

THE STALIN SCHOOL OF FALSIFICATION. By Leon Trotsky. New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1937, 326 p. $2.50.

A much-documented refutation of the falsehoods and distortions which Trotsky holds have been circulated by the Stalin dictatorship about his revolutionary record.

RUSSIA: TRIONFO DEL FASCISMO. By Renzo Bertoni. Milan: "La Prora," 1937, 240 p. L. 9.

After a year in Soviet Russia a young Italian concludes that only Fascism can rescue it from the mess the Communists have got it into.

PODGOTOVKA VELIKOY PROLETARSKOY REVOLIUTSII. Edited by M. Gorky and others. Moscow: Izd. "Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny," 1937, 578 p. $2.00.

This is the first volume of a projected large-scale history of the Russian Civil War and covers the period from July 1914 to October 1917.

1918 GOD NA RODINE LENINA. Kuybyshevsk: Kuybyshevskoye izd-vo., 1936, 344 p. 85 cents.

Materials for the study of the civil war and foreign intervention in the Simbirsk region.

LITVINOV. By N. Kornev. Moscow: "Molodaya gvardiya," 1937, 111 p. 35 cents.

A popular account of the career of the Soviet foreign minister.

BANKS, CREDIT, AND MONEY IN SOVIET RUSSIA. By Arthur Z. Arnold. New York: Columbia University Press, 1937, 559 p. $4.00.

Soviet experiments in banking and currency have aroused much curiosity in capitalist countries. This thorough study by a professor in the College of the City of New York explains Soviet experience in these fields.

PORTRAIT DE LA FINLANDE. By Jean-Louis Perret. Paris: Plon, 1937, 236 p. Fr. 16.50.

An interpretation of Finnish life today, with special attention to social and political tendencies.

PORTRAIT DE LA LETTONIE. By René Puaux. Paris: Plon, 1937, 240 p. Fr. 16.50.

Various aspects of Latvian life entertainingly described.

THE POLAND OF PILSUDSKI. By Robert Machray. New York: Dutton, 1937, 508 p. $3.75.

A revised, enlarged edition of a reliable history of Poland since the beginning of the World War.

POLISH COUNTRYSIDES. By Louise A. Boyd. New York: American Geographical Society, 1937, 235 p. $4.00.

There is no better way to get the feel of Polish rural life and its problems than to examine this book with its nearly 500 excellent photographs.

DAS WUNDER AN DER WEICHSEL: POLENS SCHWERSTE STUNDE. By Agricola. Oldenburg: Stalling, 1937, 159 p. M. 2.80.

An account of the campaign that turned back the Russian invasion of Poland.

HITLER'S DRIVE TO THE EAST. By F. Elwyn Jones. New York: Dutton, 1937, 130 p. $1.00.

A sensational exposé of the Nazi *Drang nach Osten*. The author is convinced that this new attempt to create a German *Mittel-Europa* is heading the world towards another holocaust.

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NATIONAL MINORITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. By Joseph Chmelař. Prague: Orbis, 1937, 105 p. 1/6.

Brief factual summaries of present conditions in some dozen countries.

JE ČESKOSLOVENSKO VÝPADNÍ BRANOU BOLŠEVISMU? By Jaroslav Papoušek. Prague: Svaz národního osvobození, 1936, 48 p. Kč. 3.

A defense against the accusation that Czechoslovakia is an outpost of Bolshevism, by a well-known Czech historian.

SUDETENDEUTSCHTUM: EIN LAND, EIN VOLK UND SEINE ARBEIT. Vienna: Kaiser Verlag, 1936, 254 p. 60 Schillings.

Text and photographs exalting the German inhabitants of Czechoslovakia and their culture.

TŘI PŘEDNAŠKY O PRESIDENTU DRU EDVARDU BENEŠOVI. By R. N. Foustka, Josef Linhart, Alois Hajn. Prague: Svaz národního osvobození, 1936, 159 p. Kč. 9.

Three lectures on Beneš: as student, as revolutionary, and as president.

DIE SOZIALÖKONIMISCHE STRUKTUR DER JUGOSLAWISCHEN LANDWIRTSCHAFT. By Otto von Frangeš. Berlin: Weidmann, 1937, 288 p. M. 15.

A praiseworthy piece of scholarship. The author has obviously gone through a tremendous amount of material, particularly the little-known sources in Serbian and Croatian.

IZ MOJIH POLITIČKIH USPOMENA. SUTON AUSTRO-UGARSKE I REJEČKA REZOLUCIJA. By A. Trumbić. Zagreb: The Author, 1936, 112 p.

Memoirs on the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, by the Croatian leader who was one of the Jugoslav delegates at the Paris Peace Conference.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE MAGIC OF MONARCHY. By Kingsley Martin. New York: Knopf, 1937, 125 p. $1.25.

Of the numerous books inspired by the recent crisis in Britain, this one by the Editor of the *New Statesman and Nation* is the best. It is brief, it is candid without being sensational, and it is brilliantly written. It places the English monarchy in its historical perspective over the last century and a half, demonstrating that its present quasi-divine position is a creation of recent decades. Though this development is shown to have come about in response to certain natural psychological and constitutional demands, it has now gone too far, Mr. Martin believes. His advice to the British people is to be more sensible about their monarchy.

KING EDWARD VIII; AN INTIMATE BIOGRAPHY. By Hector Bolitho. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1937, 327 p. $3.00.

A frank account of the life of the abdicated King, stressing those phases which help explain his great decision.

CORONATION COMMENTARY. By Geoffrey Dennis. New York: Dodd, 1937, 245 p. $2.00.

An honest and critical survey of the last hundred years of Britain's monarchy, with particular attention to Edward VIII.

THE CONDITION OF BRITAIN. By G. D. H. and M. I. Cole. London: Gollancz, 1937, 471 p. 7/6.

These two prolific critics of the capitalist system turn their searchlight on the state of England's working class: its health, food, housing, educational facilities, unemployment, etc.

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SURVEY OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS. Volume I. PROBLEMS OF NATIONALITY, 1918–1936. By W. K. Hancock. New York: Oxford University Press, 1937, 673 p. $8.50.

An investigation into the ideas and psychological states involved in the transition from the centralized British Empire to a coöperative association of free states. Particular attention is given to the Irish and Indian problems.

CHATHAM HOUSE. By Stephen King-Hall. New York: Oxford University Press, 1937, 144 p. $2.00.

"A brief account of the origins, purposes, and methods of the Royal Institute of International Affairs."

THE ENGLISH COÖPERATIVES. By Sydney R. Elliott. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937, 212 p. $3.00.

How the world's greatest consumer coöperative system was created and now operates for the benefit of 7,500,000 members.

LA PRÉFÉRENCE IMPÉRIALE ET LE COMMERCE DES PAYS BRITANNIQUES DEPUIS LA CRISE. By Jacques Villeneuve. Paris: Librairie Technique et Économique, 1937, 232 p. Fr. 30.

A study based on a careful examination of the statistics.

POLITICS FROM INSIDE. By Sir Austen Chamberlain. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937, 675 p. $5.00.

Austen Chamberlain was one of the outstanding statesmen of the postwar era. The present book, consisting of letters written by him to his parents between 1906 and 1914, is important for the light it sheds on his early political career.

THE LIFE OF LORD CARSON. Volume III. By Ian Colvin. New York: Macmillan, 1937, 463 p. $5.00.

This concluding volume of the Ulster leader's biography covers the period from 1914 to his death in 1935. Most of it concerns his rôle in the British War Government.

T. E. LAWRENCE, BY HIS FRIENDS. Edited by A. W. Lawrence. Garden City: Doubleday, 1937, 538 p. $4.00.

A composite biography contributed by some eighty friends and associates of the man who helped organize the Arab victory during the World War.

IRELAND AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE, 1937. By Henry Harrison. London: Hale, 1937, 354 p. 10/6.

A plea for Anglo-Irish collaboration by one whose participation in the Irish Nationalist movement dates back to Parnell. The causes of the present conflict between the two nations — historical, constitutional, economic — are discussed. Mr. Harrison believes that these differences should be settled in view of the menace of another European war.

GREY STEEL. J. C. SMUTS: A STUDY IN ARROGANCE. By H. C. Armstrong. London: Barker, 1937, 406 p. 9/.

This candid, and in places unflattering, picture of General Smuts is the result of much patient research. The author makes plain that it was not actuated by any mean spirit of detraction, for he readily admits that his subject is a great man, one of the four whose wartime reputations have not been destroyed by later revelations.

THE INDIAN FEDERATION. By Sir Shafa'at Ahmad Khan. New York: Macmillan, 1937, 450 p. $5.50.

The author was a Moslem delegate to the India Round Table Conferences. He discusses critically the origins and the contents of the Government of India Act of 1935.

NEW CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. By S. K. Lahiri and B. N. Banerjea. Calcutta: The Politics Club, 1936, 398 p. 9/.

An analysis of the new constitution from the Indian point of view.

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INDIAN STATES IN THE FEDERATION. By N. D. Varadachariar. New York: Oxford University Press, 1937, 156 p. $2.00.
Lectures by an Indian lawyer on the rôle of the native states under the new constitution.

INDIA AND BRITAIN: A MORAL CHALLENGE. By C. F. Andrews. London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1937, 190 p. 2/6.
A Christian outlook on the imperial problem, by one of Gandhi's associates.

THE LEGACY OF INDIA. Edited by G. T. Garratt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1937, 429 p. $4.00.
What India has contributed towards making this a better world to live in.

RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES IN NEW ZEALAND. By W. B. Sutch. Published for the New Zealand Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations. Wellington: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1936, 164 p. 7/6.
The manner in which New Zealand weathered the depression.

The Near East

IL REGIME DEGLI STRETTI. By Gaspare Ambrosini. Rome: Istituto Nazionale Fascista di Cultura, 1936, 76 p. L. 5.
An historical précis covering the period 1774–1937.

DIE TÜRKISCHE AGRAR- UND INDUSTRIEPOLITIK NACH DEM KRIEGE. By Ali Ekber Mahoutdji. Dresden: Dittert, 1937, 150 p. M. 3.
A detailed account of the two Turkish Five-Year Plans in their various aspects, agricultural, industrial and legislative. The author discusses the methods for financing the Plans, their present state of execution, and the program for the future.

LA RÉVOLTE DRUZE ET L'INSURRECTION DE DAMAS, 1925–1926. By General Andréa. Paris: Payot, 1937, 243 p. Fr. 25.
A detailed account expressing the point of view of the French Army.

PEUT-ON FERMER LE CANAL DE SUEZ? By Raymond Guibal. Paris: Pedone, 1937, 180 p. Fr. 30.
After an historico-legal examination of the question, M. Guibal decides that the League does not have the right to close the canal in violation of the Treaty of Constantinople of October 29, 1888.

PALESTINE AT THE CROSSROADS. By Ernest Main. London: Allen and Unwin, 1937, 309 p. 7/6.
A keen analysis of the Palestine problem, fully appreciative of the racial, economic and cultural factors. The author favors a policy of raising the living standards of the Arab masses in order to bring their social status more in harmony with the great economic changes wrought by Jewish colonialization.

YÉMEN ET SAOUDIA: L'ARABIE ACTUELLE. By General Edouard Brémond. Paris: Lavauzelle, 1937, 144 p. Fr. 10.
An historical summary of the relations between the two countries by the former head of the French Military Mission in Arabia.

L'ÉVOLUTION ÉCONOMIQUE DE L'IRAN ET SES PROBLÈMES. By Hassan Sotoudeh. Paris: Librairie Technique et Économique, 1936, 255 p. Fr. 30.
A comprehensive work covering Iran's geography, natural resources, and present economic and financial conditions.

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Africa

AFRICA AND CHRISTIANITY. By Diedrich Westermann. New York: Oxford University Press, 1937, 221 p. $2.25.

An exposition of the impact of Christianity on native beliefs and institutions, by the Director of the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures.

LA CONQUISTA DELL'IMPERO. By Corrado Zoli. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1937, 442 p. L. 30.

This sequel to the former Governor of Eritrea's "Cronache Etiopiche" and "Etiopia d'Oggi" is a carefully integrated chronology of the war and of the subsequent "police" operations up to April 1937. Most of the chapters concern the military operations, are illustrated by topographic maps, and clearly show the primary rôle of aviation. However, since most foreign observers emphasize the importance of gas in demoralizing the Ethiopian forces, it might have been wise for the author either to refute these charges or admit their truth. The concluding chapters explain the organization of the new Italian Empire in East Africa. This is the best and most comprehensive book on the Ethiopian adventure to appear in Italy.

THE FIRST OF THE LEAGUE WARS: ITS LESSONS AND OMENS. By J. F. C. Fuller. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1936, 319 p. 10/6.

General Fuller observed the war in northern Abyssinia from the Italian side. His critique of the military operations is useful, but his remarks on political questions are of questionable value in view of his frankly Fascist predilections.

CON L'ESERCITO ITALIANO IN AFRICA ORIENTALE. Milan: Mondadori, 1936–37, 2 v. L. 65.

A profusely illustrated account of the Ethiopian war by various Italian observers.

DIE EROBERUNG ABESSINIENS, 1935–1936. By Rudolf Ritter and Edler von Xylander. Berlin: Mittler, 1937, 87 p. M. 3.50.

An expert German study of the Ethiopian campaign. There are descriptions of the advance of the Italian army, the campaign itself and finally the lessons of the war touching strategical theory.

DER UNTERGANG ABESSINIENS. By Friedrich Immanuel. Berlin: Verlag "Offene Worte," 1936, 98 p. M. 2.40.

The war — its antecedents, military operations and political consequences — summarized by a retired German colonel, who admits the wide use of gas by the Italians.

IN SOMALIA SUL FRONTE MERIDIONALE. By General Luigi Frusci. Bologna: Cappelli, 1936, 162 p. L. 25.

The man who commanded the native corps under Marshal Graziani gives a military man's chronology of the campaign in southern Ethiopia. Numerous tables, charts and illustrations.

LA PELORITANA E LA GUERRA IN SOMALIA. By Salvatore Giovenco. Palermo: Priulla, 1936, 248 p. L. 14.

An account of the campaign, by a young officer.

IL CROLLO DELL'IMPERO DEI NEGUS. By Mario Appelius. Milan: Mondadori, 1937, 348 p. L. 16.

A popular account of the Ethiopian War as seen by an Italian journalist.

LE TERRE DEL LAGO TSANA. By Raffaele di Lauro. Rome: Società Italiana Arti Grafiche, 1937, 101 p. L. 10.

An illustrated work by the former Italian consul at Gondar, who is optimistic about the economic possibilities of northwest Ethiopia.

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NEL SUD DELL'IMPERO. By B. V. Vecchi. Milan: Bocca, 1937, 216 p. L. 10.

Pertinent geographic and economic information about the least-known part of Ethiopia by an Italian official who has traveled extensively in that region.

LA SOMALIA ITALIANA. By Saverio Gallucci. Milan: Scuola Tipografica Istituto Pavoniano Artigianelli, 1936, 181 p. L. 6.

A rapid survey of the colony's resources and potentialities.

LA GOLD COAST. By Jacques de Carbon Ferrière. Paris: Librarie Technique et Économique, 1937, 207 p.

A well-organized study of the colony's political and financial administration.

DIE EINFUHR DES DEUTSCHEN REICHES AUS DEN TROPEN, 1897–1932. By Wilhelm Bast. Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1936, 120 p. M. 6.

A statistical study showing the growing rôle of Africa as a source of raw materials and demonstrating the need Germany has for her former colonies. Each region is considered by itself with the aid of many graphs and tables.

DIE ROHSTOFFGEBIETE DES TROPISCHEN AFRIKA. By Leo Waibel. Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1937, 424 p. M. 18.

A thorough inventory of the raw material resources of tropical Africa by a Professor of Geography in the University of Bonn. The moral is, of course, that France and Britain own too much of Africa and Germany not enough. There are a number of good maps and a bibliography.

The Far East

THE FAR EAST COMES NEARER. By Hessell Tiltman. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1937, 318 p. $3.00.

An unbiased account of the course of events in East Asia since Japan's conquest of Manchuria in 1931, providing an excellent background for an understanding of the present armed clash between China and Japan. The author is an Englishman, author of a score of books on international and Far Eastern questions.

CRISIS IN THE PACIFIC. For the International Peace Research Committee of Melbourne. Melbourne: Ruskin Press, 1937, 87 p. 2/.

The conflict in Anglo-Japanese-American relations seen through Australian eyes.

SIAN: A COUP D'ÉTAT. By Mayling Soong Chiang and Chiang Kai-shek. Shanghai: China Publishing Company, 1937, 119 p.

Madame Chiang Kai-shek's graphic account of her husband's captivity, together with extracts from the latter's diary during those weeks.

HEROIC CHINA. By P. Miff. New York: Workers Library Publishers, 1937, 96 p. 15 cents.

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
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